Opinion: Opinion | China, Russia, UAE: What Each Country Wants From BRICS

Everyone knows the summit of the BRICS is on. Most know that the term is an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and that it meets at exotic locations from time to time. Hardly anyone knows more than that. That's unsurprising. The ‘declarations' at the end of each such meeting are usually long, dilatory, seemingly short of any actual action. But in the new global chaos initiated by US President Donald Trump's tariffs and worsened by two raging wars, there has been greater interest in what BRICS can do about all this, particularly in terms of a shaky global economy. In the run-up to the summit, a reality check is worthwhile.

What BRICS Is

The BRICS came together in the background of the global financial crisis of 2008, and thus focused primarily on market volatility, energy, and, primarily, reforming the global financial system. At its very first summit in Yekaterinburg, then Russian President Medvedev decried the dominance of the dollar and stressed the centrality of the G-20. By then, Moscow had already been pushed out of the G-8, and China had eclipsed the US as the largest trading partner. The Indian economy was in serious trouble as GDP growth fell from 8.4% to a projected 5.6% thereafter. South Africa joined a year later as economic chaos continued. Shortly thereafter, the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) were set up. The former was aimed at lending for infrastructure and sustainable-development purposes, notably also in other non-member developing and emerging economies, a visionary and practical approach. Bangladesh was an early beneficiary of the bank's flexible financing terms. The CRA was aimed at mutual support during a sudden currency crisis, which was then followed logically to the use of local currencies. It still took a while for expansion, with Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia joining in 2024, while Indonesia joined just last year. The Saudis are listed as members, but don't call themselves so. That surge in membership continues, with some 10 countries waiting in the wings for full membership, much to the fury of the US President. But whether this grouping is indeed a challenge to its dominance is worth evaluating country by country.

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Russia's Motivations

The motivations of Russia are not hard to seek. Apart from the global financial meltdown, Russia has long been on both sides of the fence, no matter how much it considers itself part of ‘Europe'. All this worsened following the Crimea annexation of 2014 and then the Ukraine war, with increasingly destructive sanctions. Russia's total trade turnover with BRICS countries is over $330 billion, which is about 35% to 40% of Russia's entire global trade. More importantly, about 90% of this is conducted in national currencies. True, much of this is with China and India, but Brazil is also pulling up rapidly, doubling its trade last year. But the value of BRICS is that President Putin is an honoured guest in all these countries, even while it brought in Belarus as a partner, as well as Cuba and Kazakhstan - all ‘friendlies'. BRICS support matters in the fight in Ukraine, with China providing vital support, most recently 46 tonnes of a chemical material used to produce carbon fibre, vital for building lightweight drone airframes. 

India is accused of ‘buying oil' and supporting the war, even while European imports of Russian gas actually increased. As for South Africa, it is a lynchpin for Russian moves in Africa, which shows in many countries here abstaining from UN Resolutions against Russia. All this means Russia has managed to break its ‘isolation' due in a large part to BRICS. But that is not the original purpose of BRICS, which is meant to jointly fight a highly skewed international financial and governance system. That skewing is, in part, due to Russia's Ukraine ‘special operations'. So, no, BRICS cannot help unless Moscow decides to end the war. And that is in the interest of most members. You cannot fight Western dominance if you are weak from within. Hence the strong call by the Indian Prime Minister Modi in Bishkek to end it, as also the visit to Ukraine by his Foreign Minister. This matters.

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China's Posturing

For China, again, BRICS adds to its international standing in a grouping where it is the most powerful. This is further apparent in a UN report that notes that while intra-BRICS trade has grown rapidly due to strong complementarities in natural resources, manufacturing, and technology, the main driver of this rise is China, and, to a lesser extent, India. It also notes that Beijing is the least dependent on BRICS for trade. Besides, constraints in policy-level cooperation still limit intra-BRICS trade's full potential. Witness the difficulties Indian traders face in accessing the Chinese market, given the range of non-tariff barriers and selectively applied regulatory mechanisms. Then there's the declared common intention for reform of the United Nations. While China declares that India is an 'important' power, it does not directly support India or South Africa's candidature. In the end, it is local politics that matter rather than grand reform. True, BRICS countries push back against unilateralism at the World Trade Organization, but they have different agendas on agriculture, for instance. And here's the most important thing. Despite all the talky talk, the reality is that China remains the US's largest trading partner, with a $202 billion trade deficit and holding some $760 billion in bonds. Notably, a $33 billion US trade surplus in services with China, which no one talks about, rather limits Washington's power to punish. In sum, while other BRICS members have little room for manoeuvre in Washington's fury towards BRICS, China does.

The Saudis And The UAE

For the Saudis, BRICS originally offered a way out of not just the US petrodollar system but also a source for the weapons it was denied. The petrodollar originated from a 1974 unwritten agreement, which ensured that Riyadh paid for oil in dollars, which plowed it back to the US, in exchange for American weapons and security. That last bit began to unravel when Washington refused to supply the Saudis with missiles during the Iran-Iraq war. Beijing happily obliged. Now, with the Mecca Pact encouraged by President Trump, it seems security is no longer a US priority. But more importantly for BRICS, as the US became a major energy exporter itself, China replaced it as the biggest oil importer. Beijing has since invested in Prince Mohammad bin Salman's Vision 2030, with $35 billion in infrastructure projects alone. For Saudis, the digital payment system and the lure of using local currencies for payment almost complete the circle. 

But the Saudis don't list themselves as ‘members' of BRICS and usually send the Foreign Minister and not the head of state. In other words, a ‘positive neutrality' ensures that Riyadh can join BRICS activities without committing itself, even while keeping its relationship with the US intact. 

