Opinion: Opinion | Why India Cannot Keep 'Overestimating' Its Value To Washington

A few days before Donald Trump met Xi Jinping in Washington, I argued in these pages that the summit would reveal how much Washington values India after negotiating with its main rival. I outlined three possible results: Trump could get a big concession from China, the two sides could reach a limited deal that keeps the rivalry going, or the talks could fail. The summit led to the second outcome, though it was less substantial than the White House ceremony suggested. For India, the most important development was about Taiwan. Now, Washington treats its support for a partner as something it can trade with Beijing. This shift means India should reconsider how it values itself to the United States.

Managed Competition

Both sides agreed to extend their trade truce by just two months, which was less than most people expected. They also decided to create a working group on agricultural trade, with talks planned before the end of the year. Scott Kennedy from the Center for Strategic and International Studies called the results on trade, rare earths, refined oil, investment, and artificial intelligence limited and uncertain. Chinese analysts told reporters the relationship remains as tense as before.

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A two-month extension means both sides must check in often. Each government can watch the other's actions and put pressure again if needed. Regular meetings between the two leaders help keep things stable. This was their second meeting this year, after Trump went to Beijing in May. Trump will visit China again for the APEC summit in November, and Xi will come to Miami for the G20 summit in December. Experts call this setup managed competition. The two countries compete strongly but keep talking so problems do not get out of hand. Frequent meetings let both sides solve issues before they become crises.

Both leaders benefit from this approach. Xi can show his people that China is dealing with the United States as an equal while still growing its economy, technology, and military. Trump can show American farmers and businesses that his direct talks with Xi are getting results. For India, the key question is what each side had to give up to reach this point.

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Taiwan As A Bargaining Chip

The clearest example is Taiwan. After the May summit in Beijing, Washington paused a record USD 14 billion arms package for Taiwan. Trump called arms sales to Taiwan a “very good negotiating chip” with China. After last week's meeting, analysts in Washington expect the delay to continue, since the two leaders will meet twice more this year. The White House fact sheet did not mention Taiwan. China's official account of the talks recorded that Xi asked Washington to oppose Taiwanese independence. On Sunday, the American ambassador to China, David Perdue, said Trump described the Taiwan sale to Xi as just one of many regular American arms sales and even asked whether China itself would like to buy American weapons.

A Chinese scholar close to the government explained it simply before the summit. He said the results had been good for China because of the pause on American military exports. The deal was not balanced. China got a real strategic benefit, while the United States only got promises about farm purchases that may not happen.

This imbalance has a clear reason. In October 2025, China responded to American tariffs by limiting exports of rare earths, which are important for American industry and defence. Washington eased its stance within weeks. China had leverage and used it to influence the relationship. Now, lawmakers from both parties in the US, along with the government in Taipei, are urging the administration to approve the Taiwan arms deal. Whether they succeed will show how much Congress can still influence Trump's China policy.

What US Thinks Of Its 'Friends'

In my own research for a Takshashila study on American decision-making, I interviewed 42 current and former officials, congressional staff, and policy experts in the US earlier this year. The study found that Washington now values its partnerships less and is less willing to pay a political price to keep them. I call this change repricing. The pause on Taiwan is the clearest sign of repricing since the study ended. When support for one partner becomes a bargaining chip with China, the value of every partner is up for negotiation.

India has already experienced this directly. In August 2025, Washington raised tariffs on Indian goods to 50% while working out a deal with Beijing. China responded with rare earth controls, and Washington changed its approach. India lacked a similar tool and had to accept the penalty for six months. Many in New Delhi have believed that India's importance to Washington increases as US-China rivalry grows. The events of 2025 challenged that belief. On September 18, President Trump signed a law, passed by large majorities in both houses of Congress, that allows tariffs of up to 100% on the largest buyers of Russian oil and gas, including India. China falls under the same law, yet a week later Xi arrived in Washington with rare earths as his counter-leverage. Last week's summit confirmed the lesson.

The comparison with Taiwan has limits. India is a sovereign power with its own influence, and the real issue is Washington's approach. New Delhi uses a similar approach with Beijing. Since the border disengagement deal in October 2024, India has steadily reopened its channels with China. Prime Minister Modi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin in August 2025, and direct flights between the two countries started again on 26 October 2025 after five years. India maintains a working relationship with China while still seeing it as a rival. India should judge Washington by the same standards it uses for itself.

The main lesson is about the kind of value India creates. Some of India's value to Washington came from the tension between the US and China. For example, India became attractive for supply chains moving out of China, but this advantage fades when Washington and Beijing lower tariffs. Other strengths keep their value no matter what happens between the US and China. India's naval presence in the Indian Ocean, reliable large-scale manufacturing, and a defence industry that can support regional partners fall into this group. The more India builds these strengths, the less it depends on the ups and downs between Washington and Beijing.

What To Watch

The next test is coming up soon. Indian readers should follow whether the Taiwan arms deal moves forward after Trump's November trip to China. If the deal remains on hold after the Miami meeting in December, it means repricing has become US policy. If Washington approves the deal, the pause was just a tactic for this round of talks. Either way, New Delhi will see how Washington balances a partner's security against making a deal with Beijing, and India should plan its own partnerships based on that lesson.

(The author is a Research Fellow in the Geostrategy Program at the Takshashila Institution)