October 7 haunts Netanyahu's election campaign, but his bloc holds its ground

A few months back, when talk of early elections was abundant, conventional wisdom held that they would take place sometime in September.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, this thinking went, would not want to go to the people in October, when ceremonies marking three years since October 7 would bring memories of that tragedy painfully back to the surface.

That assumption made sense. It also proved wrong.

Netanyahu did not call early elections that would have let him pick a more convenient date. Instead, he decided to see his term through to the very end – October 27.

Perhaps he calculated that by then, the emotional weight of this week’s commemorations would have eased, overtaken by other news and events.

Or perhaps he concluded that the date made little difference: whether the election was held on September 1 or October 27, October 7 would cast a long shadow over everything else.

If October 7 would be there regardless, he might as well finish his term – itself a remarkable political feat considering the magnitude of the disaster and the seething anger directed at him and his government in its immediate aftermath.

Still, this week offered a reminder of why an October election might have seemed an unappealing prospect.

October 7 commemorations bring national mourning into election campaign

The country essentially just went through four days of remembrance, beginning on Simchat Torah, the Hebrew date of the attack, continuing through the 24th of Tishrei, the official state memorial day, and extending through October 7 itself, when a massive citizen-organized ceremony was held at Ganei Yehoshua.

Television, radio, and the print media were filled with harrowing accounts – stories of horrific tragedy and remarkable heroism. The grief was palpable. So, too, were many unresolved questions, including what Netanyahu knew and when he knew it, and why he continues to refuse to establish a state commission of inquiry.

Was it politically wise, then, to hold an election just 20 days after the nation revisited its deepest wounds?

The polls suggest the answer is less obvious than expected.

From October 1 to October 7, nine major polls were taken for eight media organizations, with Channel 14 publishing two. Their simple average put the Netanyahu bloc – Likud, Shas, United Torah Judaism, Religious Zionist Party-Zehut, Otzma Yehudit, and Ofer Winter’s People of Israel party – ahead with 55.5 seats.

That compares with 50 for the opposition bloc of Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar, Naftali Bennett’s B’Yachad, Avigdor Liberman’s Yisrael Beytenu, and Yair Golan’s Democrats. The two Arab parties averaged 13 seats, with the remaining 1.5 going to parties that cross the electoral threshold in some polls.

There is a caveat. For months, the Channel 14 and i24 polls have been outliers, giving the Likud significantly more seats than the other surveys. Exclude them, and the two blocs are in a virtual dead heat: 52.17 seats for Netanyahu’s bloc and 51.83 for its opponents.

Both remain well below the 61 seats needed to form a government. But comparing those figures with nine polls in early May and nine others in late September puts them in perspective.

Opposition's lead over Netanyahu's bloc narrows

Excluding Channel 14 and i24, Netanyahu’s bloc averaged 51.5 seats in the May polls, compared with 57.83 for the opposition – an opposition advantage of more than six seats. By late September, that gap had narrowed to less than one seat: 51.75 for Netanyahu’s bloc and 52.63 for its opponents.

During the first week of October, Netanyahu’s bloc edged ahead. The striking point is that the gap has closed because the change bloc has lost ground, not because the Netanyahu bloc has significantly increased.

Netanyahu’s bloc has gained only about two-thirds of a seat since May. But the opposition has lost six. In some five months, therefore, a clear opposition advantage – at least in the polls – has become a virtual tie.

These averages cannot establish whether this week’s commemorations changed anyone’s vote. They do show that a week spent reopening the wounds of October 7 did not coincide with an erosion of support for Netanyahu’s bloc or an increase in support for the other side.

The wounds are still raw, but what that will translate into at the ballot box remains contested.

And while other issues – foremost the haredi conscription issue – are consequential in this campaign, questions about reported warnings from Egypt and the UAE before the Hamas attack, what Netanyahu knew, and whether he acted appropriately have brought the campaign back to October 7 and its origins.

