Belt and Road a military path too

• By Robert D. Eldridge James E. Fanell

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For more than a decade, Beijing has described its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a benign program of ports, railways, factories and digital connectivity. That description was never true. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has begun to stage military power behind the commercial geography it has constructed — and its recent air exercise in Egypt is the clearest warning yet.

Last month, a Chinese flight of J-16 strike fighters, Y-9LG electronic warfare aircraft, KJ-500 AWACS aircraft, Y-20 transport aircraft, Z-20 utility helicopters and YY-20A in-flight refueling aircraft flew approximately 6,000km to Egypt for the “Eagles of Civilization” exercise with the Egyptian Air Force.

Two significant firsts from the exercise were the J-16’s first deployment to Africa and the first ever YY-20A mid-air refueling of Egyptian Rafale fighters. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) gained valuable experience moving combat power across continents, sustaining it en route and conducting advanced air combat training against dissimilar aircraft alongside a major Arab military and US defense beneficiary.

The location matters. Egypt sits astride the Suez Canal, one of the world’s indispensable maritime arteries. Chinese companies have invested billions of dollars in the Suez Canal Economic Zone and have an expanding presence in manufacturing, logistics, ports and technology. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s September visit connected those economic ties with cooperation in security and counterterrorism.

The emerging pattern is unmistakable: first commercial penetration, then political influence, technological dependence, military partnership and operational access. Indeed, this was the second time PLAAF combat aircraft have participated in this exercise. Last year’s Eagles of Civilization included J-10 multirole aircraft along with a YY-20A tanker conducting the first ever air-to-air refueling of Egyptian MiG-29 fighters.

Militarization does not require a communist Chinese flag to be raised over every BRI-funded port. It develops incrementally: a commercial berth capable of replenishing naval vessels; an airport accustomed to receiving Chinese military aircraft; a telecommunications network useful for intelligence gathering; regular exercises that familiarize the PLA with local terrain and command structures; and access agreements that can be activated during a crisis.

The PRC has demonstrated this progression. After beginning continuous PLA Navy task force operations in the Gulf of Aden in 2009, the PLA established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017, beside the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint and near Chinese-financed port infrastructure. AidData reports that China committed almost US$24 billion to 168 overseas ports between 2000 and last year.

The Pentagon believes that Beijing is seeking a global logistics and basing network encompassing permanent garrisons, shared facilities, military sites co-located with commercial infrastructure and ad hoc access to foreign ports.

This is not incidental mission creep. The PRC doctrine of military-civil fusion deliberately erases the boundary between commercial and strategic assets, just like its “gray zone” operations blur kinetic and non-kinetic actions. Beijing’s own 2019 defense white paper declares that protecting China’s overseas interests is a mission of its armed forces. As Chinese investments, citizens, supply chains and resource dependencies expand abroad, the Chinese Communist Party would claim an ever-growing need to “protect” them. The BRI creates the justification and the infrastructure.

The next phase would probably bring more long-range deployments, joint exercises, arms sales, intelligence facilities, Chinese security contractors, naval replenishment visits and negotiated access rights. Only a limited number of locations might become formal bases. Beijing does not need dozens. A network of dual-use nodes offering fuel, repairs, surveillance, diplomatic cover and emergency access could transform the PLA’s global reach without provoking the resistance that declared bases would invite.

The danger is not merely that the PRC as a hegemon would defend its commerce. It is that infrastructure marketed under the auspices of Xi’s Global Development Initiative can become an instrument of coercion in war or crisis — restricting rivals’ access, monitoring their movements, and supporting Chinese military operations far from Asia. It also leverages its uses against host nations.

Governments, reporters, and academics should stop evaluating BRI projects as ordinary commercial transactions. Port ownership, financing terms, data access, contractor obligations and military-use provisions require national security scrutiny. Democratic nations must offer credible infrastructure alternatives and help vulnerable countries preserve genuine control over their strategic assets.

Egypt’s skies supplied the warning. The Belt and Road is no longer merely an economic plan. Increasingly, it is becoming the logistical map of Chinese military power.

Taiwan and other like-minded countries need to be especially attentive to PRC actions far away as these economically-linked military maneuvers would complement the PRC’s ability and willingness to increase pressure on Taiwan when it knows its other bases are covered and defended.

Robert D. Eldridge, Ph.D., was a tenured associate professor at Osaka University before serving as the political advisor to the United States Marine Corps in Japan. He was a 2024 Taiwan MOFA Fellow at Tamkang University and is the author and editor of numerous books.

Retired US Navy captain James E. Fanell served as a naval intelligence officer whose positions included senior intelligence officer for China at the Office of Naval Intelligence and chief of intelligence for CTF-70, 7th Fleet, and the US Pacific Fleet.