Seoul shouldn’t pursue nuclear submarine purely as ‘status symbol,’ says US Navy official

A South Korean Navy Sejong the Great-class Aegis destroyer leads a formation of ships during a maritime firing drill on Oct. 13, 2016, with the US. (via ROK Navy)

A high-ranking US Navy official stressed that South Korea’s push to acquire nuclear-powered submarines must be backed by a clear strategic need to operate beyond the Korean Peninsula, rather than a desire for a mere “status symbol.”

The official also suggested that while the US’ recent scaling back of joint military exercises with South Korea does not necessarily weaken deterrence against North Korea, Pyongyang could misread those changes.

Speaking with the Hankyoreh and other foreign correspondents on Wednesday, the US Navy official said that Washington had indicated it was “happy to help” Korea acquire nuclear-powered submarines but noted that “you don’t need a nuclear submarine if you never leave the Korean area.”

“Korea’s got to find the right reason to have a nuclear submarine,” the official said. “We can’t tell you what that reason is.”

“If Korea is buying it because it’s a status symbol, then that’s the wrong reason,” the official added.

The remarks suggest that before committing the enormous sums required to field nuclear-powered submarines, Seoul should first articulate a strategic requirement, such as operations beyond the Korean Peninsula.

In a follow-up explanation after the briefing, the US Navy said the official’s point was that decisions to acquire military assets should be based on national security needs and actual operational use.

In the briefing, the Navy official referred to previous calls by US Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle for the Korean Navy to expand its operations beyond the region.

During a visit to Korea last November, Caudle said that using a Korean nuclear-powered submarine “to counter China” would be “a natural expectation.”

The latest remarks strongly suggest that the US Navy thinks Korea’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines should be tied not simply to deterring North Korea around the Korean Peninsula, but to an expanded role for the South Korean Navy across the Indo-Pacific, which would include deterring China.

Asked whether Russian assistance could strengthen North Korea’s submarine technology and capabilities, the official noted that “having submarines does not mean you know how to operate them.”

“The Russians helping North Koreans is concerning,” he said, while adding that “we haven’t seen anything yet that makes us worried.”

The official’s apparent point was that the ability to effectively operate submarines can be as important as their numerical strength or capabilities.

In a follow-up explanation after the briefing, the US Navy said the official was conveying that advanced underwater warfare capabilities require specialized training, maintenance, infrastructure and operational proficiency to be used effectively.

The official also commented on the temporary diversion of US aircraft carriers from the Pacific to the Middle East conflict by stressing that deterrence is about more than numbers alone.

In the same briefing, the official was asked about how recent reductions and adjustments to ROK-US joint military exercises might impact deterrence against North Korea. “I think that the ROK military can handle the North Koreans without any trouble,” he said, while arguing that changes in troop levels or military exercises do not necessarily downgrade military capability.

But the official noted that these changes “might have an impact” on what Kim Jong-un thinks, with the implicit warning that Pyongyang could read them as a sign of diminished US strength.

In regard to challenges faced by the US in its capacity “to build ships and to maintain them,” the official described Korean shipbuilders as “some of the best in the world” and stressed the need for cooperation.

A related question that came up is whether the Trump administration’s “Bridge Strategy” — under which two ships would first be built in Korea or another foreign country while the US works to expand its production capacity — would be too slow to build up the fleet.

“Late or never, right?” the official said.

“Going the way we were, we never would do it,” he said, suggesting that under the previous approach, production capacity might never be expanded.