Beyond the acquisition: Strategic next steps for KRI Sriwijaya-100

Bogor, W Java (ANTARA) - The administration of President Prabowo Subianto and Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka will mark two years in office on October 20, 2026.

One development that has drawn significant public attention in the security and defense sector is the arrival of the former Italian aircraft carrier ITS Giuseppe Garibaldi.

Officially renamed KRI Sriwijaya-100 after becoming an Indonesian Navy (TNI AL) asset, the ship arrived at Pier 107, Tanjung Priok Port, North Jakarta, on September 18, 2026, after a long journey from Italy that began on August 24.

Its arrival was welcomed by an Indonesian military marching band, with Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, TNI Commander General Agus Subiyanto, and senior military officials attending the ceremony, including Army Chief of Staff General Maruli Simanjuntak, Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Muhammad Ali, and Air Force Chief of Staff Air Marshal Mohamad Tonny Harjono.

Acquired through a grant mechanism, the former aircraft carrier arrived 33 days before the Prabowo-Gibran administration’s second anniversary. Its entry into service, however, marks only the beginning of a much larger institutional and doctrinal challenge.

Muhammad Teguh Ariffaiz Nasution, a defense analyst at Horizon Indonesia, said the successful induction of KRI Sriwijaya-100 will depend not simply on Indonesia’s technical ability to operate the ship, but on developing a coherent Concept of Operations (CONOPS).

Fundamental question

The first question, Teguh said, is what Indonesia actually intends to do with the carrier.

He raised three possible primary roles, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), or amphibious support. The choice will determine the force structure, doctrine, organization, training, and supporting capabilities TNI AL must develop around the ship.

“Indonesia now has to answer not simply ‘How do we operate the carrier?’ but ‘How do we build a naval force capable of making meaningful use of a carrier?’” he said.

Aircraft carriers are highly versatile platforms, but treating the ship as a “Swiss Army knife” for ad hoc taskings could produce an incoherent concept of employment. TNI AL therefore needs to establish the ship’s primary operational function before assigning secondary roles.

The carrier can operate a substantial helicopter force, and statements from Indonesian presidential and Navy officials suggest HADR could initially be a major focus. Navy Chief of Staff Muhammad Ali said the ship could support forest-fire operations as a mobile operating base for more than 10 helicopters from the Navy, Air Force, and Army.

HADR: Highly visible role

According to Teguh, HADR would be a useful and highly visible role given Indonesia’s vulnerability to natural disasters and its geography as an archipelagic state.

The ship could also serve as an amphibious-support platform, but it lacks a well deck like a Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) or Landing Platform Dock (LPD). It therefore cannot directly land troops and heavy vehicles from sea to shore like an amphibious assault ship.

It can, however, operate a large helicopter fleet and function as a Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH), rapidly transporting light Marine Corps forces and equipment from sea to shore.

ASW is another possibility. The vessel was originally designed for an ASW role in the Italian Navy. Under an ASW-oriented CONOPS, it could become the centerpiece of a task group composed of frigates and other surface combatants. A large helicopter detachment could deploy multiple ASW helicopters over a wide area using sonobuoys and dipping sonar to locate submarines and engage them with lightweight torpedoes.

“This would be particularly relevant to Indonesia given its extensive maritime territory, strategic sea lanes, and the increasing importance of undersea warfare,” Teguh said.

Coherent CONOPS

For KRI Sriwijaya-100 to become a genuinely capable TNI AL asset, a coherent CONOPS is indispensable because it will dictate the organizational and doctrinal changes required for full integration.

If HADR is the primary role, the carrier would initially serve predominantly in a non-combat capacity. This could provide an easier and faster path to induction and adaptation because TNI AL would not immediately need to define the ship’s precise role in the main combat fleet or address the shortage of suitable escort ships.

“If the carrier is primarily intended for HADR, its requirements for high-end combat integration would naturally be lower. However, making HADR the carrier’s primary purpose could also leave some of the platform’s naval aviation potential underutilized,” Teguh said.

Japan’s JS Hyuga illustrates that distinction. The ship has participated in disaster-relief operations, including after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, while its broader force-design role remains centered on maritime warfare, particularly ASW.

“The lesson is that an aviation ship can provide substantial HADR capability without necessarily making HADR its primary operational purpose,” Teguh noted.

ASW platforms

If ASW becomes the primary role, the implications for TNI AL’s fleet structure, organization, and doctrine would be significant. The carrier would form the core of an ASW task group and require an air wing equipped for aerial ASW.

TNI AL currently has limited dedicated ASW helicopter capability. Its Airbus AS565 Panther fleet provides useful maritime aviation capability but is insufficient to generate a large carrier-based ASW air wing. Indonesia would therefore need additional dedicated ASW helicopters.

The task group itself would also require ASW-capable surface combatants, particularly frigates with suitable sonar and anti-submarine weapons, as well as air-defense escorts to protect the carrier and other high-value units from aircraft, missiles, and other threats.

TNI AL faces limitations in both areas. Planned Balaputradewa-class frigates could provide part of the carrier’s air-defense screen, but their initial numbers will remain limited. Indonesia also lacks a large force of high-end ASW surface combatants, especially ships equipped with modern variable-depth or towed-array sonar.

A high-end ASW force cannot rely only on hull-mounted sonar. Combining hull-mounted sonar, towed-array or variable-depth sonar, helicopters, maritime patrol aircraft, and other sensors would provide a more capable underwater surveillance architecture.

An ASW-oriented CONOPS would therefore require much more than additional helicopters, it would require an entire ASW task-group capability centered on the carrier.

Amphibious-support role

As an amphibious-support platform, the carrier would complement TNI AL’s existing amphibious fleet, including LPDs and Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs), by providing dedicated rotary-wing aviation.

Operating as an LPH within an amphibious task force, it could add substantial value. LPDs and LSTs would provide most heavy troop, vehicle, and equipment transport, while the aviation ship would provide helicopter lift for rapid deployment of light, helicopter-borne Marine forces from sea to shore or farther inland.

“It could also potentially operate attack helicopters, providing an amphibious force with an additional source of organic close air support, subject to the availability of suitable aircraft and the development of necessary operating procedures,” Teguh said.

The organizational and doctrinal implications would remain significant. In an amphibious concept, the carrier would primarily join TNI AL’s amphibious warfare force rather than the fleet’s main combat force.

“Its operational employment would frequently involve sailing alongside amphibious transports rather than operating with high-speed surface combatants,” Teguh noted.

That concept would also represent an adaptation of the vessel’s original design philosophy. Built for the Italian Navy’s main combat fleet with a strong initial emphasis on ASW, the ship can reach speeds exceeding 30 knots.

“This makes it one of the faster major vessels currently entering TNI AL service. Its speed gives Indonesia the flexibility to employ it either with an amphibious force or, with an appropriate supporting fleet, as part of a high-speed naval task group,” Teguh concluded.

*Rahmad Nasution is a journalist at the ANTARA News Agency

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the ANTARA News Agency.