Trump’s North Korea outreach is about U.S. politics

U.S. President Donald Trump’s mid-August declaration that he would downsize American participation in joint drills with South Korea due to his “very good” relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has been seized upon by some of his critics as evidence of his favor for dictators over Washington’s traditional democratic allies.

Whatever one thinks of Trump’s approach to negotiations with Kim — as well as his past compliments for him, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping — this statement and the accompanying downsizing of exercises should not be seen as a reflection of a shift in U.S. priorities under Trump toward authoritarian leaders.

Given its timing, and the president’s precarious domestic situation with midterm elections on Nov. 3, this should instead be seen as a political Hail Mary, designed to get Trump’s dealmaking back in the headlines and push his Iran quagmire — not to mention the staggering price increases that conflict has caused — into the background.

And that is why this round of social media diplomacy is unlikely to succeed.

Post-2019 shift

Much can change in seven years and the North Korea of 2026 only superficially resembles the North Korea of 2019, when Trump and Kim met in Hanoi. Its views of the outside world have shifted in such a way as to make diplomacy with the U.S. less important for achieving Pyongyang’s objectives.

When Trump walked away from a deal in Hanoi, judging — not incorrectly, in this author’s view — that the U.S. would be giving away too much and gaining too little, the result was the greatest humiliation of Kim’s decade and a half in power. By the end of 2019, Kim was lamenting that diplomacy with the U.S. had netted nothing and announced a new direction.

In the years that followed, the world just outside the Korean Peninsula has shifted. North Korea is one of the few countries around the world to not only excuse Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and occupation of its territory, but celebrate it in an international setting. In return Russia has, along with China, blocked the resolution that would have maintained the U.N. Panel of Experts tracking North Korea’s illicit activity to fund its nuclear program; blocked (along with China) a U.N. vote to punish the North over its missile testing; and in 2024, reached a landmark security pact with Pyongyang.

Under that arrangement, Russia has since accepted the help of an estimated 14,000 to 16,000 North Korean troops in its campaign to subdue Ukraine and Pyongyang has received billions in arms supplies, energy, food supplies and other products. Observers have already warned that this could shift the balance of power at the DMZ, even if the U.S.-South Korea alliance remains ironclad.

And unlike during the Cold War, when North Korea played an antagonistic Moscow and Beijing against each other, North Korea’s Russian gains do not appear to have come at China’s expense. Despite the loss of the Panel of Experts, we still have reason to believe North Korea’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal is facilitated by China, and Beijing is still responsible for up to 95% of North Korea’s legitimate trade.

The June 8-9 summit between Kim and Xi Jinping, in which the former blessed the latter’s idea of a multipolar world, tells us what Kim’s priorities are at the moment. Xi and Putin both speak of multipolarity, and there’s little doubt that both envision a decreased role for the United States.

And that’s not even addressing Kim’s rejection of unification, or even peace, with South Korea, whom he has since 2024 designated a “most hostile state,” rejecting overtures from Seoul for lowering the tension. Achieving peace on the peninsula and paving the way for an official declaration ending the Korean War presented much of the impetus for the last round of negotiations between Trump and the North Korean leader, which took place alongside an ongoing series of meetings between Kim and the then-South Korean president, Moon Jae-in.

Changing the conversation

From Trump’s point of view the rationale for negotiation is not difficult to ascertain. His Republican Party is favored to lose the House of Representatives and possibly the Senate in November. With the war in Iran looking no closer to a resolution six months on and Americans everywhere feeling the sting of higher energy and commodity prices, Trump needs a North Korea summit to change the headlines and preserve what he can from his Congressional majority, as well as his mandate.

But under current circumstances, what is left for Kim to negotiate with Trump? Thanks to Russia and China’s support, Kim no longer needs U.S. sanctions relief to boost his economy or strengthen his conventional or nuclear deterrent. Any concession from Trump large enough to matter under such conditions is liable to open him up to charges of “appeasement” from Senate Democrats (and even some Republicans). American voters notoriously prioritize economic conditions over foreign policy; a North Korea deal will not unblock the Strait of Hormuz and bring down energy bills.

And if Trump’s negotiations with Kim fail to change his fortunes in November, it may be that Kim would have another Agreed Framework on his hands — a deal reached with an administration without the Congressional authority to enforce it. With all this as a given, Kim has every incentive to ask Trump for the moon in negotiations — assuming its current negative posture changes.

If Trump wants to play a positive role in fostering peace on the Korean Peninsula, this is the time for him to shore up the alliance with Seoul — not outright discouraging the autonomy that South Korea clearly wants, but not sacrificing readiness and U.S. influence either. An administration that wants more favorable conditions for negotiations with North Korea would undermine Russia’s position by supporting Ukraine’s defenses, rather than waffling over missile defense.

A favorable deal with North Korea may be possible one day if the U.S. fosters the conditions necessary for it — that will be a process too long to complete before Americans go to the polls in November.

Rob York is director for regional affairs at Pacific Forum in Honolulu, Hawaii, overseeing programming on the Korean Peninsula. He earned his Ph.D. in Korean history from the University of Hawaii in 2023.