What Takaichi’s Cabinet reshuffle reveals

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reshuffled her Cabinet for the first time on Thursday, focusing her changes on less prominent positions while keeping key figures intact.

While the reshuffle saw more than half the Cabinet replaced, almost every senior Liberal Democratic Party executive remained, as did the prominent Cabinet members. The most noteworthy changes were the addition of a Japan Innovation Party member to the Cabinet, the removal of the LDP’s Upper House secretary-general and the departure of a future prime minister hopeful.

This was not what many observers anticipated. Takaichi has faced discord within the party ranks, the specter of a declining public approval rating and a looming LDP leadership race. Traditionally, Cabinet reshuffles have been tools for managing intraparty competition, so it would not have been unusual to see substantial personnel changes as the prime minister managed allies and rivals.

The reshuffle instead revealed three things about the state of Takaichi’s administration and her party: that Takaichi has confidence she can maintain public support without a dramatic shake-up, that Takaichi is navigating a new methodology for handling personnel changes in a post-factional system and that the prime minister has chosen to defer, rather than resolve, some of the party’s internal grumblings.

Cabinet reshuffles typically happen once a year in Japan, with the prime minister reevaluating party executive positions, Cabinet appointments, and subcabinet postings.

In the past, the LDP evaluated candidates for these appointments through its factional system. Formally established blocs within the LDP would gather and prioritize the desired Cabinet appointments among faction members, which they would then negotiate among the handful of faction heads and secretaries-general.

While this system concentrated power in the hands of a small number of party leaders and reinforced the factions, it also provided a mechanism for deliberating more than Cabinet appointments. Reshuffles offered opportunities to negotiate policy priorities, maintain party unity, reward allies and accommodate or marginalize rivals.

In this reshuffle, more than half of the 18 Cabinet members were swapped out. While the number is notable, key figures like Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, Finance Minister Satsuki Katayama and Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi remained. The majority of the changes instead came via the minister of state positions, which manage policy portfolios rather than full-fledged ministries.

Among the changes, there were three noteworthy moves. This included the introduction of the Japan Innovation Party’s former Secretary-General Hiroshi Nakatsuka to the Cabinet. He joined as the minister of state for regulatory reform.

Nakatsuka’s appointment is significant because it marks a shift in the ruling coalition. Previously, the JIP chose not to seek a Cabinet post to maintain some distance from LDP decision-making. With a Cabinet position, however, the party gains both a greater opportunity to challenge Cabinet decisions before they are finalized and an obligation to own the decisions once they are made.

The other change that has drawn attention is the replacement of the LDP’s secretary-general for the Upper House, Junichi Ishii. Takaichi had reportedly become displeased with Ishii’s handling of Upper House affairs. This included his formation of a separate club for the party’s Upper House members and his legislative management with opposition parties that allowed for the fiscal year to elapse without passing the budget.

This is an unusual move, and one that introduces risk for Takaichi.

Ishii may not have been effective in the Upper House secretary-general position, but his replacement is unlikely to enjoy more success while the LDP is still a minority party in the house. As such, Takaichi will own any subsequent failures in Upper House affairs.

Takaichi has claimed that she had no hand in the decision, but the move is still being characterized as prime minister-intended punishment. This may exacerbate tensions within the party, as Ishii’s allies have already expressed frustration behind closed doors. Further, it could lead to problems securing unified voting in a house where every LDP vote is necessary for passing legislation.

The third notable change was the departure of internal affairs minister Yoshimasa Hayashi. Hayashi has long desired to become prime minister, and his separation from the Cabinet is a natural move to allow him to prepare for the LDP presidential race next year. His departure is a clear indication that Takaichi will have at least one opponent in that internal leadership election.

Beyond these notable exceptions, the major players have all remained in place. The decision to leave the senior posts largely untouched while focusing the shakeup on less influential politicians reveals three important things about the state of the Cabinet and the ruling party.

First, it indicates Takaichi’s confidence that she can continue to carry public support despite retaining all the key figures from her first year.

In the past, sweeping Cabinet reshuffles that introduce unlikely appointments and younger, more diverse ministers in key positions have tended to contribute to boosts in public approval — sometimes by as much as 10 percentage points.

Going into her Cabinet reshuffle, it appeared that Takaichi might have needed such a boost. Her polling numbers had begun to dip below the historical highs she had enjoyed. But a slight uptick in September reversed that trend.

By essentially retaining the core leadership group, Takaichi seems to be betting that those numbers will remain stable. It suggests a sign of confidence that her brand of leadership will continue to resonate with the public even without upending the status quo among party elites.

The second revelation is that the LDP is still working out how to negotiate Cabinet reshuffles in a post-factional system.

Ahead of the reshuffle, the more than 400 sitting LDP members of parliament were asked to fill in questionnaires with their preferences for Cabinet appointments — including, notably, former Prime Ministers Fumio Kishida and Shigeru Ishiba. The party then sifted through the forms to identify preferences, at which point they needed to deliberate who would be most appropriate for which positions.

But with so many competing candidates for coveted jobs, the question became how to decide upon appointments, especially when considering that career politicians may not have established credentials for the positions in which they are seeking.

Certain long-standing practices remained intact, such as picking ministers from among lawmakers who have won at least six elections. This reshuffle, however, appeared to have much more direct involvement from the prime minister.

Takaichi said that she spent the past three weekends personally reviewing the questionnaires to ascertain that she is picking the right people for the jobs. Through this process, she decided upon seven first-time ministers to join her Cabinet.

This approach contributed to less influential politicians being swapped out, but the retention of the major players suggests the LDP is still searching for a workable system for conducting the more contentious personnel decisions.

Finally, the reshuffle indicates that the Takaichi administration is punting on resolving tensions within the LDP, rather than addressing them before the next parliamentary session begins.

Heading into the summer recess, fissures had been growing within the party. These included heavyweights within the conservative wing of the party jockeying for greater influence, opposition to Takaichi’s consumption tax proposal and disagreements over other policy decisions, such as imperial succession rules.

The reshuffle may have afforded Takaichi an opportunity to resolve some of these issues through Cabinet appointments and policy agenda-setting. The absence of major changes among party heavyweights, however, suggests that no such bartering took place, leaving the outstanding issues to be fought another day.

Takaichi may have concluded that staying the course with minimal changes was the safest option. But she will face immediate tests from public opinion and the forthcoming parliamentary sessions. With the LDP leadership race a year away, this is the team she will have to rely on to produce successful policies while maintaining enough unity within the party to secure another term.

For Japan’s ruling party, meanwhile, the reshuffle offers a clear indication that the transition to a post-factional system remains incomplete. The old mechanism for managing personnel and intraparty competition may be moribund, but a comprehensive replacement has yet to emerge.