How will Trump's economic 'D-Day' plan impact Iran's nuclear, ballistic missile threat? - analysis

The Trump administration’s threat of an “economic D-Day” against Iran sounded impressive but so far appears to have dropped to a bit of a whimper.

It is not clear that any strategic change took place vis-à-vis Iran on Monday, though if Washington decides to go head-to-head with Beijing over Iranian oil, and if China moves in America’s direction on the issue, those events could impact Tehran over time. But the keywords here are “economic,” “if,” and “over time.”

The real “D-Day” (June 6, 1944) was not an economic sanctions campaign; it was one of the largest military ground invasions of all time.

Trump’s unwillingness to use ground forces in Iran, even for targeted operations, such as securing the Strait of Hormuz or removing Iran’s 60% enriched uranium, cannot be covered up by using the catchphrase “D-Day” where it does not apply.

The United States may hope to coax Chinese President Xi Jinping into reducing the oil it gets from Iran, given that it purchases an estimated 90% of that oil, but Jinping has also said “No” plenty of times, and it is unclear what Trump can offer him to sell such an arrangement.

“If” China keeps buying Iranian oil, is the US really going to use force against Chinese ships to block them from moving through Hormuz?

As it is, there is evidence that China has figured out how to dodge America’s blockade in some cases with its shadow fleet maneuvering tactics.

No matter how well this goes, it is a strategy that will only work “over time” – it takes time and patience.

Can Trump own such a long-term campaign?

This will not wear down Iran in a few days or weeks, unless its leadership suddenly completely changes its colors.

Rather, this will only work if the United States and the West are ready to go all in on this strategy for months, if not longer.

Can Trump own such a long-term campaign, which so far is crippling him politically, along with the US economy?

The key question is not whether Iran is being increasingly hurt economically; certainly it is.

Nor is it whether Trump has managed for some weeks here and there to mitigate some of the gas price pains with some of his confounding public relations; sometimes he has.

But the basic economic picture in the US is dark, and if the Americans’ threshold for suffering is much lower than the Iranian regime’s threshold, which is likely the situation, Trump may ditch the strategy before it can work.

Prior to the war, US gas prices were as low as $2.80 a gallon.

They have reached as high as $4.50 since Iran began to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, dropped as low as $3.80 in July, and are now back up to $4.05.

Before the war, an estimated 100 or more ships sailed through Hormuz daily.

At a low point during the war, this dropped to an average of 20 ships exiting per day and 10 entering.

In July, the numbers temporarily jumped to an average of 50 exiting daily and 20 entering.

Now those numbers are back down to 20 exiting and 10 entering.

That is the broader picture, and oil shipping has been even worse, with estimates of average daily shipping down to around 10% of pre-war levels.

The official numbers do not tell the whole story. Both Iran and the US are running clandestine shipping operations, but if gas prices remain as high as they are, that is the bottom line, which could undermine the US’s staying power in this “economic suffering” contest.

Let’s say Israel benefits from the best-case scenario where Trump stays the course on an economic and maximum pressure campaign over the next several months or longer.

How would that make Israel safer from the nuclear and ballistic missile threats?

Such a campaign would reduce Iran’s support of terror proxies and prevent it from getting a strategic upper hand to blackmail the US and the West by using Hormuz as its new regular point to crunch everyone.

In a general sense, having less money could also make it harder to restore its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

But not really.

The debate around Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program

Time and time again, Israel has seen that religious fanatics, from Iran to Hezbollah to Hamas, are ready to use any small amount of funds they receive to finance their most dangerous military options at the expense of helping their civilian populations.

Since the full-on part of the early 2026 war ended, Iran has been working at a furious speed to repair and rebuild aspects of its missile program and possibly aspects of its nuclear program.

And it has, at least in some months since the war ended, received billions of dollars from China and Russia – so there is money there.

The status of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missiles program is hotly debated.

Israel certainly succeeded in setting Iran back on the nuclear issue in June 2025, given that 15 months have passed and the Islamic Republic is nowhere near developing a weapon in the near future.

It also set back Iran’s missile program, given that estimates were at one point that it had 2,500 to 3,000 missiles and the capacity to build 100 to 300 additional missiles per month, eventually reaching 5,000, 6,000, or even 8,000 missiles – and now it is down to under 1,000, possibly only several hundred.

Further, while how many new missiles it can produce now is debated, no one doubts that if enough time passes, and with help from China and Russia, the missiles could emerge once again as a separate existential threat from the nuclear program.

Trump’s minimum stated goal at the start of the war was to remove the Islamic Republic’s more than 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium.

That has not been accomplished.

How long do Israel, the US, and the West want to give the regime in Iran to figure out ways in which to charge forward on the nuclear or ballistic missile issues with whatever it has left?