US-led delay in confronting Houthis a ‘grave mistake,’ says former Houthi spokesman - interview

The US delay in confronting the Houthis in coordination with Saudi Arabia “is a grave mistake that will cost dearly later,” Yemeni politician, writer, and former Houthi spokesperson Ali Al-Bukhaiti told The Jerusalem Post on Thursday.

According to Axios, US President Donald Trump has rejected multiple requests from Riyadh to strike the Houthis, despite repeated Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and Saudi assets. Bukhaiti said the delay was a strategic error that the West could spend years paying for if it is not corrected soon.

“Defeating them after a few more years will be extremely costly for the region and the world, and may become impossible, forcing the world to recognize them as it recognized the Taliban government,” Bukhaiti said. “Worse, the Houthis control an international shipping lane, so the pain will be chronic for the West and the world, unlike the Taliban, who primarily harm their own people.”

Bukhaiti highlighted that, unlike the Taliban, the Houthis lack a large support base and remain a minority movement able to continue operating by exploiting “chaos and divisions of other political actors” and a unifying ideology.

“Washington and the West must therefore understand that the Yemen file is not like Afghanistan, and that defeating the Houthis is far easier than defeating the Taliban - especially with a capable, strong state that has powerful allies inside Yemen, namely Saudi Arabia,” he continued.

“Houthi rule is closer to Alawite rule and Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and it will unravel in the same way Assad’s system did…They resemble the Taliban only in that they are a cohesive religious movement; they resemble Assad in that they are a minority and most of the population is against them.”

Bukhaiti: Continued Houthi presence means 'end of American imperial era'

Bukhaiti also argued that the West needs to understand that failing to confront the Houthis and allowing their position to grow stronger at a strategic location next to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait would mean “the end of the American imperial era,” with consequences reaching far beyond the Gulf.

“If the United States cannot secure the Middle East, its presence there, and the sea lanes through it, the Chinese will not respect it over Taiwan, nor the Russians over Ukraine - or even Europe - and the world will face a grave danger,” he cautioned. “What is needed is an American strategic mind in the mold of Henry Kissinger, to grasp the extremely dangerous implications of a Houthi takeover of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.”

The Houthis claimed control of Perim Island earlier this month, which sits directly in the middle of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait at its narrowest point.

Now “sitting at zero distance from the shipping lane, the Houthis can now close the strait at any moment without Iranian support,” he explained.

“They can also fight Saudi Arabia and the [internationally recognized] Yemeni forces arrayed against them so long as the war stays as it is: one front active while the others sleep. But if Saudi Arabia chose a full-scale war, committed all allied forces, and forced them to fight together rather than in pieces, the recognized Yemeni government, its allied forces, and Saudi Arabia could successfully topple Houthi rule.”

Despite assessing a strong possibility of a Houthi defeat, Bukhaiti doubted Riyadh retained the “boldness it had in 2015,” suggesting Saudi decision-makers would err on the side of caution, particularly over concerns that Tehran could become more directly involved if a genuine Houthi defeat appeared likely.

He also argued that Riyadh’s confidence in its Arab and American alliances was waning, creating uncertainty that helped pave the way for the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement signed with Pakistan and Turkey in August.

“Once Saudi Arabia reaches a clear agreement with Pakistan and Turkey that they would confront Iran if it intervenes - and once advance warnings are sent to Tehran not to do so - I believe Saudi decision-makers would then launch a full-scale war against the Houthis aimed at bringing them down,” he predicted.

That lack of trust has also prevented the Yemeni majority opposed to the Houthis from taking action. Bukhaiti said economic collapse, unpaid salaries and growing corruption had pushed public anger in Houthi-controlled areas to a high point. However, fear of Houthi repression and a lack of confidence in the internationally recognized government and Saudi Arabia had kept people from rebelling.

If Yemenis were given a credible force they could trust to support them, he argued, the public could turn against the Houthis and their rule could collapse rapidly.

Explaining the Houthis’ motives, Bukhaiti identified two apparent aims. First, on the domestic front, he said the Houthis are seeking to ease their economic crisis by pressuring Riyadh to pick up the tab for employee salaries. Second, they aim to “squeeze Saudi Arabia by stopping its ships from passing through Bab el-Mandeb, completing a siege after Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz.”

Houthis likely to be a part of eventual Saudi-Iranian peace agreement

The second aim, he argued, is tied to the Houthis’ alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Any conflict between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed, internationally recognized government of Yemen, he reasoned, would be addressed in an Iranian ceasefire agreement, protecting the Houthis from potentially having to fight alone in a full-scale war.

He said Tehran and the Houthis remain in close contact, but “the Houthis do not take orders from Iran.” Rather, the group’s leadership is almost free to decide when and to what extent it is willing to risk its own interests and survival for Iran’s benefit.

Though the Houthis are able to make some decisions on their own, Bukhaiti alleged that some members of the group’s leadership are closer to Iran than others and, as a result, the Islamic Republic of Iran “has hidden, dormant tools of influence.”

Those closer to the regime “press” Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and persuade him that moves aligned with Iran would better serve the movement and are worth certain strategic risks.

“Abdul-Malik al-Houthi lacks a deep grasp of international and regional politics - though he is shrewd at managing the local internal struggle - so he cannot always choose the right decisions,” he claimed.

“He does not submit to Iranian diktats, but his weak regional and international political awareness leads him to accept advice from some of his own commanders who themselves have been shaped by Iranian counsel.”

With the Islamic Republic of Iran already viewed as a “good and honorable ally” by the Houthis’ religious base, accusations that the Houthis are serving Iranian interests over other Yemeni ones would not threaten domestic support, he added.

“Most civilians in areas they govern, however, believe the Houthis are gambling with their lives and interests for Iran’s sake - but those civilians have no influence and are powerless.”

Though the group is likely banking on a ceasefire agreement between Washington and Tehran including them, Bukhaiti stressed that they could not be trusted to honor those commitments.

“The assurances they sent the United States and Israel are deceptive and tactical, meant to keep Washington, Israel, and their regional allies from joining Saudi Arabia against them. They fear an international coalition like the one that brought down ISIS and al-Qaeda, and they know that once Saudi Arabia is sure the United States is with it - or at least will deter Iran from intervening - Saudi and Yemeni forces can topple their rule,” he said.

“Whenever the Houthis decide it serves them to target American ships or bar them from Bab el-Mandeb - if the war in Gaza reignites, another global crisis erupts, or even China or Russia asks, and they cooperate on other files - they will do it. They are an adventurist group and will cut shipping at any moment against America and the rest of the world.”

Bukhaiti insisted that cooperation between Riyadh and Jerusalem would be “dangerous for the Houthis,” but he doubted that such cooperation would ever be confirmed publicly or handled directly, especially as Saudi officials doubt Jerusalem would remain quiet on such dealings.

Despite the danger such a partnership could pose to the Houthis, he argued that opposition to Israel in the region could mean such a coalition risks further legitimizing the Houthis.

“The better course is for Israel to press the United States and the West to form an international coalition…,” he reasoned, adding that it wasn’t necessary to have boots on the ground to win this war.

“Some airpower, political and military support, and a clear green light for Saudi Arabia to wage the campaign against the Houthis until their authority falls in Sanaa and even in Saada would suffice. The US-led coalition must also pledge to cover Saudi Arabia’s back against any Iranian intervention. Then, once those conditions are in place, Saudi Arabia and Yemeni forces would have the ability to topple the Houthis within a few months.”