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Friday, November 20, 2026

IDF personnel is a strategic pillar of Israel’s national security, and it's under threat - opinion

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The IDF’s personnel are one of the central pillars of the military's strength. That strength also stems from the “People’s Army” model, a fundamental strategic asset that enables the IDF to build a military force based on qualitative superiority. Human resources and their quality are not merely a basic condition for the IDF’s existence; they also directly affect its size, quality, and ability to contend with persistent threats.

The structure and organization of the IDF’s personnel is unique compared with those of almost every other military in the world. It is based on a combination of three main components: compulsory service, career service including civilian employees, and the reserves. Together, and in full synergy, these three components form the IDF’s MP force structure and determine its strength during peacetime and war.

Like some earlier articles I have published in this newspaper, this article summarizes a comprehensive study of IDF personnel conducted as part of the "Nagel Committee on the Defense Budget". It focuses mainly on the career service members and on the technological corps, while also addressing key aspects of the compulsory service and the reserves.

Compulsory service members form the core from which the IDF is built. They are also the pool from which commanders are developed, and the career service and reserve forces are replenished. Career service members are the command and management backbone, responsible for continuity, expertise, and the management of the IDF’s institutional knowledge.

The reserve force is built from the regular military, both compulsory and career personnel, and serves as a strategic force that complements the IDF’s operational capabilities, as has been clearly demonstrated over the past three years and continues to be demonstrated today.

Haredi protesters gather outside the Tel Hashomer IDF base in Kiryat Ono on November 1, 2026.
Haredi protesters gather outside the Tel Hashomer IDF base in Kiryat Ono on November 1, 2026. (credit: AVSHALOM SASSONI)

Each component has a different service model, but they are, of course, interconnected and affect one another. Any crisis or major reform in one component has a direct effect on the other two.

Changes in IDF personnel policy in recent years

In recent years, the IDF’s service models have undergone significant changes, including shortening the compulsory service, changing the career-service model, and enacting a new Reserve Service Law. Changes in Israel's security, economic, and demographic environment make it essential to continually review these models and adapt the personnel policy to evolving circumstances and force-building requirements, to safeguard the security of the State of Israel. Some of the changes that were implemented created severe crises across almost every component.

The crisis affecting IDF personnel began, for a variety of reasons, before the war, and it has deepened and spread during the war. Addressing it properly requires time, managerial attention, changes to the organizational culture, and substantial resources. It also requires separating the management of all service members from the standard procedures and constraints of the regular civil service.

The "Nagel Committee," which I had the honor and privilege of chairing, reached a clear conclusion: without a deep, root-level response to the personnel crisis, the IDF and the country could find themselves in a situation from which it would be very difficult to recover. The committee concluded that we are approaching “the 90th minute” and a point of no return on this issue. Some of the proposed solutions were adopted and have already been implemented following decisions by the prime minister and the cabinet, including their budgetary implications. But what has been done so far will not be enough to resolve the crisis.

Given the limited space for an op-ed, I will focus mainly on the career service ("keva") group, while also noting a few important issues regarding the compulsory service and the reserves.

Compulsory service

Compulsory service is a central component of Israel’s security and social policy. Under the law, all citizens are required to serve in the military. Unfortunately, the law is not being enforced, and nearly half of those eligible for conscription do not enlist in the IDF or perform alternative national service. This is not limited to the ultra-Orthodox.

Conscription was one of the main sources of political friction before, during, and after the last elections. In keeping with my practice of avoiding political issues in my writing, I will limit myself to presenting the clear recommendation of the Nagel Committee, a recommendation that required considerable effort to reach by consensus among all committee members.

The quality of the IDF’s personnel, which is Israel’s greatest strategic advantage, stems from the “People’s Army” model.

Over the past two decades, changing needs, demographic shifts, and social and economic factors have led to changes in the length of the compulsory service. Men currently serve 32 months, compared with 36 months until 2015, and before the war the trend was even toward further reductions. The changing security reality and the lessons of the war halted, for now, further reductions. However, there is an urgent operational need to increase the number of conscripts immediately and restore compulsory service to 36 months.

The need to extend service stems, among other things, from the large number of fallen and wounded who will not return to combat, the expansion of the theaters, the expected fundamental change in border-defense doctrine, and the heavy burden of missions. Increasing the number of conscripts is necessary to reinforce existing formations, establish new ones, and, of course, urgently reduce the burden on the reserves.

The committee recommended that the “People’s Army” model, meaning equal compulsory service for all citizens, is a foundational principle of Israeli society, serving security, social, and civic goals alike, particularly as Israel faces persistent security threats. All citizens have equal rights and obligations and are expected to share the burden of service. Any change should be implemented gradually and in keeping with the IDF’s capacity to recruit and absorb personnel and with its operational needs.

Recognizing and compensating service members, while preserving differentiated recognition for combat soldiers who risk their lives, is essential and morally right. It is also an integral part of building public trust in the military.

Career Service

David Ben-Gurion once wrote: “In my opinion, conditions must be created so that capable and talented young people will want to join the career army, and personal concerns will not prevent them from doing so. The state must put these matters in order if it wants to ensure that it has an outstanding army.”

Career service is the IDF’s foundation. Career service members command the military, lead it, and are responsible for building and employing its capabilities. The structure, size, quality, and management of career service have profound implications for the IDF’s performance. In the current war, we have seen the paramount importance of high-quality commanders at every level and across every component, taking personal responsibility and leading with intensity and continuity.

