Taiwan no longer just a US-China problem
By Bonnie Yushih Liao 廖雨詩
Beijing has for decades insisted that Taiwan is a matter to be settled between China and the US — or, preferably, by China alone. The strategic environment around Taiwan is making that increasingly difficult.
The clearest evidence this week came not from Washington or Beijing, but from Tokyo.
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on Tuesday met with US President Donald Trump before his summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平).
Taiwan is expected to feature prominently in US-China talks, particularly as Beijing presses Washington over arms sales to Taipei. However, focusing only on what Trump might or might not concede misses the larger structural change: Taiwan is increasingly becoming part of Japan’s security geography, and therefore part of the wider architecture of US alliances in Asia.
A Taiwan Strait contingency would affect Japan’s southwestern islands, US forces based in Japan, major sea lanes and the First Island Chain. Pressure against Taiwan also increasingly resembles the “gray zone” pressure Japan has experienced around the Diaoyutais (釣魚台), which it calls the Senkaku Islands, so Tokyo has a direct interest in how Taiwan is handled.
Tokyo cannot dictate the US’ Taiwan policy, nor does it oppose US-China dialogue. Communication between the two is necessary for regional stability, but Japan has reason to resist a framework in which Taiwan becomes simply one item in a bilateral bargain.
Dialogue should not come at the expense of deterrence.
Takaichi’s Cabinet reshuffle last week adds another dimension. She replaced more than half of her ministers. In a system characterized by consensus-building and nemawashi — informal coordination before formal decisions — her choices suggest an emphasis on faster implementation and clearer political control.
She changed much of the political machinery while preserving that of external strategy. This was not a strategic reset, it was closer to strategic acceleration.
Tokyo’s approach to Washington is changing as well. Japan has traditionally sought reassurance from the US regarding the Diaoyutais, extended deterrence and its commitment to the alliance. However, Japan increasingly wants consultation before major US decisions on China.
Taiwan sits near the center of that transition. The formula that “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are important” tells only part of the story. Taiwan is increasingly discussed alongside the East China Sea, Japan’s southwestern islands, semiconductors, critical minerals and economic coercion.
Takaichi’s emphasis on artificial intelligence, semiconductors and critical minerals in her meeting with Trump is significant. Military deterrence and economic security are becoming increasingly difficult to separate.
The world cannot completely decouple from China to avoid its economic coercion, so the US, Japan and their partners need to move from economic resilience to economic deterrence — building an economy that Beijing cannot easily coerce.
Taiwan should view this shift with reassurance and caution. Its security is becoming harder to isolate from the interests of Japan and other US allies. However, that does not guarantee particular US decisions, especially under a transactional president.
Taiwan’s stronger protection lies in embedding itself in the regional architecture, so that changing the “status quo” would impose costs well beyond Taipei and Washington.
Taiwan is moving from diplomatic concern to the structure of allied security. Beijing might continue to call Taiwan a bilateral red line, but geography is making it a multilateral reality.
Bonnie Yushih Liao is Tamkang University Department of Diplomacy and International Relations associate professor.
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