No walk in the park for new Malaysian facilitator tackling Thailand’s southern insurgency
Malaysia’s newly appointed facilitator for the peace talks between the Thai government and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) spent three days in Thailand this past week, introducing himself to a long list of officials.
Lt Gen (Rtd) Datuk Ahmad Norihan Jalal is no stranger to Thailand. A former head of intelligence at Malaysia’s Ministry of Defence, he has strong personal ties with many senior Thai military officers and knows well the staff of the Fourth Army Area, which oversees day-to-day security in the far South.
He is not the first Malaysian military man to hold the post. Gen Tan Sri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, a retired chief of the Malaysian Armed Forces, became facilitator in January 2023. He replaced Tan Sri Abdul Rahim Noor, Malaysia’s fifth Inspector-General of Police and the man who gave Anwar Ibrahim, now Prime Minister, that infamous black eye.
In fact, Zulkifli’s name had been floated as early as the government of Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob, on the belief that a military man would deal better with the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), the grand title the Thai junta gave itself after the May 2014 coup.
Why Zulkifli was replaced after only 18 months remains unclear. He was not dropped altogether, however. He stayed on as Malaysia’s adviser and facilitator for the Mindanao peace process, which suggests a reassignment rather than a falling-out.
Zulkifli shared one view with Thai military leaders: neither wanted the mediation and facilitation crowded with international NGOs and foreign governments. What stalled the talks during his tenure was not the BRN but criticisms from the policy circle of the then-ruling Pheu Thai Party, where some felt the process was too lenient toward the rebels. In truth, nothing concrete was on the table. Both sides were still negotiating the text of the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace (JCPP), the roadmap for the talks.
What disturbed Prof Surachart Bamrungsuk, senior advisor to the Pheu Thai on national security, was the absence of a binding commitment to reduce violence. The veteran academic lashed out at members of the international community, accusing them of siding with the BRN and legitimising its violence while overlooking the political underpinning of these acts. His criticism faded once Anutin Charnvirakul replaced the Pheu Thai government.
The space for foreign involvement opened slightly under Datuk Mohd Rabin Basir, the former Director-General of Malaysia’s National Security Council, who succeeded Zulkifli. But he, too, did not last long.
With Pheu Thai out of the picture, there was hope that the talks would resume and become more than a talking shop. The first Anutin government, which took office in September 2025, toyed with the idea of an “end state” – what Patani would look like if and when peace is achieved.
The second Anutin government, in power since March 2026, went further and began thinking about implementation on issues close to Malay hearts and minds: a national policy giving Bahasa Melayu space to become a working language in Thailand’s public sphere; the promotion of Malay identity to give the nearly two million people of this contested region a sense of pride and ownership; and room for the historical and cultural narrative of Patani to flourish.
A terms of reference agreement for a temporary cessation of violence (TCOV) was due to be signed at a meeting in September 2026. Then, on July 22, a group of combatants shot dead five Paramilitary Rangers at close range. Because the attack was caught on CCTV, it jolted the entire security apparatus.
Security officials froze the talks and demanded an explanation as to why such violence was necessary when the talks were moving in a positive direction. The BRN combatants responded with coordinated attacks on 51 incidents within a four-hour period. Two days later, the tally had passed 78.
Two months on, with the political storm having calmed, the talks are back on track. Norihan became the facilitator, and this past week he came to introduce himself to the wide range of people working on the far South.
The BRN combatants were not about to let the occasion pass without reminding Norihan that resolving the Patani conflict is no walk in the park. Within 48 hours, they carried out multiple IED attacks – in one instance coordinated – across four provinces.
Most troubling was a time bomb planted near a security checkpoint in Satun Province, which injured three students passing in a van, one of them seriously. It is unlikely that the insurgents targeted the students’ van. They usually work to avoid casualties in local communities, whose members generally support – or at least do not inform on – insurgent operations on the ground.
In Songkhla, insurgents hit power poles and other infrastructure in Chana, Sadao and Na Mom districts on 11 November, damaging five utility poles but causing no injuries. Chana is where the Trans Thai-Malaysia pipeline comes ashore; Sadao is a busy border crossing with Malaysia, and one blast there went off about 200 metres from a power plant.
The attacks in Satun and eastern Songkhla mark a notable and troubling expansion of the insurgency’s traditional boundaries. Satun lies outside the usual theatre of separatist violence, and only four Songkhla districts bordering the Malay-speaking region are classified as conflict-affected by the security apparatus.
Predictably, officials are trying to play down the attacks, particularly as the high tourist season begins. Thousands of Malaysians cross at Sadao each month, many of them men seeking solace in the “night entertainment” zones of Hat Yai.
In Yala, a reconnaissance patrol in Than To District from 7-9 November ended in a gunfight with separatist insurgents in which one insurgent was killed. Security officials described him as an operational-level insurgent wanted on five arrest warrants.
On the evening of 10 November, insurgents struck eight locations in Yala in coordinated bombing and arson attacks. Targets included a local administration office, official vehicles, mobile phone towers and security cameras.
At a Tambon Administrative Organisation office in Yala, about 20 attackers tied up five security guards while they torched the premises and official vehicles, including a fire engine, a refuse truck and a pickup. No one was hurt, but the damage was extensive.
The 11 November attacks coincided with Norihan’s call on National Security Council Secretary-General Chaiyapruek Duangprapat at Government House, where he was accompanied by Thailand’s chief negotiator, Thanut Suvarnananda. He then met Wan Muhamad Noor Matha, the chair of the Prime Minister’s advisory board, a fancy title given to him because the ruling party couldn’t find a Cabinet seat for him.
In response to the spate of attacks, Thai politicians like to state the obvious. Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva said the Satun attack showed the insurgents extending their theatre of operations; he urged the Prime Minister to “overhaul” the intelligence agencies for their “repeated failures” to monitor insurgent activities.
Wan Noor sounded a similar note, asking why the intelligence agencies had failed to detect the spread of violence. Neither he nor Abhisit singled out a particular unit – understandably, since just about every agency in Thailand has its own spooks on the ground.
The current wave of the separatist insurgency resurfaced in the far South in 2001 but was not officially acknowledged until 4 January 2004, when scores of the BRN combatants raided an army battalion and made off with about 350 weapons.
Peace talks began under Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra in February 2013, but no government since has been willing to make any meaningful concession to the Malays of Patani or the BRN, the one long standing separatist movement that controls all of the combatants on the ground.
Chief negotiator Thanut is pushing through a number of progressive ideas aimed at winning hearts and minds of the local Malays and give them a sense of ownership of their historical homeland that is now a part of Thailand’s southernmost border provinces. It is not clear, however, what kind of resistance or support he will get from the conservative Thai political and ruling elites.
The two sides are working out the finer details on the TCOV – to limit it to the “red zone” – areas prone to attacks, not the entire Malay-speaking region, which includes the provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and parts of Songkhla.
Some believe that limiting the geographical area for the TCOV will help them obtain a better understanding of the BRN combatants’ capability. Incidentally, after more than two decades of continuous fighting, not to mention repeated ceasefires to demonstrate to the Thais that they are talking to the right people, some officials in Thailand still feel the need to test the water.
The Thai Army has long believed that if it could only sit down with leaders of the BRN’s military wing, it could persuade them to end the conflict. This playbook isn’t new, and it has never worked because the Thai side could never agree on what kind of concession they could make. Each generation of Patani Malay fighters has been followed by another that takes up arms and carries on where the last one left off.
Don Pathan is Thailand-based security analyst and freelance consultant.
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