Reframing the Trump-Xi meeting

Prior to next week’s expected meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), reports have emerged that Beijing has sought to use Xi’s visit to the US as leverage in hopes that Washington would delay new arms sales to Taiwan. Some in US policy circles have also called for the withdrawal of US military personnel assisting with training in Taiwan.

Familiar questions that arose prior to the previous Trump-Xi meeting have resurfaced. Would Trump make concessions to Xi regarding Taiwan? Would the US revert to its policy of strategic ambiguity? Would Taiwan become a bargaining chip in US-China negotiations?

Focusing attention on “how much the US would concede on Taiwan” before the meeting even takes place essentially amounts to allowing Beijing to set the agenda — for US-China relations to remain stable, the Taiwan issue must remain on the table.

This is a noteworthy aspect of Beijing’s recent diplomatic maneuvers. China has once again been repeatedly emphasizing that Taiwan is “the core of the core” of its interests, while attempting to persuade Washington to accept a particular causal argument: US-China relations are unstable because the US and Taiwan have grown too close.

After Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim’s (蕭美琴) visit to Italy last week, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) demanded that France refrain from holding any official exchanges with Taiwan. From Beijing’s perspective, reducing tensions in the Taiwan Strait must always begin with altering the behavior of others.

However, the party that has been steadily increasing military pressure in the Taiwan Strait is not the US, nor is it Taiwan. Beijing the one in the driver’s seat when it comes to military exercises, coast guard activities and “gray zone” operations in the Strait.

Similarly, the recent efforts of the US, Japan and European countries to reduce their supply-chain reliance on China were not requested by Taiwan — rather, the moves are the result of individual countries reassessing the risks of economic coercion and security threats.

If Taiwan is on the agenda at the meeting next week, rather than repeatedly asking what Trump might trade Taiwan in exchange for, the more important question should be to ask Xi what China is prepared to contribute to achieve regional peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

The issue also involves how Taiwan views itself. Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) has put forward the idea of a “symbiotic partnership” between the US and Taiwan, addressing everything from trade and investment to industrial ecosystems. Taking this line of thinking a step further, what Taiwan and the US should really seek to establish is a greater shared understanding of regional risks. Having dealt with China for decades, Taiwan has firsthand experience with Beijing’s decisionmaking, “united front” tactics and “gray zone” operations. That experience could allow Taiwan to play a more proactive role as the US, Japan and Europe re-evaluate their China policies.

Dialogue between US and Chinese leaders could reduce the risk of conflict, which would not necessarily be a bad thing for Taiwan, but “stability” should not mean asking the US to reduce arms sales, Taiwan to scale back its international activities or other countries to limit their interactions with Taiwan.

If Beijing truly hopes that the Trump-Xi meeting would bring stability to the Taiwan Strait, the outside world should also observe whether China reduces military activities around Taiwan, scales back its “gray zone” activities and stops its coast guard for law enforcement as a pretext to alter the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait.

What needs to be addressed is not the “Taiwan issue,” but China.

Wang Hung-jen is a professor in National Cheng Kung University’s Department of Political Science.