Illegal activities in prisons: A question of control, not perfection

AS per a recent report in the New Straits Times on Sept 20, concerning alleged drug smuggling and the influence of money and hierarchy inside prisons have understandably attracted tremendous public attention. From a criminological perspective, however, it is important to distinguish between allegations or individual incidents and evidence of the overall prevalence of illegal activity across the prison system.

The reality is that illegal activities occur in prison systems around the world. Prisons are, after all, closed environments containing individuals who have been convicted or detained for a wide range of offences, while some retain links to criminal networks outside prison. Consequently, contraband, illicit trading, intimidation, corruption and the formation of informal inmate hierarchies are recognised risks in correctional institutions internationally.

The more important question for Malaysia is therefore not whether illegal activities can occur in prisons, they can, but to what extent they occur, how frequently they occur, how effectively they are detected, and whether they represent isolated incidents or a wider systemic problem.

Recent reports illustrate why this distinction matters. Singer-composer Muhammad Yasin Sulaiman alleged that drugs could still enter prison despite stringent security procedures. The Prisons Department subsequently rejected the broader claim that prison life is determined by money and influence, while acknowledging that negative incidents can occur and stating that its standard operating procedures are reviewed regularly.

There are also independently reported cases that demonstrate that prohibited items entering prisons is not merely a theoretical risk. In August 2026, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission investigated a prison officer over an alleged RM3,000 bribe connected to bringing prohibited items into a prison. Separately, authorities investigated a case involving alleged attempts to bring prohibited substances into Marang Prison. These cases should be treated as allegations subject to investigation and due process but they demonstrate the importance of addressing the possibility of insider involvement as well as external sources.

At the same time, it would be inappropriate to conclude from several reported incidents that illegal activity is widespread throughout Malaysian prisons. We need reliable data before making such a conclusion. The number of detected incidents tells us about what authorities have discovered, but not necessarily the total amount of activity taking place. Conversely, the absence of detected incidents does not automatically mean that no incidents have occurred.

This is where prison intelligence becomes particularly important. Modern correctional management should not depend exclusively on physical searches. Intelligence-led policing inside prisons should identify patterns, relationships, unusual behaviour, attempts to introduce prohibited items, financial irregularities and possible links between inmates, visitors and staff. Detection should be based on intelligence, technology, supervision and investigation rather than on searches alone.

The integrity of prison personnel is equally critical. In any closed institution, a small number of compromised staff can potentially undermine a much larger security system. This does not mean that prison officers generally are corrupt; rather, criminology teaches us"Illegal Activities in Prisons: A Question of Control, Not Perfection"

As per a recent report in NST (20/9/26) concerning alleged drug smuggling and the influence of money and hierarchy inside prisons have understandably attracted tremendous public attention. From a criminological perspective, however, it is important to distinguish between allegations or individual incidents and evidence of the overall prevalence of illegal activity across the prison system.

The reality is that illegal activities occur in prison systems around the world. Prisons are, after all, closed environments containing individuals who have been convicted or detained for a wide range of offences, while some retain links to criminal networks outside prison. Consequently, contraband, illicit trading, intimidation, corruption and the formation of informal inmate hierarchies are recognised risks in correctional institutions internationally.

The more important question for Malaysia is therefore not whether illegal activities can occur in prisons, they can, but to what extent they occur, how frequently they occur, how effectively they are detected, and whether they represent isolated incidents or a wider systemic problem.

Recent reports illustrate why this distinction matters. Singer-composer Muhammad Yasin Sulaiman alleged that drugs could still enter prison despite stringent security procedures. The Prisons Department subsequently rejected the broader claim that prison life is determined by money and influence, while acknowledging that negative incidents can occur and stating that its standard operating procedures are reviewed regularly.

There are also independently reported cases that demonstrate that prohibited items entering prisons is not merely a theoretical risk. In August 2026, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission investigated a prison officer over an alleged RM3,000 bribe connected to bringing prohibited items into a prison. Separately, authorities investigated a case involving alleged attempts to bring prohibited substances into Marang Prison. These cases should be treated as allegations subject to investigation and due process but they demonstrate the importance of addressing the possibility of insider involvement as well as external sources.

At the same time, it would be inappropriate to conclude from several reported incidents that illegal activity is widespread throughout Malaysian prisons. We need reliable data before making such a conclusion. The number of detected incidents tells us about what authorities have discovered, but not necessarily the total amount of activity taking place. Conversely, the absence of detected incidents does not automatically mean that no incidents have occurred.

This is where prison intelligence becomes particularly important. Modern correctional management should not depend exclusively on physical searches. Intelligence-led policing inside prisons should identify patterns, relationships, unusual behaviour, attempts to introduce prohibited items, financial irregularities and possible links between inmates, visitors and staff. Detection should be based on intelligence, technology, supervision and investigation rather than on searches alone.

The integrity of prison personnel is equally critical. In any closed institution, a small number of compromised staff can potentially undermine a much larger security system. This does not mean that prison officers generally are corrupt; rather, criminology teaches us that effective institutions must be designed on the assumption that opportunities for misconduct can arise. Strong recruitment standards, regular integrity screening, rotation in particularly vulnerable assignments, confidential reporting channels, financial and lifestyle red-flag mechanisms, and firm disciplinary and criminal action where wrongdoing is established can reduce those opportunities.