Since its establishment, the career-service system has undergone, and continues to undergo, many internal processes and changes, driven by global and local, national, social, and economic trends. These changes challenge the IDF’s efforts to retain high-quality career personnel. Over the years, and almost every decade, significant reforms, some of them contradictory, have reshaped the system. The composition of the career force has changed, and job security has weakened for most service members.

I will not detail every change, but the most prominent was the 2016 Kahlon–Ya’alon agreement, which still serves as the IDF’s career-service model. After nearly a decade in operation, it is clear that the harm it has caused far outweighs the benefits it has delivered.

The following are some of its effects.

Severe professional damage

The loss of highly knowledgeable, skilled, and experienced personnel.

Paradoxically, specialists, centers of expertise, and technologists are being driven and pushed out, including from fields facing acute shortages.

Declining quality in personnel

The quality of personnel has suffered, and the IDF is struggling to fill existing career-service positions. Tenure in roles has shortened, the pool of candidates for positions has narrowed, and some roles have almost no candidate pool at all, leading in some cases to mediocrity.

Reduced willingness to continue serving: Even before the war, officers and noncommissioned officers were becoming less willing to continue in career service.

Among career personnel, there are growing and worrying signs of reluctance to continue serving after the war, although it is important to note that willingness has increased in some parts of the military.

Weakened job security, predictability

Paradoxically, despite its professional nature, most of the career force has become a system without job tenure. The IDF has become the only body in the public sector that, under the law, unilaterally dismisses roughly one-third of its officers each year once they reach about 14 years of service.

Excessive management constraints: "Numerical" oversight and control mechanisms were introduced in the name of economic efficiency, including retirement targets, quotas, and retirement ages. These mechanisms wrongly introduced a technocratic dimension into the sensitive task of managing people.

Many decisions about individuals are now made based on technical considerations, average age, and cost, rather than human-resources management considerations such as operational needs, quality, performance, and sensitivity to individuals’ expectations. It is essential to manage this critical resource properly and efficiently through better mechanisms that make this possible.

Faulty planning assumptions

The IDF finds itself replacing its entire entry-level career-service cohort every two years to fill its ranks.

The model projected seven to nine years of service at the rank of major, whereas in practice the current average is four to five years before promotion to lieutenant colonel.

Hundreds of leading majors choose to leave on their own initiative, largely because the shift to a defined-contribution pension makes it possible, and sometimes even encourages them to retire.

The technological corps

Technological personnel are among the strategic assets on which the IDF relies in the technological world we all inhabit. Training in this field takes a very long time, and the IDF invests substantial resources in each individual. Under the current model, a career-service technologist is released by the system at an average age of 42, like other career personnel, despite the many years of education and training invested in them.

This is creating critical gaps in the technological corps. The IDF is losing the unique knowledge and experience of officers just as they reach the peak of their abilities. Officers in this corps are required to support combat forces on the battlefield and build the systems of the future, as the current fighting has demonstrated. Yet some are leaving, against their will, at the height of their careers.

Combat and support forces: These forces have been fighting continuously for three years and coping with an unusually heavy operational workload, creating significant strain on family life. The burden wears down service members and raises serious questions about their willingness to continue in career service. Among the contributing factors are the impact on the spouse’s earning capacity and the resilience of the family unit.

Harm to service members

Some parts in the public have become less appreciative of career personnel and have come to value their service less.

The Nagel Committee presented a broad set of recommendations for career service, some of which have been implemented. I will not detail them here; they are described in the published, unclassified section of the committee’s report.

The committee did not reach consensus on when the career-service model should be dealt with and maybe changed. The majority believed that, although fundamental change is clearly needed, now is not the time, because another major change to the current model would cause further upheaval, which is undesirable at this moment, especially while the IDF is engaged in continuous fighting and faces additional challenges in the near future.

The majority’s position was that necessary adjustments should be made carefully, and that career personnel should be managed in a thoughtful, tailored, and differentiated way. This should strengthen the professional foundation, create stability, establish a balanced and professional system of role tenures by extending time in positions, and create a high-quality pool of candidates. The minority believed that the change must happen quickly.

In my personal view, now, roughly two years later, it is time to review the career-service model again before it is too late, with particular attention to the technological corps.

The Reserves

The reserve force is a central pillar of Israel’s security doctrine and reflects citizens’ commitment to actively defending the country. After three years of continuous fighting, there is no need to explain to the people of Israel how important the reserves are or what role they play.

The scale of mobilization and the number of reserve-service days that personnel are still performing, especially the unequal distribution of the burden, place an extremely heavy load on service members and extract a substantial economic and social cost from them and their families. They also risk their lives and health and are removed from their normal routines, with serious economic consequences for the individual and their family.

Mobilizing reserves on this scale and for such extended periods also has major economic consequences for the country, mainly because reservists are absent from work and, in some cases, because their spouses’ ability to work is affected.

The government has approved many assistance programs for reservists, including compensation and grants, support for the self-employed and employers, and additional family and financial assistance. These programs come at a high cost, but they are not enough. The reserve force is being worn down, mainly because the burden falls on too small a share of the country’s citizens. That must be corrected.

As I noted at the beginning of this article, the IDF depends on its people, conscripts, reservists, and career personnel. The crisis across all three components is serious. Any formed government must give this issue special attention, including by allocating all the resources it requires.

Brigadier General (res.) Professor Jacob Nagel is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a professor at the Technion. He served as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s National Security Advisor and as Acting Head of the National Security Council.

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