Drone strategy beyond production

Over the past two weeks, the Taipei Security Dialogue and the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience International Forum brought together leading figures working on Taiwan’s defense and resilience, with discussions ranging from higher defense spending and asymmetric capabilities to societal preparedness.

At the Taipei Security Dialogue, Stanford University Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro made an interesting observation that many of Taiwan’s defense initiatives are intended to influence the audience in Washington. Taiwan faces an adversary considerably larger in military and economic terms, hence continued US support is an important element of deterrence.

Former chief of the general staff admiral Lee Hsi-min (李喜明) has in the past made a related point in discussing Taiwan’s ability to show it can resist aggression. Signaling commitment to partners is understandable, but it is most convincing when accompanied by credible capabilities at home.

At the resilience forum, Anduril founder Palmer Luckey praised Taiwan’s pace in developing asymmetric capabilities, particularly autonomous systems. Taiwan has indeed made considerable progress over the past few years. Yet the discussion raises a more difficult question: What exactly does Taiwan mean by asymmetric capability?

The term appears often in conferences, policy papers and public statements, but the definition is often less clear. Ukraine, Iran and other countries have all employed forms of asymmetric warfare, but under different circumstances, force structures and strategic objectives. Taiwan cannot simply acquire large numbers of relatively inexpensive systems and assume that asymmetry would follow.

This is particularly relevant to drones. The appearance of Chinese civilian drones over military positions in Kinmen County in 2022 provided an early indication of how inexpensive drones could create disproportionate operational problems. Taiwan subsequently accelerated drone and counterdrone development, while the “Drone National Team” and strong government support helped bring together manufacturers and technology companies.

At the same time, concepts that had long existed on the margins of Taiwan’s defense debate received attention. US Naval War College professor William Murray’s “porcupine strategy” and Lee’s “overall defense concept” became increasingly relevant to discussions about how Taiwan could use smaller, mobile and survivable systems against a much larger adversary. For a period, industrial development and strategic discussions about integrating uncrewed systems appeared to advance together.

However, the balance seems to have shifted. Much of the attention surrounding Taiwan’s drones now concerns manufacturing capacity, export growth, international partnerships and procurement targets. These are genuine achievements. Taiwanese manufacturers have expanded overseas relationships, while efforts to establish trusted, China-free supply chains have given the industry a potentially valuable position in international markets.

However, Taiwan’s original interest in drones was not primarily about exports. It emerged from a defense problem. A successful drone industry does not automatically produce an effective asymmetric military capability. Thousands of drones contribute little if the armed forces lack the command-and-control architecture, training, maintenance capacity, communications networks, force structure and operational concepts required to employ them effectively. Procurement increases inventory quickly, but institutional adaptation is considerably harder.

That point has repeatedly emerged in interviews with defense practitioners, strategists and policymakers. They disagree on many issues, but there is notable concern about the need for doctrine and organizational structures that integrate new technologies into Taiwan’s particular geography and defense requirements. Their perspective is often more cautious than the enthusiasm surrounding export figures and procurement announcements.

Other major drone users offer useful context. Ukraine and Russia have reorganized units, training and operational concepts during the war. Iran has spent years adapting uncrewed systems into a broader doctrine designed around its military limitations and regional objectives. Their models cannot simply be transferred to Taiwan, but they demonstrate a common principle: Hardware becomes strategically meaningful only when institutions adapt around it.

That does not mean Taiwan should slow its industrial ambitions. A self-sustaining drone industry, secure supply chains and access to international markets can bolster economic and national security. Export success can also support production capacity that Taiwan might need during a crisis.

The concern is the balance. If Taiwan’s objective is primarily to become a globally competitive drone manufacturing hub, current industrial progress is encouraging. If the objective is also to make uncrewed systems a central component of asymmetric defense, manufacturing and procurement must be accompanied by less visible work on doctrine, command and control, training, maintenance and force integration.

Those developments rarely produce impressive export statistics or headlines, but they determine whether drones are simply products Taiwan manufactures or capabilities Taiwan can actually rely on. Taiwan’s drone industry has gained considerable momentum. The strategic task now is to ensure that its military adaptation does not fall behind it.

Harun Talha Ayanoglu is a visiting research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research.