Beijing only needs the US’ silence

As Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) plane landed at Joint Base Andrews last week, cameras captured US service members adjusting the red carpet laid out for him while Chinese officials waited. It was the image Beijing desired. US President Donald Trump broke with tradition by greeting Xi himself at the base rather than at the White House.

Xi’s 2015 trip made him the fourth Chinese leader to pay a state visit to the US, and none of his predecessors made a second. Xi now has.

The practical driver was a deadline. As Xi landed, Washington announced that the trade truce, due to expire on Nov. 10, would be extended to Jan. 10 next year. The two sides also agreed to cut tariffs on US$30 billion of goods in each direction and to set up a channel for artificial intelligence (AI)-related incidents. China’s commerce ministry said the extension gives both sides room to evaluate their arrangement. What the summit lacked in substance, Beijing made up for in framing, and on Taiwan, the framing is the substance.

According to Chinese media, Xi told Trump that China hopes Washington will “adhere to the correct position of opposing ‘Taiwanese independence.’” Washington’s long-standing formulation is that it does not “support” independence, and “oppose” is a tougher position. By asking the US to “adhere” to a position it has never held, Beijing sets up any US silence to be read as confirmation.

In return, Beijing got silence. The White House’s account did not mention Taiwan or the arms package, and Trump said only that Taiwan was raised, but not discussed at length. Taiwan’s foreign ministry accused Beijing of distorting facts. That is true, but it rebuts China’s position, not its record. The only detailed account of what was said about Taiwan is Beijing’s.

This is how China turns summitry into leverage without winning a concession. A Chinese media account that records China’s demand and omits any US response becomes a reference point that Chinese diplomats can invoke later and that third countries would find as the only version on file. Beijing does not need Washington’s agreement if it controls the narrative of what was understood.

The test is the US$14 billion arms package. It has been in abeyance since Trump met Xi in Beijing in May, and Trump has called arms sales to Taiwan a “very good negotiating chip.” Representative to the US Alexander Yui (俞大?) has urged quick delivery. US Ambassador to China David Perdue said he did not know when the sale would be signed.

The calendar suggests Taipei might be waiting a while. Trump and Xi are to meet again at the APEC summit in Shenzhen on Nov. 18 and 19 and at the G20 in Miami in December.

US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent has said the truce extension is meant to give the leaders time for those meetings. A White House that treats the package as a bargaining chip has every reason to hold it through two more summits. The likeliest outcome is that it slips into next year, and Beijing would read each week’s delay as confirmation that Xi’s words have landed.

There is a wider cost. Internationally, “no clash over Taiwan” reads as a win for Beijing regardless of what was agreed. When the world’s two largest powers trade tariff cuts and warm words while Taiwan barely features in the US account, observers from Southeast Asia to Europe conclude that Taiwan is an item to be managed between Washington and Beijing, not a democracy with its own voice.

Taipei cannot control what Washington says, but it can control how quickly its own account travels. With two more summits before the year ends, three lessons are urgent to learn.

First, Taiwan should prepare before each summit. Responses to Beijing’s likely formulations should be ready for publication within hours of a readout, in English, Japanese and other key languages.

Second, it should rebut the record, not just the claim. Taipei should point out when the only account of an exchange is Beijing’s, and publicly ask Washington to restate its policy under the Taiwan Relations Act and the “six assurances.”

Third, amplify partners. Statements from Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra and the US Congress opposing coercion should be resurfaced in the same news cycle as Chinese media accounts, so the record carries more than one voice.

Beijing understands that summits are remembered through their images and their readouts. It got both in Washington. Before Shenzhen, Taipei needs to make sure that Beijing is not the only one telling the story.

Aadil Brar is a Taipei-based journalist and geopolitical analyst.