Opinion: Why hopes for regime collapse in Iran are misguided

British historian G. M. Trevelyan memorably described the European revolutions of 1848 as “the turning point at which modern history failed to turn.” The current of history seemed to sweep European states towards ever greater personal freedom, expanding democracy and nationalism. But those liberal revolutions fizzled out.

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In our own time, the turning point where history fails to turn is the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Every wave of nationwide protest, every round of sanctions, every economic crisis and every military confrontation since the Iran-Iraq War has been presented as the moment when the system would finally give way. Despite rising internal discontent, regime incompetence and external pressure, the Islamic Republic endures.

The answer as to why this is the case begins with a persistent analytical mistake. Policymakers and commentators wrongly assess the Islamic Republic as though it were a conventional government whose survival depends primarily on economic performance, public consent and diplomatic legitimacy. They assume that falling living standards, political isolation, widespread anger and military pressure must eventually produce regime change.

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But the Islamic Republic does not exist for the sake of prosperity, but for two unrelated purposes: to preserve the revolutionary order established in 1979; and to resist the United States, Israel and the broader western world. Doing so is not merely a foreign-policy position, but a vital source of the regime’s identity and legitimacy. Confrontation allows Iran’s leadership to present economic hardship as sacrifice, sanctions as proof of independence and isolation as evidence of revolutionary commitment.

Compromise, or even the appearance of compromise, is therefore a serious threat. Concessions to the West may occasionally be necessary, but they are rarely presented as genuine changes of direction. The Islamic Republic continues to practise a politics of resistance and performance for its domestic audience, even when senior officials recognize that the existing social contract is morally bankrupt, economically destructive and fiscally unsustainable.

The Islamic Republic’s endurance also depends on its willingness to deploy force. The security establishment has repeatedly shown that it is prepared to suppress domestic opposition with extreme brutality whenever it believes the system faces a mortal threat. The massacre of protesters deepens public anger and further destroys political legitimacy, but the regime has consistently placed its survival above social reconciliation.

Governments do not collapse simply because they are unpopular. They collapse when the institutions responsible for defending them stand down, fracture or lose the ability to act. So far, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the broader Iranian security apparatus have rallied to defend the system.

The IRGC is not merely a military organization. It is the main pillar of the Islamic Republic’s deep state. Its influence extends throughout the country’s intelligence and internal security networks, provincial administrations, strategic industries and large parts of the economy. This network gives the Islamic Republic far greater resilience than a state that depends on a narrow circle of political leaders or a single chain of command.

The present war has illustrated the importance of this institutional depth. The United States and Israel appeared to pursue a decapitation strategy based on the assumption that eliminating senior leaders and disrupting central command structures would paralyze the system. Yet the IRGC seems singularly resilient to such a strategy.

The IRGC has spent years preparing to survive exactly such an attack. As part of its “mosaic defence doctrine,” the IRGC restructured itself into 31 provincial commands. Each command was designed to retain its own intelligence capabilities, weapons, logistics, communications and delegated authority. The purpose was to allow the system to continue operating, even if its central leadership was disrupted.

A decapitation strategy may remove senior figures, but it does not necessarily dismantle institutions that were deliberately designed to survive decapitation. This is why the Islamic Republic will not easily go down. The system has built redundancy into its command structure. Critical positions are not dependent on a single individual, and multiple replacements can be designated in advance. Authority can be transferred quickly and local commanders can act with autonomy.

The relative cohesion of the ruling elite further strengthens the system. The Islamic Republic contains real factional rivalries, ideological disagreements and competition over resources. And yet at times of grave danger, these divisions have rarely produced a decisive break within the state. Competing factions understand that the collapse of the Islamic Republic would threaten not only their political influence but also their personal security, economic interests and institutional survival.

This creates a powerful incentive for unity. Officials may disagree over policy, diplomacy or the distribution of power, but most remain committed to preserving the system within which those disputes take place.

The Islamic Republic also possesses decades of experience in crisis management. Since 1979, it has survived war, sanctions, assassinations, covert operations, cyberattacks, domestic unrest, diplomatic isolation, economic shocks and repeated regional confrontations. Each crisis has forced the system to adapt. Over time, survival has become an institutional skill.

Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic is far from strong in the conventional meaning of the word. Iran faces severe economic, social, demographic and environmental problems. Public trust in government and the clergy has collapsed.  Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei is either dead or incapacitated. Corruption is rampant. Economic mismanagement has weakened the middle class and impoverished large sections of society. Water shortages, environmental degradation, unemployment, inflation and capital flight continue to undermine the country’s future.

The Islamic Republic’s social contract has largely disintegrated. Many Iranians no longer believe the system represents their interests, values or aspirations. Governance has become more expensive, repression has become more visible and the distance between state and society has grown.

But collapse usually requires more than public anger and official incompetence. It requires a breakdown in elite cohesion, fragmentation within the security forces, loss of territorial control or the emergence of a credible rival authority capable of replacing the existing order. No such conditions have yet developed.

There is a substantial opposition to the Islamic Republic, but it is ironically one of the regime’s greatest advantages. Discontent within Iran is extensive, but the absence of a unified leadership, organized internal networks, a single transition plan and a unitary, broadly accepted political program allows the Islamic Republic to confront its opponents separately rather than as a single national movement.

This does not make political change impossible, though. No system is permanent. The Islamic Republic faces accumulating pressures that will become increasingly difficult to manage. Its economic model is unsustainable, its legitimacy is damaged and its ideological message no longer commands the loyalty it once did.

The question is not how much pressure the system can endure, but what political force, institutional structure and national coalition could realistically replace it. Until that question is answered, the Islamic Republic will be weak, unpopular and unstable; but it won’t collapse, and history will fail to turn.

National Post

Michael Bonner is a former Government of Ontario policy director, a historian of ancient Iran and author of “In Defense of Civilization: How Our Past Can Renew Our Present.” Ari Moghimi is a public affairs consultant specializing in Middle East geopolitical affairs and European foreign and security policy. He holds an MA in international affairs from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, where his thesis focused on Iran-EU relations.

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