Building around US unreliability

The flurry of new defense agreements signed by Japan suggests Tokyo is attempting to reshape its own security posture. This shift would come in response to China’s geopolitical advances, compounded by the growing unreliability of the US and the associated risks of strategic disengagement.

New security alignments among US allies and partners, which affect various strategic arenas, are increasingly viewed as a reaction to the purported decline of US global leadership during US President Donald Trump’s administration.

The “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement,” signed last month by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, is seen in a similar light: as an effort by key US allies in the greater Middle East to establish self defense mechanisms against Iran (and Israel) outside the traditional US security umbrella.

However, it remains unlikely that Japan is truly hedging against a future post-US world order dominated by China, even if Tokyo is undoubtedly developing and expanding a complex, multilayered network with allied and like-minded countries.

Japan has deployed fighter aircraft to India for the first time to participate in joint exercises running until Monday next week.

The deployment follows a visit to New Delhi last month by Japanese Minister of Defense Shinjiro Koizumi, who agreed with Indian Minister of Defence Rajnath Singh to deepen cooperation through joint drills amid growing security concerns in the Indo-Pacific region.

Similarly, beginning on Tuesday, Japan’s Air Self-Defense Forces is hosting a joint exercise with French forces on Japanese territory. In April, the two countries signed a defense roadmap providing for more joint military training and maneuvers to support regional stability.

In the past few months, Tokyo reinforced bilateral security cooperation with Australia, the Philippines, New Zealand, South Korea and Canada.

All countries that have enhanced military ties with Japan have conducted maritime transits through the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea — where the Philippines is locked in territorial disputes with China — transits that consistently draw indignant reactions from Beijing. These nations are reinforcing military cooperation among themselves, rather than just with Tokyo.

Riho Aizawa, a Japanese Ministry of Defense researcher, does not view Tokyo’s efforts to boost regional defense ties with partners as a hedge against dwindling US engagement. She does not see these initiatives as a response to the Trump administration’s demands for increased military spending.

Rather, in her personal capacity, she told me that “Japan’s growing defense cooperation with these like-minded countries is better understood as part of a longstanding effort to respond to an increasingly severe security environment by maintaining the alliance with America as the cornerstone of its security policy.”

Indeed, Japan’s forces, even in combination with those of its regional partners, might not have the weight to stand against major threats from China without US support.

For instance, Starlink’s use would be vital for Tokyo. Much like its role in supporting Ukraine against Russia’s invasion, the satellite Internet service could keep Japanese and allied forces connected even if ground infrastructure were destroyed by Chinese attacks.

No US Indo-Pacific ally has an operational, fully deployed domestic equivalent to Starlink, although Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are building sovereign low Earth orbit satellite networks for the future.

Europe finds itself in a remarkably similar position, despite its drive to increase defense autonomy from Washington. NATO’s European members would be unable to support Ukraine without US intelligence, satellite and geospatial support.

Japan should build a united front of Indo-Pacific middle powers rather than relying solely on bilateral or trilateral interactions. This should include Taiwan, even though all these actors usually refrain from open cooperation with it.

Even this appears daunting. Just as there are doubts regarding whether NATO’s Article Five on collective defense would trigger an immediate response from member countries — a scenario that many suspect Russian President Vladimir Putin is probing at — it is equally uncertain that solidarity would materialize between Japan and its partners in the event of a crisis with China.

It seems unlikely that India would rush to help Japan if it finds itself embroiled in a conflict with Beijing over Taiwan or the China seas.

At the same time, it is unlikely that Tokyo would swoop to the rescue of India during a possible border conflict between New Delhi and the Chinese.

In the same way, the Mecca deal is already showing its limitations: Despite voicing support, Turkey and Pakistan have so far abstained from direct military intervention against Yemen’s pro-Iran Houthi rebels following the group’s attacks on Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile, Riyadh is set to receive a US$5.75 billion US arms package, including tank engines and Joint Direct Attack Munitions-Extended Range kits.

Any new security framework developed by Japan, or another US ally, can only complement, rather than replace, the alliance with Washington.

Emanuele Scimia is a journalist and analyst covering foreign affairs and defense issues.