ANALYSIS: Can Africa turn Red Sea rivalries to its advantage?

Ongoing conflict in the Middle East exposes shifting regional geopolitical fault lines that are pulling African states into an emerging macro-conflict system anchored along the Red Sea.

This stems from several overlapping crises arising from US and Israeli military offensives against Iran and renewed Houthi attacks on shipping lanes, Saudi-Emirati competition across the Horn of Africa, and disputes amongst African states over sovereignty and regional influence.

Should these crises deepen and become self-reinforcing, the implications for African states across much of the Red Sea littoral could be dire.

The most recent US and Israeli offensive against Iran has added to these dynamics. Iran’s retaliatory offensives against Gulf actors have called into question longstanding presumptions about the US’s reliability in providing security for its traditional Gulf allies.

That in turn has precipitated more overt hedging strategies among regional powers, most notably the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. Their prior security coordination to counter Iranian influence has buckled under the weight of opposing conceptions of regional order and claims to regional leadership.

Abu Dhabi projects power through expansive investments in ports and infrastructure, and through ties to non-state armed actors and secessionist movements in Yemen, Sudan, Libya and Somalia. It has also deepened engagement with Israel since normalising relations with Jerusalem under the 2020 Abraham Accords.

Riyadh has sought to undercut Abu Dhabi’s efforts by backing recognised central state authorities and building countervailing partnerships with like-minded regional actors. Its closer coordination with Egypt, Pakistan and Turkey points to its growing efforts to reinforce state-centric alliances, constrain the UAE and hedge against Abu Dhabi’s close ties with Israel.

This fluid security environment raises the stakes for African states along the Red Sea, which can offer access to ports, airfields, intelligence and security partnerships.

Landlocked Ethiopia seeks sea access to reduce its heavy dependence on Djibouti. Somaliland’s Berbera port appealed because the Emirati-owned logistics company, DP World, had already developed the port, an economic zone and a transport corridor to Ethiopia.

But since the controversial 2024 Ethiopia-Somaliland cooperation memorandum, Ethiopia and Somalia recommitted to each other’s territorial integrity in the Turkish-brokered Ankara Declaration, agreeing to negotiate Ethiopian commercial sea access under Somalia’s sovereign authority.

This has not, however, removed Ethiopia from Gulf competition. Turkey has become an important mediator between Ethiopia and Somalia, while the UAE retains deep commercial and political ties with Ethiopia and Somaliland.

Meanwhile, 2026 reports of UAE-linked training and logistics networks supporting Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from Ethiopian territory (which both Ethiopia and the UAE deny) have heightened regional tensions.

Africa’s Red Sea states

Egypt, by contrast, controls the Suez Canal, has substantial military and naval capabilities and is strategically positioned at the Red Sea’s northern end. Disruption around the Bab al-Mandab Strait directly hits Suez traffic and Egyptian revenues, while instability in Sudan and Somalia weighs heavily on Cairo’s security interests.

Egypt’s longstanding rivalry with Ethiopia has drawn Cairo into closer alignment with Saudi Arabia. Tensions have escalated since the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was inaugurated in September 2025 and Ethiopia revived plans for three more dams on the Blue Nile.

Cairo has responded by working to undercut Addis Ababa, opposing Ethiopia’s sea-access claims and unilateral control over Blue Nile waters, and bolstering ties with Eritrea.

Sudan’s value to Gulf actors lies in both its war and its geography. Port Sudan is a crucial gateway for the weapons, logistics and personnel inflows sustaining the conflict. The UAE faces persistent allegations of backing the RSF, which it denies, while Egypt and Saudi Arabia have generally kept closer ties with the Sudanese Armed Forces.

Somalia’s federal government decision in January 2026 to cut ties with the UAE was rejected by breakaway Somaliland and autonomous Puntland (and Jubaland), all of which have their own Emirati relationships. Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, however, have deepened engagement with the federal government.

Europe also has a role in this complex security landscape. The European Union (EU) maintains a substantial maritime presence through Operation ASPIDES, which protects commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and Operation ATALANTA, which covers the Western Indian Ocean and parts of the Red Sea.

A July 2026 EU-Djibouti agreement on ASPIDES underlines European navies’ reliance on African partners for access, logistics and onshore support.

In Somalia, the EU runs a civilian capacity-building mission and a military training mission, alongside anti-piracy initiatives. It is building maritime law enforcement and coast-guard capacity in Mogadishu, Somaliland and Puntland, with an emphasis on accountable security institutions and maritime governance.

This is a very different model of influence from the Gulf powers, who attach their support to greater access to ports, political patronage and strategic infrastructure in the Horn.

As African states along the Red Sea are pulled into the geopolitical orbit of rival Gulf powers, how sustainable are these partnerships and how might they change?

Gulf investment in ports, logistics, energy and other strategic infrastructure will probably continue, spurring deeper defence and security coordination. Commercial deals may become increasingly bundled with defence, security and intelligence commitments – a more compelling offer than anything Europe can provide.

The risk, however, is that African states become entrenched in rival security architectures and geopolitical alignments that narrow their room for manoeuvre.

This leaves Africa’s Red Sea countries facing a policy dilemma. They could engage Middle Eastern powers through a coordinated approach that channels external competition towards a common development agenda. Or they could continue the current fragmented bilateral engagements that provide immediate investment, diplomatic backing and help with pressing security-related concerns.

But the short-term gains of bilateralism come at the expense of longer-term shared development and stability.

The African Union could help by assigning North and East African states a leading role in shaping the continent’s engagement with Middle Eastern powers. Their proximity to the Red Sea and growing value to external players give them outsized access and influence that could be exercised on the continent’s behalf.

The central question is whether Africa will harness this new value to advance shared development or allow it to deepen the continent’s fragmentation.

Priyal Singh is a Senior Research Consultant at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and Geopolitical Analyst at Signal Risk.

This article was first published by ISS Today. We have their permission to republish.