Interpretive autonomy required

Over the past few weeks, domestic and international headlines have been dominated by reports of what was described as a “joint naval drill” between China and Indonesia in the waters east of Taiwan, following an announcement by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense on Tuesday last week.

The two countries conducted the activity the following day, involving the Chinese naval vessel Honghe and the Indonesian Navy frigate KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai (332).

Beijing said that the exercise was intended to enhance the two navies’ operational capabilities, deepen practical cooperation and contribute to regional peace and stability.

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the exercise, saying that China’s “reckless and irresponsible behavior” in repeatedly disregarding international norms and responsibilities continues to escalate regional tensions. The nation also sought clarification from the Indonesian government.

Indonesian officials — including the Indonesian Navy Information Service head and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ spokesperson — said that the activity was not a combat-oriented joint exercise, but rather a passing exercise. Such exercises are routine naval practices conducted when warships traverse a region, serving as a naval diplomacy, rather than a war-fighting drill.

The a passing exercise with China took place while KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai was returning home after participating in the joint exercise Orel-Garuda with Russia.

Technically, a passing exercise is a limited, short-duration exercise with a focus on non-warfighting exercises — in this case including communications drills and maritime replenishment — designed to build communication, trust, good relations and naval brotherhood.

A joint military exercise is normally more structured and deliberately planned, involving multiple phases and more complex scenarios such as simulated combat, amphibious operations or live-fire drills. Indonesia has also conducted similar a passing exercise activities with Japan and the US 7th Fleet, underscoring the routine, non-exclusive nature of these engagements.

Such naval interactions are consistent with Jakarta’s long-standing “free and active” foreign policy and its broader maritime diplomacy, which seeks to open cooperative avenues with a wide range of partners.

However, the concern here is not the technical content of the exercise, but its location. The waters east of Taiwan are geopolitically sensitive, sitting at the heart of cross-strait tensions.

Given this complexity, the combination of foreign participation and a flashpoint location inevitably carries geopolitical and strategic weight, even if it has no direct military impact on Taiwan. Indonesia’s naval presence in these waters, however routine, invites interpretations that transcend its operational intent.

What is particularly revealing is how the narrative around this a passing exercise has evolved, generating divergent readings across the international community. China described the activity as a naval navigation exercise; Taiwan characterized it an attempt to normalize Beijing’s presence in the waters to create a false international impression that China holds jurisdiction over waters east of Taiwan; and Indonesia perceived it as a routine passing exercise in service of naval diplomacy.

Modern naval diplomacy is no longer simply about what naval forces physically do at sea. It is also about how those activities are framed, communicated and interpreted. Although Indonesia did not specifically intend to conduct an exercise only with China, the narrative that emerged around the low-intensity naval exercise could carry diplomatic risks and potentially affect Indonesia’s reputation.

This episode highlights a critical lesson: Indonesia must prioritize strategic communication before others define its actions and shape narratives that could misrepresent Indonesia’s intentions. Sensitivity to the operational details and the symbolic geography of any engagement should be carefully considered in foreign policy and defense decisionmaking.

At this level, strategic autonomy alone is insufficient. Indonesia must also cultivate what might be called interpretive autonomy — the capacity to proactively shape the narrative surrounding its actions to reduce misperceptions and maintain constructive relationships with various partners — without being boxed into narratives defined by others.

This is especially pertinent given the upward trajectory of Indonesia-China defense ties. Last year, the two countries held their inaugural 2+2 foreign and defense ministerial meeting, a clear sign of deepening strategic engagement.

Indonesia is also reportedly exploring defense industrial cooperation with China, including the potential procurement of 42 Chengdu J-10C fighter jets.

Under Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s administration, Jakarta has visibly expanded its defense cooperation beyond the traditional partner such as the US, reaching out to Beijing and Moscow.

The overarching message is clear: Even routine, low-level naval cooperation carries diplomatic weight when situated in contested waters.

Indonesia must ensure that its actions are clearly communicated — so that a standard naval interaction does not inadvertently entangle it in a diplomatic framing that distorts its true intentions.

Marina Ika Sari is this year’s Japan Foundation Southeast Asia Partnership visiting fellow and a researcher at The Habibie Center.