It’s time for China to offer more than statements on Hormuz

Two summits in five months between US President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping have produced shared language but not an open Strait of Hormuz. After the May meeting in Beijing, there was little sign the two sides agreed on how to end the war. Xi’s visit to Washington yielded no breakthrough on Iran, though Xi backed a return to the interim US-Iran agreement.

Last week, Trump rejected a truce proposal from Iran and said he was considering resuming US bombing of Iran after the midterm elections next month. The one line the US and Chinese summit readouts shared – that “no country or institution can be allowed to impose tolls on international waterways” – is a principle, not a procedure.

That is the problem in a nutshell. Seven months into the war that began on February 28, China’s diplomacy has been rich in principles and thin on procedures. Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Iranian counterpart Seyyed Abbas Araghchi on September 16 that the region’s security architecture was imperfect and needed reform and strengthening.

That is the right diagnosis. Beijing does not need to replace Washington as the Gulf’s security guarantor. However, it does need to show that its access can produce something more durable than another call for restraint.

China’s stake in the region is real and goes beyond Iran. It imported about half its crude oil and almost a third of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the Middle East in 2025, according to Columbia University’s Centre on Global Energy Policy. Beijing has also absorbed much of the energy shock, cutting crude imports from 11.7 million barrels a day in February to less than 9 million by late May, accounting for about 74 per cent of the decline in global crude imports.

The more difficult question is leverage. Gulf governments have been under direct fire, with the UAE alone reporting being targeted by at least 2,800 Iranian missiles and drones between February 28 and the April ceasefire. They will want to know whether Beijing is prepared to use its standing with Tehran. Analysts have noted that Wang has stopped short of pressing Iran and offered no concrete mediation plan.

That does not mean Beijing should coerce Tehran. It means China should say what it will actually do: put proposals on the table, name a venue and be clear about what it will ask of Iran as well as of the United States. Credibility with Gulf countries has to be built on specifics.

The 2023 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran shows what is missing. China helped broker the deal in a genuine act of convening power. However, the International Crisis Group found that progress in restoring relations had plateaued after the initial rush of reopened embassies and visits by senior officials. Normalisation is not crisis management. A reopened embassy does little when a commercial vessel is attacked and there is no agreed channel for the parties to talk.

China could lend its support to a standing Gulf crisis management mechanism, one with a deliberately modest mandate that is built alongside Iran and the Gulf states. It could cover direct lines of communication, a shared procedure for reporting maritime incidents, emergency consultations when tensions spike and agreed protocols for protecting civilian shipping and critical infrastructure.

The mechanism would not settle political disputes or replace security partnerships. Rather, its purpose would be to keep miscalculations at sea from becoming a wider war. The 1972 US-Soviet Incidents at Sea agreement did not end their Cold War rivalry, but it made collisions less likely to spiral out of control.

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Building blocks for the mechanism already exist. In the first week after the US and Israel attacked Iran, China held talks with Tehran so crude oil and LNG from Qatar could safely pass through the strait. Oman has acted as an intermediary among Iran, the US and other Gulf states, as has Qatar. Pakistan has put itself forward as a mediator and co-authored a five-point plan with China in March.

Gulf states could still reject the mechanism, and their reasons should be respected. There is a lack of consensus as the war has widened the gap between Saudi Arabia – which has taken a more accommodating approach towards Iran – and the UAE, which is more hawkish and aligned with the US. Any mechanism must be regionally owned and encompass functions every participant can accept.

There is logic behind China’s reticence to directly involve itself. Military entanglement in the Gulf could be costly and hard to end. However, if its partners conclude that its influence works for trade and investment but not in a crisis, China’s economic weight will not turn into political confidence.

The test is not whether China can replace the US in the Gulf. It is whether its influence can keep any miscalculation from spilling over into a wider war.