Technology should also play a greater role. CCTV coverage, access-control systems, digital visitor management, appropriate screening technologies and integrated prison intelligence databases can strengthen institutional security. Importantly, technology should complement trained officers rather than replace professional judgement.

Another issue is prison overcrowding. The Prisons Department itself has acknowledged overcrowding as a continuing challenge in at least some institutions. Parliament was also told in June 2026 that proposed amendments to the Prison Act were intended, among other things, to address overcrowding, strengthen governance and security, enhance rehabilitation and increase community-based rehabilitation.

Overcrowding is not simply a humanitarian or administrative concern. From a criminological perspective, excessive population density can make inmate management more difficult, increase tensions, complicate classification and supervision, and make it harder to identify vulnerable prisoners or emerging informal power structures. Therefore, reducing unnecessary imprisonment and expanding properly supervised community-based rehabilitation can also have security benefits.

There should also be greater attention to measurement and transparency. Malaysia would benefit from publishing, at appropriate levels of detail, annual statistics on contraband seizures, attempted introductions of prohibited items, staff disciplinary cases, corruption investigations, assaults, intimidation, illicit trading and other significant security incidents. Such information would allow policymakers and the public to distinguish between isolated events, recurring patterns and genuine systemic problems.

Independent inspection and oversight should complement internal accountability. A credible prison system should be confident enough to subject its procedures to periodic independent review. Such reviews should not be viewed as criticism of prison officers but as an institutional safeguard that strengthens public confidence.

Ultimately, the objective should not be to suggest that Malaysian prisons are either completely secure or fundamentally dysfunctional. No prison system anywhere can eliminate illegal activity entirely. The objective is to make such activity difficult, detectable, risky and unsustainable.

The allegations surrounding Malaysian prisons therefore provide an opportunity for a broader evidence-based review rather than simply a debate between allegations and denials. The Prisons Department's position that its SOPs are regularly reviewed is important, but continuous review should be accompanied by measurable outcomes, independent oversight, stronger prison intelligence, staff integrity safeguards, appropriate technology and better publicly available data.

A secure prison is not merely one with high walls, locked gates and searches. It is an institution in which corruption opportunities are minimised, criminal networks are disrupted, vulnerable inmates are protected, staff integrity is safeguarded, rehabilitation is meaningful and misconduct is detected and dealt with fairly.

The Malaysian prison system has an important dual responsibility: to protect society while rehabilitating those in its custody. Strengthening security and strengthening rehabilitation should therefore not be seen as competing objectives. Done properly, they reinforce each other and ultimately contribute to a safer society. that effective institutions must be designed on the assumption that opportunities for misconduct can arise. Strong recruitment standards, regular integrity screening, rotation in particularly vulnerable assignments, confidential reporting channels, financial and lifestyle red-flag mechanisms, and firm disciplinary and criminal action where wrongdoing is established can reduce those opportunities.

Technology should also play a greater role. CCTV coverage, access-control systems, digital visitor management, appropriate screening technologies and integrated prison intelligence databases can strengthen institutional security. Importantly, technology should complement trained officers rather than replace professional judgement.

Another issue is prison overcrowding. The Prisons Department itself has acknowledged overcrowding as a continuing challenge in at least some institutions. Parliament was also told in June 2026 that proposed amendments to the Prison Act were intended, among other things, to address overcrowding, strengthen governance and security, enhance rehabilitation and increase community-based rehabilitation.

Overcrowding is not simply a humanitarian or administrative concern. From a criminological perspective, excessive population density can make inmate management more difficult, increase tensions, complicate classification and supervision, and make it harder to identify vulnerable prisoners or emerging informal power structures. Therefore, reducing unnecessary imprisonment and expanding properly supervised community-based rehabilitation can also have security benefits.

There should also be greater attention to measurement and transparency. Malaysia would benefit from publishing, at appropriate levels of detail, annual statistics on contraband seizures, attempted introductions of prohibited items, staff disciplinary cases, corruption investigations, assaults, intimidation, illicit trading and other significant security incidents. Such information would allow policymakers and the public to distinguish between isolated events, recurring patterns and genuine systemic problems.

Independent inspection and oversight should complement internal accountability. A credible prison system should be confident enough to subject its procedures to periodic independent review. Such reviews should not be viewed as criticism of prison officers but as an institutional safeguard that strengthens public confidence.

Ultimately, the objective should not be to suggest that Malaysian prisons are either completely secure or fundamentally dysfunctional. No prison system anywhere can eliminate illegal activity entirely. The objective is to make such activity difficult, detectable, risky and unsustainable.

The allegations surrounding Malaysian prisons therefore provide an opportunity for a broader evidence-based review rather than simply a debate between allegations and denials. The Prisons Department's position that its SOPs are regularly reviewed is important, but continuous review should be accompanied by measurable outcomes, independent oversight, stronger prison intelligence, staff integrity safeguards, appropriate technology and better publicly available data.

A secure prison is not merely one with high walls, locked gates and searches. It is an institution in which corruption opportunities are minimised, criminal networks are disrupted, vulnerable inmates are protected, staff integrity is safeguarded, rehabilitation is meaningful and misconduct is detected and dealt with fairly.

The Malaysian prison system has an important dual responsibility: to protect society while rehabilitating those in its custody. Strengthening security and strengthening rehabilitation should therefore not be seen as competing objectives. Done properly, they reinforce each other and ultimately contribute to a safer society.

The writer is a criminologist at the Centre for Policy Research, Universiti Sains Malaysia