The end of the SDF: What the dissolution means for the Kurds and Sharaa's state - opinion

A year earlier, ISIS had proclaimed itself to be a worldwide caliphate, claiming religious and political authority over all Muslims.

It then proceeded to conquer and absorb great swathes of Syria and Iraq, and it was designated a terrorist organization by the UN, the US, and many other countries, including Muslim-majority states.

Opposing ISIS in northern Syria were the Kurdish-led YPG (People’s Protection Units). Together with the closely linked YPJ (Women’s Protection Units), they joined with Arab, Assyrian, and other local armed groups to create a broader coalition – and this became the SDF.

The US had already begun supporting the YPG, particularly during the battle for Kobani in 2014-15. After the SDF was formed, Washington began arming, advising, and providing air support to it as its principal ground partner against ISIS.

Backed by Washington, the SDF proved remarkably successful in combating ISIS. It conquered stronghold after stronghold, and finally, with the capture of Baghouz in 2019, ended the ISIS caliphate in Syria.

In the years that followed, the SDF developed its own security forces and civilian administration, and became the military and governing authority across much of north-eastern Syria.

Because the SDF was Kurdish-led and YPG-dominated, its powerful presence was opposed by Turkey.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan regards the YPG as closely linked to the PKK, a political and militant element within the Kurdish autonomy movement that Turkey and the US designate as a terrorist organization.

He was doubtless delighted with the announcement on August 25 by Mazloum Abdi, commander-in-chief of the SDF.

Speaking in a televised press conference in Damascus, he declared that, following an agreement with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the SDF’s mission had ended and that it was being dissolved “as an independent military force” and was being integrated as brigades into the Syrian army.

His announcement covered not only the SDF’s military functions, but also the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and its affiliated military and civilian institutions.

Abdi said these structures had likewise been integrated into Syrian state institutions.

As president of the post-Assad government in Syria, Sharaa is attempting to bring the disparate political, military, and social forces that have been operating independently under the authority of a unified Syrian state.

A transitional administration

On March 10, 2025, Sharaa and Abdi hammered out a deal. The SDF’s civilian and military institutions, including border crossings, oil and gas facilities, and airports, would come under state control.

In return, the Kurds would be recognized as an integral part of Syria, be granted citizenship, political participation, and other rights.

The deal lacked detail and was too fragile to hold. In January 2026, government forces launched a lightning offensive against the SDF, rapidly capturing substantial SDF-held territory.

The SDF’s hopes of US protection, as in the past, were dashed, but a generous ceasefire deal saw SDF personnel entering Syria’s defense and interior ministries, while the government took over the border crossings, oil and gas fields, and civilian institutions.

The integration process continued over the next few months, eventually leading to Abdi’s dissolution announcement, which was not, of course, simply a voluntary decision by the SDF to disband.

It was the end-point of a negotiated political settlement whose terms were progressively reshaped by the dramatic change in the military balance.

The SDF leadership ultimately calculated that incorporation into the new Syrian state offered a better prospect for preserving Kurdish interests than trying to maintain an autonomous armed enclave against Damascus, Turkey, and a less dependable US patron.

A few days after the SDF’s dissolution, Sharaa appointed Abdi as a presidential adviser. The appointment was widely read as a sign that Sharaa, far from trying to destroy the Kurdish leadership, was intent on integrating it into the nation’s governance.

The SDF’s disappearance is a major piece of Sharaa’s state-consolidation project, but it is not the last, or necessarily the hardest, piece. Major steps are still required.

He has to complete the acquisition of a state monopoly on armed force.

The SDF was the biggest remaining autonomous military structure, making its dissolution a major breakthrough, but a fair number of former rebel and militia formations still need to be subordinated to the state.

He has to resolve the problem of the semi-autonomous Druze community in Sweida, which remains largely outside effective central government control. His challenge is negotiating a restoration of state authority without provoking another major sectarian conflict.

Then there is the problem of building a genuinely national political settlement. Ideally he would like Syria’s Kurds, Druze, Alawites, Christians, and other minorities to accept that their future security lies within a central Syrian state.

The Kurdish settlement illustrates the model Sharaa appears to favor – recognizing communal rights, but eliminating autonomous armed and quasi-state institutions.

Sharaa needs, within a reasonable period of time, to complete the transition from revolutionary government to a fully functioning state – national ministries, judiciary, police, taxation, public services, and a unified economic administration.

It is currently a fragile transitional administration dependent on concentrated presidential power.

Steps toward a functional Syria

Finally, there is his declared objective to establish a permanent constitution and elected government.

On March 13, 2025, Sharaa signed a Constitutional Declaration establishing the legal framework for a five-year transitional period leading to a permanent constitutional settlement and democratic elections.

The People’s Assembly, which first convened in Damascus in July 2026, is a transitional legislature rather than a fully elected parliament.

Two-thirds of its 210 members were selected by regional electoral colleges, while Sharaa appointed the remaining 70.

The roadmap is to move from this interim framework to a permanent constitution, followed by parliamentary elections.

The Constitutional Declaration provides for a five-year transition from March 2025, ending only when both the permanent constitution has been adopted and elections held under it. 

March 2030 is currently the outer horizon. The immediate next step is to establish the body to be charged with drafting the new constitution.

The absorption of the SDF’s military and administrative functions into the state was a vital step toward the eventual achievement of a fully functioning, democratic, constitutional Syria.

The writer, a former senior civil servant, is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com.