October 7 shapes competing election narratives for Netanyahu and the opposition

For both sides, October 7 is central to this election. What divides them is what they want voters to see when they look back.

The opposition wants voters to focus on the colossal failures of that day, the failures that preceded it, and the refusal to establish a state commission of inquiry.

Its argument turns on this question: can a prime minister who has neither taken responsibility nor allowed a full, independent accounting be trusted to prevent the next disaster?

Netanyahu wants voters to focus on what came afterward: the blows delivered to Israel’s enemies and the changes in the region that he argues have made the country stronger and safer.

Last week’s flydubai incident gave both sides fresh ammunition for their arguments.

Bennett, Eisenkot use flydubai security failures to challenge Netanyahu's record

For Bennett and Eisenkot, the apparent security failures surrounding the flight provide a way to bring the argument about October 7 into the present. They can argue that this is not only about a catastrophe three years ago. Even after the military achievements since then, serious vulnerabilities remain.

The passengers’ resourcefulness and courage helped avert disaster. But citizens rescuing themselves is hardly a substitute for institutions doing their jobs.

That is the connection the opposition wants voters to make: extraordinary people stepping into a vacuum left by a system that should have protected them. The heroism deserves celebration. The vacuum demands investigation.

October 7 and the attempted hijacking differ enormously in scale and circumstances. But one relevant question is common to both: whether familiar habits – complacency, gaps in oversight, fragmented responsibility – are again visible, and whether those responsible will identify and correct them.

Politically, the flydubai saga gives Bennett and Eisenkot an opening to make their points. This incident challenges the proposition that the military achievements since October 7 mean the government’s machinery is now functioning as it should. Flydubai shows that this is not the case.

Both candidates can use the flight to illustrate a major theme of their campaign: competence. Who can identify gaps, assign responsibility, and follow through? Security depends on the daily business of governing, as well as on decisions made in the war cabinet. Somebody has to ensure procedures work and problems are addressed.

Netanyahu highlights diplomatic achievements in flydubai crisis

Netanyahu, meanwhile, has an answer.

He can point to the Saudi assistance and the Emirati role in bringing the passengers home as evidence that the regional relationships he helped build have real value. The cooperation shown during this crisis reflects the new Middle East that emerged through his actions since October 7.

That argument has substance. Israelis in distress received help in a region where, not so long ago, the prospect of such cooperation would have seemed impossible. Don’t forget, only a few years ago Israeli planes could not fly over Saudi Arabia, let alone land at a joint civilian-military airfield when in need.

The Abraham Accords did not remove hostility or erase the barriers to normalization with Saudi Arabia. They did, however, help create relationships that can deliver assistance when Israelis need it.

Here, too, the flydubai incident makes both sides’ campaign arguments tangible.

For the Eisenkot and Bennett campaigns, talk of government competence is often abstract. A plane plunging while passengers struggle to save it makes this idea concrete.

Likewise, “failure to take responsibility” is abstract, while hearing officials explain after the flydubai incident that the matter is not in their jurisdiction makes it concrete.

And for Netanyahu’s campaign, a “new Middle East” can sound like a slogan. But enlisting Saudi and Emirati assistance in bringing Israelis safely home gives it practical meaning.

The campaigns will draw different lessons from the same flight. Netanyahu will point to the regional cooperation that helped bring Israelis home. His opponents will point to the failures that put them in danger in the first place and the officials who have been passing around the responsibility ever since.

Both arguments go to the heart of this election: whom can Israelis trust to keep them safe?

This week’s polls suggest that the answer does not follow automatically from the pain of October 7. The wounds remain raw, but Netanyahu’s bloc has held its ground. His opponents still have to convince voters that the failures outweigh the achievements, and that they can provide better protection.

The campaigns will make sure that October 7 – and its long aftermath – and flydubai are on voters’ minds when they enter the polling booth.

The question is which will weigh more heavily: the failures Netanyahu’s opponents want them to remember, or the achievements he wants them to recognize.

For now, tellingly, neither side has established a clear advantage in the polls.