Taiwan’s defense efforts sending signal to US, not China, security expert says

Taiwan’s growing defense preparations might be sending a stronger signal to the US than to Beijing, highlighting the need for Taipei to tailor its deterrence efforts to different audiences, a US security academic said yesterday.

Stanford University Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro made the comment during a Taipei Security Dialogue panel examining lessons Taiwan could draw from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.

Mastro said she was impressed by Taiwan’s increased defense spending, emphasis on asymmetric capabilities and efforts to prepare society for conflict, but questioned whom those initiatives were influencing.

Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim, front center, and American Institute in Taiwan Director Raymond Greene, front, third right, pose for a photograph at the Taipei Security Dialogue yesterday.

Photo: CNA

She said when she asked senior Chinese figures and analysts whether Taiwan’s improving capabilities were making Beijing more cautious, their responses generally amounted to: “We don’t really know. We’re not paying attention to that. That’s not the point.”

Although Taiwan’s efforts contributed to improved deterrence, “the audience is the US,” she said.

Taiwan’s message that it is doing more for its defense, particularly its ability to defend itself without outside intervention, is largely directed at Washington, Mastro said.

That is an appropriate strategy, because it reassured Washington of Taiwan’s determination to defend itself, she said, but added that Taipei needed a separate approach to ensure that its capabilities also affected Beijing’s calculations.

“There’s no situation under which Taiwan can defend itself without direct US military intervention,” Mastro said.

Taiwan should communicate its newly acquired capabilities more effectively to Beijing so that its defense investments can deepen relations with the US and deter China, she added.

National Chengchi University Department of Diplomacy professor Chen Ping-Kuei (陳秉逵) agreed with Mastro, saying: “I think the public believes that we have sent an effective signal to the US, but we haven’t sent a very effective deterrent signal to Beijing.”

US arms sales to Taiwan is an important signal of Washington’s commitment, he said, adding that their political significance could be more important than the size of individual packages.

If Washington were to begin discussing proposed arms sales packages for Taiwan with Beijing, it would send “a very, very bad signal” to Taipei, Chen said.

He was referring to concerns raised after US President Donald Trump confirmed he had spoken to Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) about arms sales to Taiwan when they met in Beijing in mid-May.

That violated a key tenet of the “six assurances” — that the US would not consult China on arms sales to Taiwan.

Trump seemed to brush aside such a pledge.

“What am I going to say? I don’t want to talk to you about it because I have an agreement that was signed in 1982?” he said after the meeting.

Beyond military capabilities and signaling, Taiwan must prepare to remain functional if China seeks to isolate it, German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies senior research fellow Wolfgang Muller said.

Isolation would not necessarily require a formal blockade, because heightened risk alone could alter the behavior of shipping companies, insurers, suppliers and maintenance providers, Muller said.

“Do not ask only how China would invade Taiwan. Ask also how China could make an invasion unnecessary,” he said.

Rather than pursuing complete self-sufficiency, Taiwan should measure how long essential services could continue if external supplies were interrupted, Muller said.

He also urged Taiwan to identify bottlenecks linking infrastructure systems and pre-position critical items that could be difficult to obtain during a crisis, including transformers, medicine, chemicals, communications equipment and machine parts.

“Taiwan cannot make its critical infrastructure invulnerable, but it can make failure more temporary,” Muller said. “Recovery capacity is combat power.”