A thaw in India-China relations?

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) visit to India to attend the BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — summit earlier this month, followed by his meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has generated expectations of a possible normalization of India-China relations.

The renewed high-level engagement is significant after years of political and military tensions following the Galwan clash of 2020. Indian and Chinese media have portrayed the resumption of summit-level engagement positively. Yet, the current thaw needs to be assessed within the broader strategic environment in which New Delhi and Beijing are attempting to manage their relationship.

A major catalyst for this convergence has been the changing international environment. US President Donald Trump’s policies have generated uncertainty for both India and China and, paradoxically, created incentives for greater bilateral engagement. For New Delhi, the concern extends beyond continuing US-China rivalry to the changing nature of US relations with Pakistan, particularly during and after Operation Sindoor. India already confronts a major security challenge from Pakistan and a territorial and strategic challenge from China. The prospect of closer US-Pakistan engagement alongside the enduring China-Pakistan strategic relationship has added another layer of uncertainty to India’s security calculations. Reducing India-China tensions can lessen the possibility of simultaneous pressure on India’s northern and western fronts while providing New Delhi with greater diplomatic flexibility. It also signals to Washington that India retains alternative strategic options.

China has developed its own incentives to seek greater stability with India, particularly given its changing economic circumstances. China’s export-oriented growth model faces mounting pressures from domestic overcapacity, weaker external demand, and increasing restrictions on Chinese products and investments in several major Western markets. Intensifying US-China trade tensions and the diversification of global supply chains have consequently increased the importance of alternative markets.

India is particularly significant because of its enormous population, expanding consumer demand, rising purchasing power and long-term economic growth potential. A more stable political relationship can create greater opportunities for Chinese enterprises in India and provide Beijing with an additional incentive to prevent bilateral tensions from disrupting economic engagement again.

China’s geopolitical calculations provide another incentive for rapprochement. For Beijing, stability along its western frontier has strategic value because China simultaneously faces challenges in the Taiwan Strait and intensifying competition with the US. Chinese strategic discussions have at times viewed the India-China border and Taiwan as potentially interconnected elements of a broader two-front challenge. Reducing tensions with India can provide Beijing with greater strategic flexibility. The objective need not be a comprehensive resolution of differences with New Delhi. Rather, it can prevent the India-China relationship from becoming a sustained source of military and diplomatic pressure while Beijing concentrates on other strategic priorities.

India’s position in the global south adds a further dimension to China’s calculations. India possesses considerable diplomatic influence among developing countries and has sought to strengthen its role as a voice of the global south. China has similarly attempted to expand its influence among developing states and strengthen its role in reshaping global governance. A less confrontational relationship with India could facilitate Chinese diplomacy within BRICS and other multilateral institutions.

These convergences do not imply strategic alignment; the limits of the rapprochement remain substantial. The two countries’ readouts of the bilateral meeting between Xi and Modi highlighted sharp differences. India emphasized that peace and tranquillity in the border areas remain an essential basis for the continued development of bilateral relations, while Beijing mentioned its usual position of separating the boundary dispute from broader ties.

Second, China remains attentive to India’s expanding strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly its growing security ties with Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam. Indian and Japanese air forces are also conducting a joint military exercise to boost their defense ties. It is also highly unlikely that China will take concrete measures to address the trade imbalance India faces in its bilateral ties. Moreover, China will continue to support Pakistan’s use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy against India, thereby threatening regional security in South Asia.

Although the BRICS countries have sought to project their collective strength in driving the world toward a multipolar order, there are deep divisions between China and India on this issue as well. While Beijing wants a China-dominated system devoid of democratic values and openness, India seeks to promote an international order in which developing countries have a strong say. These challenges are far too wide and structural to be resolved in the near future.

The current phase of thaw between India and China should be seen as a strategic compromise rather than the foundation for an enduring bilateral peace and prosperity.

Sumit Kumar is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs visiting fellow at National Chengchi University and an assistant professor in Delhi University’s Department of Political Science.