Navigating the strategic path ahead

Europe’s interest in strategic autonomy has been reignited as uncertainty surrounding US policy has reached a level that can no longer be covered up with diplomatic niceties. Repeated flip-flopping on tariffs, military aid, NATO and policy toward Russia have forced European countries to confront a harsh reality: Security frameworks dependent on a single provider are vulnerable to changes in political winds that can quickly translate into military, energy and industrial risks.

Increasing defense spending is the first step, not a complete solution. Europe has long struggled with fragmented weapons standards, lengthy procurement cycles, slow cross-border decisionmaking and insufficient defense manufacturing capacity. If countries increase their individual budgets, but continue purchasing and maintaining equipment independently, all that additional spending would only result in more variation in equipment models and higher logistical costs. Genuine European autonomy would require establishing shared requirements, joint procurements, interoperable components and wartime resupply mechanisms.

France’s proposal to link nuclear deterrence with European defenses mainly reflects Paris’ ambition to translate its existing capabilities into political leadership. Other member states have misgivings about concentrating decisionmaking power, as well as the possibility that France’s nuclear arsenal would ultimately serve French national interests. Such concerns cannot be dispelled by summit declarations alone. Europe must clarify who can initiate collective defense, who foots the bill, how non-nuclear states can participate in oversight and which institution takes command during a crisis.

Fiscal constraints present another major obstacle. Many European countries are grappling with aging populations, social welfare commitments, energy transitions and debt pressures. If defense budgets are financed solely through borrowing, their political support could be eroded within a few years. A more viable approach would be to integrate military procurement with industrial policy. Through joint financing, long-term contracts and regional specialization, additional spending could be converted into sustainable production capacity rather than one-off purchases.

European strategic autonomy should not be seen simply as a break from the US. It would minimize the potential fallout of any ally abandoning its commitments, while preserving NATO’s advantages in intelligence, nuclear deterrence and joint operations. Autonomy and alliance are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, a Europe capable of shouldering greater responsibility would be better positioned to coordinate with the US on equal footing.

Taiwan should draw two lessons from the debate in Europe.

First, rather than a weapons shopping list, increases in defense spending must meaningfully translate into production and maintenance capacity, ammunition supplies and personnel. Second, security cooperation commitments must be operable in peacetime, including intelligence sharing, supply chain contingencies, joint training and crisis communications.

If Europe turns strategic autonomy into nothing more than a budget race, its military system is likely to end up expensive and fragmented. Only by translating shared threats into common standards, pooled funding and joint decisionmaking can Europe develop genuinely effective security capabilities.

Similarly, Taiwan’s defense self-reliance does not mean producing everything domestically. It means ensuring that domestic capabilities are sufficient to sustain key operations even when external support is held up.

Taiwan must also be alert to the market changes that might result from Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy. As Europe looks elsewhere for defense procurements, it might toughen its requirements on local manufacturing, cybersecurity certifications and supply chain disclosures. Taiwanese manufacturers of drones, communications equipment and electronic components seeking to enter these markets cannot rely on competitive prices and delivery times alone. They must also be prepared to provide long-term maintenance, technology protections and establish local partnerships across Europe.

Security alliances are increasingly becoming a prerequisite for industrial involvement, and the government should help businesses understand the relevant standards and establish credible track records well in advance.

These steps are also a measure by which Taiwan can assess its strategic autonomy. The number of weapons procured is a single variable; the capabilities that can be sustained during a crisis are the real measure of success. Defense reform should include regular public reporting of non-sensitive indicators — such as equipment serviceability rates, training volumes and replenishment progress — so that the public can see what actual capabilities additional spending has delivered.

Edwin Yang is an associate professor at National Taiwan Normal University and chairman of the Central Taiwan Association of University Professors.