PLC elections should be held after Israeli election results, Palestinian think tank PCPSR says

Voting for the Palestinian Legislative Council should be delayed by three to four months to allow authorities to wait for the outcome of Israel’s election and address the five main obstacles to holding a credible and effective vote, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research wrote in a brief published on Monday.

Five major structural impediments justify postponing the election, PCPSR argued. First, Israel’s control over Area C and east Jerusalem makes it unclear whether Palestinians in those areas will be able to vote. Accusing Jerusalem of pursuing an “annexationist agenda,” the center said Israel could interfere with the electoral process by confiscating election materials, arresting political candidates, and restricting some communities from participating in the vote.

The second major issue identified is that the Palestinian Authority lacks operational security and administrative presence across the Gaza Strip and in expanding regions of the West Bank, making it impossible to safeguard polling locations, protect personnel, ensure secret balloting, or enforce election results.

Without the PA’s administrative control, PCPSR warned that holding elections in Gaza risks producing widespread voting failure.

Additionally, PCPSR warned that the unresolved political and legal status of Hamas currently presents a “major political contradiction.” Without genuine reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, the potential outcome of Hamas winning a significant number of seats in the council could cause major issues, especially given that many international donors are conditioning reconstruction aid for Gaza on Hamas's exclusion from executive governance.

Mass displacement in Gaza erroded trust in electoral process

PCPSR also warned that amendments to Palestinian electoral law which require candidate lists and individual nominees to explicitly pledge adherence to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole legitimate representative create a legal requirement that risks excluding prominent political movements, independent factions, and anti-establishment coalitions that reject specific PLO agreements.

Finally, the think tank warned that public trust in the electoral process had been severely eroded by the mass displacement in Gaza, the PA's fiscal insolvency, unchecked settler violence, and modifications to the election laws, which could undermine the core purpose of establishing a new governing authority.

Compounding these issues, Israel’s election is set to go ahead on October 27. PCPSR predicted that some political parties will likely use cracking down on Palestinian electoral activity as a means to demonstrate their “toughness.”

PLC and presidential elections could trigger a constitutional deadlock

Palestinians are also anticipated to vote in presidential elections in 2027, which, if done after holding PLC elections, could create constitutional instability and potentially trigger a constitutional deadlock if a newly elected PLC challenged Abbas’s executive authority.

 Assuming the PLC elections take place as scheduled, or after a short delay, PCPSR noted that it would center around five distinct political forces: Fatah leaders, Fatah dissidents, Hamas and its potential coalition partners, leftist parties, and civil society groups.

Despite polls demonstrating widespread dissatisfaction with Abbas’s leadership, the official Fatah movement has substantial institutional advantages, including patronage networks, party discipline, and administrative experience, the brief noted.  The official leadership may also attempt to appeal to more voters by recruiting youth leaders, civil society figures, and respected independents; however, such efforts would likely be hindered by voter frustration with PA corruption, security coordination, and economic stagnation.

The Fatah dissident faction list, centered around imprisoned Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti and prominent figures such as Qaddoura Fares, has tremendous appeal to voters. Polls indicate that Barghouti is the most popular Palestinian figure, likely to receive 54% of votes in the presidential election. However, should Barghouti's list run separately against an official Fatah list, Barghouti's would capture 33% of the vote, while the Fatah official list would receive just 14%, according to PCPSR polls.

Anti-Abbas coalition centered on Hamas, other terrorist factions

The third, which PCPSR claimed could be the most decisive force, is a broad anti-Abbas national opposition coalition centered on Hamas, but extending beyond it. The ongoing talks with Hamas by Mohammed Dahlan’s Democratic Reform faction, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Nasser al-Qudwa's political movement, and independent figures, could provide Hamas the opportunity to run through a unified national list.

PCPSR said that by nominating independent technocrats, respected national figures, and non-partisan candidates, Hamas could broaden its electoral reach while also shielding the list from international sanctions.

The fourth camp, which consists of leftist lists like the Palestinian National Initiative (Mubadara), PFLP, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and Palestinian People's Party (PPP), collectively commands around 18% support among likely voters.

The final camp, comprising independent and civil society lists, faces significant structural hurdles and limited financial resources, making a substantial parliamentary presence unlikely.

A fragmented parliament

Predicting the outcome of the election, PCPSR published that it is unlikely that the 2006 results would be repeated, as the November election will most probably produce a more fragmented parliament.

The August 2026 poll found that Fatah would receive 32% among likely voters, Hamas 29%, and third parties combined 18%. However, at the time, a crucial 21% of likely voters remained undecided.

The emerging Hamas-Dahlan coalition could, however, consolidate multiple small voting blocs into a dominant parliamentary force, especially given that the anti-Abbas opposition coalition started with a base of at least one-fifth of the electorate.

Fatah’s official faction, PCPSR, insisted that it could not secure a parliamentary majority unless opposition forces remain deeply divided.