Olmert reveals intelligence breakthrough leading to Israel's 2007 strike on Syrian nuclear reactor

Former prime minister Ehud Olmert provided new details of Israel’s operation to destroy a Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007 during an interview with Channel 12 on Monday.

In the interview with Channel 12’s Amit Segal, Olmert said the intelligence breakthrough began with a Mossad officer referred to as “Anat,” who became convinced that Syria was pursuing a nuclear program despite being told there was no evidence pointing towards such a program.

After completing her training, Anat requested to work on Syrian nuclear activity rather than Iran, Olmert said.

“She had an instinct,” he said. “During the course and exposure to bits of intelligence that agents are exposed to, she felt there was something there. That was enough for her.”

Anat faced resistance from her superiors, including after two operations involving Ibrahim Othman, head of Syria’s Atomic Energy Commission, failed to produce evidence of a nuclear program.

'Anat' remained in the Mossad, became senior official

“One of her commanders told her: ‘Stop confusing your mind; we’ve already carried out two operations on Ibrahim Othman, and we haven’t discovered anything. There’s nothing; what do you want from us?’” Olmert said.

He said she was later summoned to a hearing over her continued work. She nevertheless remained in the Mossad and eventually became a senior official.

Olmert said former Mossad chief Meir Dagan later invited Anat to a discussion about the operation that led to the reactor’s discovery, despite her junior rank.

Dagan told Olmert that he had a rule of inviting people who might “tell me what others were not saying,” Olmert recalled.

The intelligence eventually reached Olmert, who was prime minister at the time.

At a meeting attended by Dagan, Tamir Pardo, Amnon Sofrin, and another Mossad official whose identity remained classified, Olmert received the intelligence.

After they left, Olmert summoned his advisers Yoram Turbowicz and Shalom Turgeman.

“I told them: ‘There is a nuclear reactor in Syria, we will destroy it,’” Olmert said.

“We will not deal with the question of how it happened that we did not know, but rather we will do everything so that it does not exist,” he recalled telling them.

The operation included preparations for the possibility of war with Syria. Olmert said Israel considered abducting Othman, who had been an important intelligence target during the investigation, in order to obtain evidence that could establish that Syria had built a nuclear reactor.

Israel ultimately destroyed the reactor in September 2007 in an airstrike on the facility at al-Kibar in eastern Syria. Israel formally acknowledged its responsibility for the strike in 2018.

Olmert said maintaining secrecy was critical because Israel’s strategic advantage depended on Syria not knowing that its nuclear project had been discovered.

He estimated that about 2,500 people knew that Israel was conducting surveillance related to the reactor. Those involved were required to sign declarations that a leak would lead to a Shin Bet investigation, he said.

Olmert also said he held key meetings at his official residence rather than the Prime Minister’s Office to reduce the risk of the operation being exposed.

“The fact that it didn’t leak from you is a big deal,” Olmert recalled the then US president, George W. Bush, telling him. “The fact that it didn’t leak from us – it’s a miracle.”

Olmert said Syria’s nuclear program represented an existential threat to Israel, even though he did not believe Syrian President Bashar al-Assad would necessarily have used a nuclear weapon against Israel.

“I don’t think so,” Olmert said when asked whether Assad would have used a bomb. “But it’s not a risk I can take.”

He also said that, despite Israel’s knowledge of the reactor, he continued to consider the possibility of a peace agreement with Assad over the Golan Heights.

“Assad tried to deceive me, and it turned out that in the end I deceived him,” Olmert said.

Olmert distinguished October 7 from nuclear threat

Olmert said the October 7 attack and the 1973 Yom Kippur War did not constitute existential threats in the same sense as the prospect of Syria acquiring nuclear weapons. He argued that Israel could recover from a conventional attack, while a nuclear strike would have consequences “unlike anything we have experienced in our 80 years of existence.”

“There is a difference between a few thousand Nubah fighters and a nuclear bomb,” Olmert said. “A second blow comes after you take a blow, and if you take a nuclear blow – the dimensions of the disaster are unlike anything we have experienced in our 80 years of existence.”

Olmert said the possibility of a nuclear-armed Syria would have affected Israel even if Assad himself had been unlikely to use the weapon.

“I don’t think so,” he said when asked whether Assad would have used a bomb. “But it’s not a risk I can take.” He said that living under a nuclear threat could have had broader consequences for Israeli society, including prompting people to leave the country.

Towards the end of his conversation with Channel 12, Olmert told Segal that he didn’t believe that things would also turn out for the worst. When asked if enemy states’ nuclear proliferation aspirations would one day be fulfilled, Olmert answered, saying, “30 years ago, Saudi Arabia led the Arab boycott; today the Gulf states are making peace.”

“We need to protect Israel, but also be open to dialogue and be human,” he added.