Civil defense must work locally
By Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos
Taiwan’s ability to survive a national emergency would depend on decisions made far beyond the Presidential Office and military command centers. Local governments would have to shelter displaced residents, distribute essential supplies, treat casualties, repair damaged infrastructure and maintain public order while communications and essential services are disrupted.
Taiwanese law assigns these responsibilities to municipal, county and district authorities. The government has also expanded exercises intended to test whether they can perform them. However, official audits continue to identify inaccurate records, incomplete equipment inventories, weaknesses in supply contracts and problems coordinating personnel among agencies.
Cuba confronted a similar issue after US President Donald Trump said that he wanted to “get Cuba done” before leaving office and would consider using military force against the island. Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel responded that his government was preparing the country to resist a possible US attack.
On Nov. 4, Cuba conducted “Moncada 2026,” a nationwide exercise that activated military commands, provincial and municipal defense councils, territorial defense zones, economic institutions and civilian organizations.
Cuba’s authoritarian political system should not serve as a model for democratic Taiwan. However, its territorial organization illustrates the importance of assigning specific responsibilities before an emergency. Cuban local authorities are expected to know who would protect civilians, maintain production and distribute essential supplies if national systems are disrupted.
Under the Civil Defense Act (民防法), municipal and county governments are civil-defense authorities. They must organize civil-defense corps, while district and township offices establish subordinate units and villages establish local service groups.
The regulations governing these organizations place the mayor or county commissioner in command of the local civil defense corps. The system includes units responsible for shelter, medical assistance, environmental protection, engineering repairs, essential supplies and firefighting.
The Disaster Prevention and Protection Act (災害防救法) requires local governments to prepare regional disaster plans, establish emergency operations centers, organize evacuations, provide temporary accommodation, maintain inventories of personnel and equipment, and coordinate with hospitals, schools, utilities, companies and volunteer organizations.
The All-out Defense Mobilization Readiness Act (全民防衛動員準備法) requires municipal and county governments to incorporate mobilization preparations into their annual administrative plans. They must help inventory specialist personnel, machinery, facilities and supplies needed to sustain military operations and civilian life.
Taiwan has begun testing these responsibilities more seriously. The government combined its previous mobilization, air-raid and infrastructure exercises into the Urban Resilience Exercises. Last year, 10 local governments mobilized more than 17,000 people in exercises involving relief stations, first-aid stations and essential-supply distribution. Air-raid components in 18 jurisdictions involved more than 46,000 participants and 16,000 vehicles.
Taipei’s exercise activated its joint emergency command center and backup command structure. It included supply distribution, emergency infrastructure repairs and first-aid stations. The city reported mobilizing 2,252 people and 56 vehicles.
Exercises this year also tested cooperation between neighboring jurisdictions. Kaohsiung and Pingtung trained together, as did New Taipei City and Yilan County. This is important because a city suffering major damage might need assistance from a neighboring government whose hospitals, communications and transport networks remain functional.
These are meaningful improvements. They still do not prove that every local government could perform its duties during a prolonged emergency. Opening one relief station successfully on a scheduled afternoon does not establish how many people the entire system could accommodate, how long supplies would last or whether operations could continue without electricity and mobile communications.
Official audits reveal several weaknesses. The National Audit Office found that information systems supporting whole-of-society mobilization remained incompletely integrated. It called for clearer priorities governing how civilian personnel would be allocated among competing agencies and stronger legal provisions for mobilizing them.
Auditors also found incomplete local records of excavators and cranes available for emergency mobilization. Some companies were missing from the system, while some local governments had failed to verify machinery data. An engineering-repair unit exists largely on paper if the government does not know which machines work, where they are or who can operate them.
Shelter information has presented similar problems. An audit in Hualien found 181 air-raid shelters that had not been entered into police records. The county corrected the omission, but the case showed how nominal shelter capacity can differ from an accurate inventory.
A separate audit identified 170 shelter records that had not entered the national database because of formatting errors or missing coordinates, along with 58 records with incorrect addresses, service areas or capacities.
Supply contracts can also conceal vulnerabilities. Auditors found that six New Taipei City district offices had agreements that did not prevent suppliers from refusing delivery because they were located inside the affected area. New Taipei City corrected the contracts across its 29 districts, but only after the weakness was discovered.
These examples do not show that local governments are doing nothing. They show that Taiwan has reached the more difficult stage of determining whether its system would actually work.
The next step should be to evaluate resilience through measurable capacity rather than participation figures. Every local government should identify how many people its relief and first-aid stations can support, how quickly they can open, how long backup electricity and water will last and which agencies assume responsibility when communications with the central government fail.
Exercises should be unannounced, conducted without fixed scripts and extended beyond a single day. Officials should be required to operate with interrupted communications, unavailable personnel, damaged facilities and suppliers that fail to deliver.
Local governments should also test whether mutual-aid agreements can move medical teams, machinery, fuel and food across jurisdictional boundaries. Such plans are useful only if neighboring governments know what they must provide, how quickly they must provide it and who can request it.
Personnel registries must be checked for duplication, availability and training. Listing someone in a civil-defense organization is not equivalent to having a person who understands the assignment, has the necessary equipment and can report for duty.
Taiwan does not need Cuba’s political system or its militarization of civilian life. It can nevertheless learn from Cuba’s insistence that territorial organizations know their responsibilities before a crisis begins.
Taiwan has already created local civil-defense organizations and assigned them extensive duties. Its challenge is proving that every city, county, district and village can perform them under the conditions in which they would actually be needed.
In a national emergency, Taiwan’s resilience would not be measured by the number of committees it has established or people listed in databases. It would be measured by whether local authorities can keep water flowing, distribute food, treat the injured, shelter displaced residents and continue governing when normal systems stop working during the country’s most dangerous and demanding national test.
Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos is a Honduran journalist based in Taipei. His work on Taiwan-China-Latin America relations has been published in Nikkei Asia, The Diplomat and the Taipei Times.
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