South Korea’s military ambitions get a reality check

The deck is stacked against a significant shift in military control on the Korean Peninsula, yet that is exactly what South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is staking his leadership on. It’s the right idea, at the wrong time.

Seoul still relies on an American general to lead combined U.S.-South Korea military operations in wartime, one of the enduring legacies of the Korean War. Lee wants to put a South Korean in charge. Yet Seoul is having a difficult time with the second Trump administration — the two sides are divided over their trade agreement and Lee’s reluctance to get involved in the U.S. president’s war in Iran.

That acrimony is bleeding into all aspects of the relationship. Indeed, the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, Michelle Steel, has described ties as being in a state of turbulence. So why is Lee pushing so hard now to speed up the timeline to take wartime operational control of the combined forces, when Washington has indicated 2029 is a possibility and the allies have yet to agree on a final date?

There is no doubt that the South Korea of today is very different to the one badly outmatched by North Korea when it was invaded in 1950 and survival depended on U.S.-led U.N. forces. Today, the country has a sophisticated military, is the world’s ninth-largest major arms exporter and is in the midst of an AI-driven chip boom. Many South Koreans want this change — they regard it as a matter of national sovereignty. A survey published in August by the East Asia Institute found 52% support a transfer as early as 2027-2028.

But for South Korea to meet the conditions set by both Seoul and Washington, it will need to demonstrate it can lead the combined defense forces, while the alliance must be able to respond to North Korean nuclear and missile threats. The security environment must also be calm to allow for a stable transfer. Regardless, assessing how ready the military is should be a judgment based on agreed defense criteria, not driven by Lee’s political deadline. This change has long been an ambition among the nation’s progressive leaders. Lee wants to achieve what his predecessors could not, making it a defining accomplishment of his presidency, which will end in 2030.

But the security climate is not in his favor. North Korea’s military capabilities have been strengthened by its involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine, giving its troops valuable battlefield experience, while Pyongyang has rejected renewed dialogue with Seoul. U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson — the officer who currently holds wartime command over the combined forces — warned on Oct. 14 that conditions had clearly changed, citing recent North Korean ballistic missile tests. The same day, Pyongyang tested two types of submarine-launched strategic cruise missiles, further underscoring the evolving threat.

Brunson is right to recognize Pyongyang’s military capacity. But Seoul is wary of Washington moving the goalposts. Defense Minister Kang Shin-chul expressed concern about Brunson’s remarks, arguing that the conditions for transferring wartime operational control had not changed.

Kang’s comments reflect a widespread South Korean desire for a more equal alliance with the U.S. Still, it’s difficult to ignore that the security situation — and the relationship between the two Koreas — has been recast. North Korea abandoned the idea of peaceful reunification and in 2024, leader Kim Jong Un called for the constitution to be revised to allow the South to be occupied and annexed in the event of war.

Asia’s defense ministers met in the Philippines last month, where Kang held bilateral talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. They reaffirmed their commitment to transferring wartime command to Seoul, but postponed their annual defense meeting until next year without agreeing on a timetable, underscoring the distance that remains.

Against such a backdrop, the revival of stalled talks on Seoul’s access to nuclear-powered submarines seems unlikely. There is a serious mismatch of expectations at the highest level of government, Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told me. South Korea shouldn’t push too hard on the submarine issue, Panda said, or there’s a risk the whole project could fall apart.

Given how uneasy their relationship is right now, Lee’s decision to tie so much political capital to a timetable that is generating such resistance from the U.S. is a bold but ultimately fraught plan. The risk is that it will fester for the remainder of his term. For South Korea’s sake — and that of stability on the peninsula — he would be better off biding his time.

Ruth Pollard is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asia politics and policy.