China’s global ambitions dilemma
A planned trilateral summit tomorrow between US President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Shenzhen, China, has drawn considerable international attention. With the existing international order under significant strain, the prospect of these three leaders discussing major global issues together highlights the growing influence of great power politics. For China, the gathering offers an opportunity to demonstrate its international standing. Yet it also exposes a diplomatic dilemma that Beijing has struggled to resolve: how to establish itself as a leading global power while continuing to present itself as a champion of developing countries.
China’s diplomatic strategy has long relied on cultivating relationships with the global south. Beijing has sought to distinguish itself from Western powers by emphasizing the principles of sovereignty, noninterference in domestic affairs and the right of developing countries to determine their own political and economic futures. Through this approach, China has attempted to position itself not simply as an emerging major power, but as a representative of countries whose voices and interests have traditionally been underrepresented in the international system.
This positioning has been supported by several concrete diplomatic and economic policies. The Belt and Road Initiative has enabled China to expand infrastructure investment, trade and connectivity across Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions. Although it has also generated concerns over debt sustainability, economic dependence and the terms of Chinese investment, it has provided Beijing with an important instrument for strengthening its presence in developing economies.
China has also sought to establish a broader diplomatic framework through proposals, such as the Global Development Initiative. The program, announced in 2021, emphasizes poverty reduction, infrastructure development, food security and cooperation in areas such as public health. The Global Security Initiative, introduced in 2022, advocates a security framework based on sovereignty and territorial integrity. In 2023, Beijing further promoted the Global Civilization Initiative, emphasizing respect for different civilizational values and development paths. Taken together, these programs seek to present China as an alternative source of international leadership to the Western-led order.
At the institutional level, China has bolstered its engagement through BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, while calling for greater representation of developing countries in international institutions, including the UN and global financial governance structures. The expansion of BRICS, in particular, has provided Beijing with a platform to deepen cooperation with countries that seek greater diplomatic and economic autonomy from Western powers.
These efforts are not merely rhetorical. They form part of China’s broader strategy to translate its economic influence into diplomatic support and a more prominent role in shaping international rules and institutions.
This strategy contains an inherent contradiction. If the US, China and Russia increasingly determine the direction of international politics through negotiations among themselves, developing countries might find themselves excluded from decisions that directly affect their security and economic interests.
Many countries in the global south are dissatisfied with aspects of the Western-led international order, but this does not mean they want to replace Western dominance with a system in which a small number of major powers exercise disproportionate influence. Their priorities include preserving national sovereignty, maintaining strategic autonomy, and avoiding excessive dependence on any single external power.
China’s growing international influence gives it a strong incentive to participate in great power diplomacy and demonstrate that it can shape solutions to major international problems. However, its claim to represent developing countries depends partly on its ability to distinguish its diplomatic approach from the power politics it has frequently criticized.
China’s economic relationships with developing countries are often characterized by significant asymmetries in economic and political influence. Although Beijing emphasizes mutual benefit and South-South cooperation, concerns over debt, market access, trade imbalances and dependence on Chinese capital can complicate its efforts to build lasting trust. Consequently, China’s position as a champion of developing countries cannot be secured through diplomatic messaging alone; it also depends on whether its economic and political practices are perceived as consistent with the principles it advocates.
The planned trilateral summit raises a broader question about the direction of Chinese diplomacy. Beijing wants to be recognized as a great power capable of shaping the international order, while retaining the diplomatic support and legitimacy it has cultivated across the global south. These objectives are not necessarily incompatible, but reconciling them would become increasingly difficult as China’s international influence expands. The central challenge for Xi’s administration is not simply to secure a seat at the table with Washington and Moscow, but to demonstrate that China’s growing status as a major power does not come at the expense of the countries whose interests it has long claimed to represent.
Daiju Wada is a political scientist specializing in international security, counterterrorism and economic security. He contributes as an external expert to geopolitical risk organizations, including Oxford Analytica and Gatehouse Advisory Partners. As CEO of Strategic Intelligence, he provides critical geopolitical intelligence to international consulting firms.
KioskNews shows a cleaned-up reading view extracted from the publisher’s page — the original always lives on their site, not ours.