Madlanga Commission reveals how implicated figures used security firms to wield immense power

The Madlanga Commission has pulled back the curtain on a South Africa where the instruments of state power have been repurposed to serve private criminal interests, creating a shadow state that effectively houses multiple private militias boasting more guns and influence than the state police.

The prevalence of security company ownership among those implicated in the commission’s hearings is no accident. It is a direct and inevitable consequence of a system where public funds are looted to build parallel power structures, where the badge and the gun are commodities to be bought and sold and where the private security industry has become the vehicle through which criminal syndicates project force and maintain control.

Staggering financial scale of ‘criminal enterprise’

The staggering figures laid bare by the commission illustrate the financial scale of this phenomenon. At the Tshwane Metro Police Department alone, 22 companies were granted a security tender that has seen approximately R2.9-billion paid out to date, with the commission scrutinising allegations of tender manipulation that ensured only a handful of companies remained on the payroll.

Among these, Gubis85 Solutions stands out as a particularly egregious example, receiving R59.13-million for ad hoc services between July 2024 and June 2025 on top of its standard monthly security services payment of R3.5-million. The commission heard testimony that the allocation of additional sites to Gubis85 was carried out by junior officials without proper authorisation, with 40 ad hoc sites assigned between January and February 2025 alone, each staffed by 24 security officers and supported by three patrol vehicles.

A Tshwane Metro chief later testified that she halted an irregular private security tender costing R800-million that had been approved by a deputy chief. This is not legitimate business; this is the systematic diversion of public resources to build private armies that operate beyond the reach of the law.

The question of why these specific people need to arm themselves is answered by the commission’s findings: it is to maintain control over lucrative tenders, to intimidate rivals and to operate with impunity. 

The security company is not merely a business venture; it is a franchise of power, a source of revenue, and crucially, a private militia that can be deployed at will. This was made disturbingly clear in the testimony regarding the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan area, where the commission identified a sophisticated criminal syndicate operating within the municipality and the Ekurhuleni Metro Police Department (EMPD). 

A former EMPD deputy police chief testified that there was a “criminal enterprise” operating within the EMPD, describing a core group of officers who were suspected of serious crimes including murder, robbery, kidnapping and extortion, yet had not been prosecuted or subjected to internal disciplinary processes. 

Efforts to hold the senior officer leading this group to account were blocked at the highest level of the municipality. The murder of private security officer Marius van der Merwe, who was gunned down outside his home in December 2025 just three weeks after testifying anonymously before the commission, demonstrates the lethal consequences of exposing these networks.

Van der Merwe had testified about a night in April 2022 when the group allegedly tortured and killed a robbery suspect in an effort to obtain stolen goods and money for their personal use. His murder appears to have been an act of retribution, intended to silence him and it illustrates the violent power these private security-backed networks wield.

Central role of taxi boss Msibi

The central figure in this web of private militias and criminal enterprise is the late taxi boss Jothan Msibi, who has been identified by multiple witnesses as the head of the so-called Big Five cartel that infiltrated South African state institutions, politics and the private sector.

Msibi, who died in January 2024, was described by a senior policeman as heading a sprawling criminal network that reached into every corner of law enforcement. His funeral was attended by a former police minister, underscoring the political connections that shielded this enterprise.

Msibi was identified as the owner of security company Themy Styles, while his associate Katiso Molefe, a man accused of orchestrating several contract killings, was listed as its director. The ownership of this security company was not incidental to Msibi’s operations; it was central to his ability to project force and control the various criminal enterprises he was involved in.

The commission has uncovered evidence that Msibi’s security company and his network were involved in a breathtaking array of criminal activities. WhatsApp messages presented at the inquiry revealed that Carnilinx, a controversial tobacco company, used Msibi to retrieve stolen stock and firearms. In one exchange, Carnilinx director Kyle Phillips messaged Msibi, addressing him as “Pappa Joe” and thanking him for sorting out a theft, asking if the firearms could also be recovered.

This demonstrates that Msibi’s private security apparatus was being deployed not just for conventional security work but as an enforcement arm for criminal enterprises. In another exchange, Phillips offered Msibi “red water”, a substance associated with illicit gold processing, further cementing the connection between the security company and organised crime.

Alleged plot to acquire spy equipment

Perhaps most alarmingly, the commission has exposed an alleged plot involving Msibi, suspended Sergeant Fannie Nkosi, Molefe and private security businessman Steve Motsumi to acquire sophisticated phone-interception technology known as “grabbers” from a Czech Republic-based company for resale in Eswatini. The evidence suggests that Nkosi used a police stamp and his force number on a procurement document to help advance the deal, effectively using the state’s authority as a front for a private transaction.

WhatsApp exchanges presented to the commission provided a glimpse into the negotiations, with Nkosi forwarding a message from a contact asking whether the “Swazi deal” remained possible, and Msibi replying: “It’s on the table but they have to display. We don’t want to become fools.” 

The evidence leader told the commission that it was “very worrying” that members of the alleged cartel were claiming to be representatives of the state and engaging with foreign companies about spy tools that should only be in the hands of intelligence agencies operating under strict regulations.

This is not a private security company in any legitimate sense; this is a criminal syndicate masquerading as a commercial enterprise, using state resources and authority to trade in surveillance technology that could be used against citizens.

Msibi’s influence was not limited to the underworld. The commission has also linked him to alleged tender fraud at the Ekurhuleni Municipality. WhatsApp messages revealed Msibi’s alleged involvement in rigging a tender for a project management unit at the municipality, where he personally nominated a company called Camp Rock for the bid.

The tender was subsequently awarded to Camp Rock, a company tied to an associate of Msibi, demonstrating how the security company owner could manipulate state procurement processes for private benefit. The connections emanating from Msibi reach further into the political sphere, with his phone records showing he communicated with former Ekurhuleni city manager Imogen Mashazi.

Alleged crime boss Matlala reflects same pattern

The figure of Vusimuzi “Cat” Matlala, an alleged crime boss who has been described as a leader within the Big Five cartel, further illustrates this pattern. The commission has heard that Matlala’s company Cat VIP Security had an “unlawful” agreement with the EMPD to supply surveillance technology, suspect-tracking tools and tactical support in pursuing violent repeat offenders.

A former EMPD deputy chief testified that a memorandum of understanding signed by a suspended brigadier unlawfully granted the private security firm access to EMPD surveillance systems and effectively outsourced core policing duties to a private company, leaving EMPD operations hollow and insufficient. 

Matlala, however, told the commission that none of his companies was ever awarded contracts by the EMPD, stating that the only business he conducted was for no financial gain when his company provided security services to a former mayor. He claimed privilege against self-incrimination regarding his pending trial over the Medicare 24 Tshwane contract with the South African Police Services (SAPS).

State security captured from within

What the Madlanga Commission has revealed is a country where the state has effectively been captured from within, where law enforcement resources have been repurposed to serve criminal interests and where private security companies have become the vehicle for this criminal capture. 

The individuals implicated in the Madlanga inquiry own security companies because they need to arm themselves against rivals and law enforcement, yes – but also because they need to maintain control over their criminal enterprises. The security company provides them with the legitimacy to employ armed personnel, the financial vehicle to launder money and the operational cover to conduct illegal activities. 

As the commission continues its work, the revelation that South Africa is housing multiple private militias that rival the state police in firepower and influence stands as one of the most disturbing findings to emerge from this inquiry. 

The path to reform will require not just prosecuting the individuals involved but dismantling the entire system that has allowed private security to become a tool of criminal enterprise. DM