Meanwhile, Saudi money is across BRICS countries - $10 billion in India and a promised $100 billion; a recent deal with Brazil for cooperation in mineral resources, technical exchange, and with joint development of strategic minerals; investment in South Africa, in infrastructure, energy, and core corporate sectors. In June, Riyadh signed 13 ‘strategic' agreements with Russia worth some $1.4 billion. Balance out all this with the recent US move of clearing a $5 billion arms sale, adding to the mega $142 billion last year, in tandem with a Saudi promise to invest $600 billion in the US. So no, even the combined BRICS is nowhere near what Riyadh invests in the US and Europe. But it offers alternatives.

The UAE is more or less in the same situation, except it has no qualms about multi-alignment, and also that its largest non-oil trading partners are China and India. The UAE joined the NDB in 2021 and has engaged in all activities, including counter-terrorism and the Business Council. But at the last BRICS Foreign Ministers meeting, there was predictably a run-in with the Iranians, with the UAE not unreasonably pointing out that its air defences had intercepted around 3,000 multi-platforms targeting critical infrastructure, including airports, ports, oil facilities, desalination plants, energy networks, service facilities, and residential areas. Meanwhile, India is in ‘advanced talks' to provide BrahMos and ‘Akashteer' air defence systems. That's not BRICS. That's just good diplomacy by Delhi. But it also means Russia has to be on board for the sale. It is unlikely to refuse. Meanwhile, the UAE sports top-line US systems such as THAAD and Patriot, among others. So again, no, BRICS doesn't negatively impact the US influence at all. In fact, the emerging UAE-Saudi competition may be its problem, more than anything else.

South Africa, Brazil, Egypt, Ethiopia

South Africa's largest trade partner is again China, and, in some ways, India, which is facilitated to an extent by BRICS Interbank Cooperation, local currency settlement, and customs and trade cooperation. Brazil is one of the most BRICS-oriented nations in terms of its exports - about 40% - again the highest with China, with whom it has a comfortable trade surplus, given Beijing's huge appetite for its agricultural produce. 

In turn, Brazil is highly dependent on Russia for fertiliser to power its farm sector. Again, what helps is the use of local currency, and its Pix instant-payment network with other domestic systems like China's CIPS and India's UPI. Egypt's largest trading partners are all BRICS members, with China, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia being the top ones. Egypt faces hard currency difficulties, which attracts it towards a BRICS payments system, and the less stringent terms of its bank. Its primary interests for the summit are precisely these, and green energy. Meanwhile, its geostrategic location on the Suez gives it a certain cachet in BRICS. Ethiopia's motivations are almost identical, including a signal to the West that it has ‘options', especially after run-ins with them over internal conflicts. Ethiopia proudly hosts the permanent headquarters of the African Union (AU), cementing its status as the diplomatic capital of the continent, and for India, a gateway to the resource-rich continent. Better late than never.

For India, Some Common Concerns

For India, the summit will be useful if it reverts to its original mandate of achieving an even playing field in the world economy. Which is why the NDB was created at India's instance, and why India was against adding new members till the original grouping got its act together. But the thing is done, and Delhi is likely to encourage a little quiet mediation on the Iran issue in particular, with the Saudis, the UAE, and Iran involved. 

The lack of a consensus document would hugely affect the image of BRICS. Remember, the foreign ministers' meeting was not able to do so. Meanwhile, India is concentrating on what matters to people in each country, not just to foreign affairs and war-hungry elites. That includes practical cooperation on climate change, where BRICS has rather excelled with the 2025 Framework Declaration on Climate Finance, calling for reform of multilateral development banks, greater concessional finance, and mobilisation of private capital for developing countries. The Baku-to-Belém Roadmap hopes to scale climate finance for developing countries towards $1.3 trillion per year by 2035, in a move that stresses that climate costs and decarbonisation are expensive and usually borne by those who least contribute to emissions. 

The Nepal tragedy demands a strong commitment to reduce unbridled hydropower and road projects, particularly with regard to China and India. Without a strong commitment to change on the ground, BRICS risks being seen as irrelevant. Delhi is also leading the push for a unified framework on data sovereignty, and vitally quietly pushing for on-the-ground cooperation in counter-terrorism, with faster sharing of financial, investigative, time-bound information exchange, standardised formats, asset recovery mechanisms, and, most vitally, a defined legal process. Then there's the “ Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2030” aimed at safeguarding the interests of India's farmers, among other issues, all centred around the WTO. In short, backing the existing rules-based order in trade.

But for all of this to happen, both wars have to end. Remember that India's trade with Iran was once around $17.03 billion, now less than a billion. That was not just oil, but also some Rs 5,000 crore of basmati rice. Ending the Ukraine war is also a common concern for all BRICS members, all of whom had good relations with Ukraine. Moscow is bleeding, but whether it will be allowed to end the war is questionable, given Europe's determination that it be put in its ‘place', an ambition that has remained unrealised since the 16th century, when a Tsar ruled the empire. 

Overall, a healthy BRICS would actually add to the health of the global economy, and reduce the present bleeding apparent all around. If ‘de-dollarisation' is taking place, it is pushed by US tariffs and the war, rather than any desire by members - barring China - of having a common BRICS currency. The thrust towards national currency payment is undoubtedly taking place, but again, the US has only itself to blame. Its wars and unpredictable behaviour have eroded the whole ‘petrodollar' system. 

Meanwhile, there is much talk of a G-2 with President Xi visiting Washington at the end of the month. That is the biggest challenge that BRICS actually faces individually and collectively. But much depends on Xi, who is on an unprecedented tour of nations after nearly seven years. Change is in the air, and as the Nepal floods so tragically brought out, nothing and no one is permanent.

(Tara Kartha is a former Director, National Security Council Secretariat)