10 years after surgical strikes, more eyes on ground and sky, focus on Jammu

Teams of the Army’s Para (Special Forces) flew over the LoC and targeted seven terrorist launchpads — both north and south of the Pir Panjal range — under the cover of artillery fire, killing an estimated 35-50 terrorists. The troops carried weapons, rocket launchers, flamethrowers and grenades. While the Army had carried out cross-border operations before this, it was the first time it publicly acknowledged carrying out “surgical strikes”.

Ten years later, counter-terrorism operations, cross-border retaliatory strikes, and the security situation in Jammu and Kashmir have all changed significantly, defence officials told The Indian Express.

“For instance, the Valley is considerably quieter than it was in 2016-18, but the threat situation is more dispersed, harder to detect and increasingly concentrated in difficult terrains in the Jammu region,” an official said. Government data recorded 322 militant incidents in 2016, with 150 terrorists and 82 security personnel killed. In comparison, there were 12 terror-related incidents in 2025, with deaths of 16 security personnel.

In terms of geography, independent, non-profit conflict-monitoring and crisis-mapping organisation ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data) notes that over 60% of violent militant activity in J&K in 2025 occurred in the Jammu division, against 5% in 2018. It attributes this partly to the difficult forested and mountainous terrain of Jammu areas, and changes in troop deployment after the 2020-21 India-China border crisis.

“In 2016, an urban/semi-urban militancy, with stone-pelting incidents and local militant recruitment, were key. Now, it is about small groups moving through forests and mountains, often operating for extended periods without being detected,” another official said, adding that the abrogation of Article 370 in J&K in 2019, accompanied by the infusion of troops into Kashmir, was one factor behind this change. “Additionally, a crackdown on contact between locals and terrorists through extensive patrolling and surveillance has kept them confined to hideouts or in higher reaches.”

In terms of counter-insurgency, this has meant a shift from earlier when cordon and search operations in suspected areas were carried out with big contingents of troops. Now, the Army’s operations are more intelligence-specific, involving fewer troops and greater use of technology, targeting specific areas. While human intelligence and tracking radio frequencies from communication between terrorists was earlier the mainstay, an official said, the large-scale induction of UAVs has made this more elaborate.

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“Simultaneously, there is more access to satellite imagery,” an official who has served in the area said, cautioning that cultivating human intelligence can’t be entirely jettisoned, as had been felt “after a series of attacks south of Pir Panjal”. Inter-agency coordination and information-sharing — both laterally and vertically — have also been enhanced, accelerating the flow of real-time intelligence.

Alongside, there is day-and-night area domination and strengthening of the counter-insurgency grid, with changes in deployment patterns. The Army, particularly the Rashtriya Rifles, has historically carried a huge part of the counter-insurgency burden in J&K.

After the Pahalgam terror attack and Operation Sindoor, surveillance drones and counter-drone capabilities have been further enhanced, and temporary operating bases have come up along vulnerable stretches.

Former Northern Army Commander Lieutenant General D S Hooda (retired) explained the change from ground-based 2016 surgical strikes to the 2019 Balakot air strikes and Op Sindoor in May 2025 — an integrated operation. Referring to 2016 surgical strikes, which he had overseen as the Army Commander, he said one of the biggest improvements, aside from troops being better equipped, has been in the surveillance and intelligence-gathering architecture. He, however, cautioned that with these improvements, the risk of escalation has gone up. “This was seen during Operation Sindoor. This has to be factored in for the future,” he said.