How are Gazan gangs affecting the strip amid Israel, US election cycles? - analysis

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would have liked to have reinvaded it in early 2026 (or, for that matter, never to have been forced into a ceasefire with Hamas by the Trump administration in October 2025) and at almost every moment since then.

Hamas wants to limit any concessions it makes over its control to being symbolic, but to remain the force behind the curtain so that when all is said and done in 5-10 years, it remains the decisive power in the Strip.

Jared Kushner, the lead player in the Trump administration on Middle East and Gaza policy, has wanted since early 2026 for Israel to make gradual and periodic withdrawals to a much thinner security zone within Gaza (from 50-60% of the Strip to closer to 15%), to press forward with rebuilding Gaza, and for Hamas to take gradual and periodic steps toward disarming.

In the long run, unless something major changes, Kushner has the upper hand over all sides because at every key moment since October 2025, Trump has backed his plans.

Netanyahu government forced to concede to ISF, Hamas

This has forced Netanyahu to approve the idea of letting an International Stabilization Force (ISF) into Gaza, compelled Hamas to approve the idea of letting a technocratic committee, the NCAG, to come into the Strip to take over civil rule issues, and has made the government continue to provide massive amounts of aid to Gaza, through Hamas, even as Jerusalem watches the terror group's power grow.

True, the ISF and NCAG actually moving into Gaza have been delayed pending Israeli and US elections in October-November.

But when one averages these trends and countertrends together, the result has been that Netanyahu does not get to invade, but neither has Israel had to withdraw much or allow much rebuilding.

This has basically held the status quo in place for a year, with Hamas growing stronger very slowly, but with the IDF being able to continue to strike its field commanders and, back in May, two of its military leaders.

Within this framework of a status quo which is inching forward toward the Trump-Kushner vision of "the Day After" in Gaza, enter the slew of stories about Hamas attack balloons, the Erez crossing opening and then suddenly not opening, talks of overthrowing Hamas with local gaza gangs, and talks of Hamas getting so strong so soon that the IDF will need to immediately invade Gaza as soon as election season is over.

Israel, Shin Bet maintains ties with Gaza gangs

Some of what is behind these stories is real.

There are local Gaza gangs supported by Israel.

Netanyahu himself confirmed this publicly in 2025 when there were repeated reports about Israeli defense teams working with Gaza gang boss Yaser Abu Shabab.

The Jerusalem Post and other media outlets also confirmed that the Shin Bet was in charge of managing relations with these gangs.

The primary long-term purpose then and now was to build up local opposition to Hamas in Gaza to help eventually lead to toppling it from within, and the short-term purpose was to use the militias for various smaller, messy tactical missions so as to avoid the risk of Israeli security officials getting stuck in one quagmire or another.

Over the weekend, Haaretz revealed that the IDF has also been heavily involved in managing the local Gaza gangs, and that their number has expanded to six, covering nearly every major region in Gaza.

The Post got clear indications from IDF sources that while the Shin Bet is the lead Israeli player with the gangs, the military is also often involved.

This makes sense since the Shin Bet is small compared to the IDF and usually has highly trained specialists accomplishing a mission in Gaza, but accompanied by IDF forces who provide the specialists with security.

Local gangs contribute, but are not primary drivers of toppling Hamas

In any event, political leaks suggesting that the local gangs have any chance of taking over Gaza from Hamas in the near or medium term are divorced from reality.

Each of these groups can only survive now with clear IDF protection and can only confront Hamas for small and limited operations.

If their numbers range between the dozens and a couple hundred, Hamas still has thousands or more foot soldiers.

Put differently, these local gangs might contribute long-term to the fall of Hamas, but they will not be a central component toward that fall.

Rather, most experts agree that either some arm of the Palestinian Authority or a hybrid of the PA, Egypt, the ISF, and some outside IDF support would be needed to overcome Hamas long-term.

There is also some truth in reports that Hamas is making a comeback.

Israel has made zero attempt to replace Hamas politically over the last three years and since the October 2025 ceasefire.

This has allowed Hamas to consolidate its power in the 40-50% of the Strip that it governs, which contains well over 90% of the Palestinian population.

Hamas even experimented with sending balloons over the border recently to test Israeli patience.

Israel responded by increasing the number of airstrikes against mid-level Hamas officials and Hamas weapons depots.

As such, Netanyahu as well as some IDF sources, mostly from the Southern Command, have been pushing for even stronger responses, including a potential invasion after election season.

They also claimed this could be a sign that Hamas may undertake some major offensive move.

What move? Hamas cannot even hold training exercises in public. The October 7 "surprise" came in an atmosphere when Hamas was holding constant massive military exercises, which made the military disregard them as just for training. Hamas could not move a large group of soldiers out of their territory and far past the IDF's first outposts within the Strip. At most, maybe Hamas could surprise a few outposts, but they would certainly not get into Israeli territory. And they have either no rockets or almost no rockets. Even the balloons this time were not fire or explosive balloons as in 2018, but just...balloons.

Trump holds the cards, wants 'quiet' in the Middle East

And what Israeli invasion?

There are no signs that Trump would permit Israel to start a new invasion.

He wants quiet in the Middle East and to advance normalization deals, and none of that has happened for him whenever fighting escalates.

In addition, polls currently show a real chance that Gadi Eisenkot will be the next prime minister.

There are no signs that he would push as hard to invade Gaza as Netanyahu did, given that the former IDF chief was the first in the war cabinet to want to end the war to get the Israeli hostages back, as early as early 2024.

It has only been Trump's deference to Netanyahu's electoral needs that has slowed his pressure on the prime minister to move forward with allowing the ISF into Gaza in fact, and not just in theory.

But that deference may fade as Trump may search for a photogenic moment of ISF soldiers and NCAG technocrats actually entering and operating in Gaza before US midterm elections.

In some scenarios, Trump may twist Netanyahu's arm if they meet at the UN in New York in September, and in other scenarios he may allow Netanyahu to wait to approve the progress until the week between Israeli elections on October 27 and US elections on November 3.

All of these tangled election calculations explain the latest bizarre policy double-take this week when the National Security Council, which works for Netanyahu, told the IDF to carry out all necessary security measures to get ready to open the Erez Crossing, but then hours later, after he saw he was taking some political flak for the move, the prime minister pretended he was against the idea and stalled it.

To be clear, there had been a plan to open the crossing based on a deal with Kushner.

But without Trump going public about it, Netanyahu has now delayed implementing the deal to try to avoid paying an electoral political price for it.

Hamas could try a surprising offensive move. The local Gaza gangs could escalate against Hamas.

But most likely, other than some possible additional mild steps of progress toward the Kushner-Trump vision, the status quo will remain in Gaza at least until October 27.

After that, Trump will likely press either Netanyahu or Eisenkot to make further concessions in Gaza, provided Hamas makes its own symbolic concessions.

Until then, the Palestinian people will continue to suffer from the status quo in which they do have food, but have no proper housing or even a start of a horizon for a future, and Israel's reputation in the world will continue to suffer as it will not get any credit for refraining from invading Gaza until the strip starts getting rebuilt.

This also likely means that concerns about major Hamas moves before November, and even for a while after that, are likely misplaced.