On right to internet, Supreme Court ruling isn’t enough

The SC’s recognition of access to the internet as a fundamental right only calls attention to the extremely fraught context it comes in — restricting the internet is often the first weapon in the state’s toolkit for policing.

On both aspects of the ruling, however, much depends on whether they remain on paper, and how they translate into practice. On this count, both invite serious questions.

3 min readOct 21, 2026 06:00 AM IST First published on: Oct 21, 2026 at 06:00 AM IST

The Supreme Court, on October 15, delivered a ruling that is significant for two reasons: It tightened the rules on child sexual exploitation and abuse material online, and it declared access to and use of the internet a fundamental right under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. These provisions guarantee the freedom of speech and expression and the right to life and personal liberty. On both aspects of the ruling, however, much depends on whether they remain on paper, and how they translate into practice. On this count, both invite serious questions.

Citing gaps in compliance with existing statutory norms under the Information Technology Rules, the bench directed the government to build a national database of digital identifiers for child abuse material. It requires platforms to remove “known origin” matches from the database, even without verifying them. Intermediaries have been asked to judge content by its propensity to facilitate exploitation, even where it is not explicit. The Court also suggested hefty fines on intermediaries that don’t comply with rules to remove such content. To be sure, child safety is an urgent issue and needs more proactive state intervention. However, it will take a meticulous institutional architecture to govern the use and misuse of databases, not just the Court’s assurance.

The SC’s recognition of access to the internet as a fundamental right only calls attention to the extremely fraught context it comes in — restricting the internet is often the first weapon in the state’s toolkit for policing. In principle, elevating it as a fundamental right allows a citizen to directly move the SC for its enforcement and confines future laws on screen time curbs within narrowly defined and constitutionally permissible limits. But the real test lies in how rights are realised. Scholars have long pointed to an anomaly — the Court expands Article 21 faster than it steps in to secure the rights guaranteed under it. Citizens may be told they have a right to a speedy trial or clean air or safe roads, but when the state fails to deliver, they cannot invoke those rights in court meaningfully. Saying that access to the internet is part of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression, therefore, is not enough. That recognition must be put to work when internet shutdowns are imposed unreasonably and disproportionately — that is when the Court must intervene to restrain the state instead of kicking the can down the road.