Transferring West Bank enforcement from IDF to police is a mistake without a plan - editorial

Defense Minister Israel Katz wants to shift responsibility for handling Israeli extremist violence in the West Bank from the IDF to the police. It is an idea worth discussing, but a shift this radical should not be announced before it is actually planned, particularly in an arena as volatile and operationally complicated as the West Bank.

Reporting by The Jerusalem Post’s Yonah Jeremy Bob revealed exclusively that Katz did not coordinate his proposal with a number of the relevant IDF authorities before making it public.

Some senior officials reportedly did not fully understand what he was proposing until a meeting on Monday. Between legal questions, manpower constraints, operational difficulties, and potential High Court challenges, the plan could still easily end up delayed, diluted, or blocked entirely.

Katz has spoken about the transfer as though the fundamental decision has already been made, while the institutions expected to carry it out are still trying to determine whether it is workable.

A defense minister is certainly entitled to pursue major reform, including reform that challenges an imperfect status quo. However, governing requires doing the difficult work needed to make an outcome function rather than just declaring an outcome.

IDF has responsibility for security and public order

The existing system is complicated because the reality on the ground is complicated.

The IDF has primary responsibility for security and public order in the West Bank, while the police and the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) play parallel roles. Violent incidents involving Palestinian residents and extremist settlers also do not fall into clean institutional categories.

At the same confrontation, soldiers can face Palestinian suspects, Israeli civilians, violent rioters, and bystanders requiring protection. Katz’s proposal does not make that complexity disappear.

And this is hardly an academic discussion. Recent weeks have provided disturbing examples of extremist settler violence in Kusra, where settlers repeatedly entered the Palestinian village despite a closed military zone order.

Residents described threats and attacks, while IDF troops were deployed to the area and an additional battalion was sent as reinforcement.

The military has since opened an internal investigation into its own handling of the events, specifically looking into why it took 48 hours to evacuate an illegal outpost and why troops reportedly failed to carry out parts of the evacuation mission.

Video footage showed extremists dismantling fences, blocking roads, and surrounding areas, while Yesha Council leaders themselves condemned violence against Palestinians and Israeli security personnel.

Those failures should lead to better enforcement, clearer authority, and greater accountability rather than confusion over who is supposed to intervene. If the police are to assume a much larger role, they need the officers, command structures, and legal authority to do so.

Katz risks creating outcome of further failure

The transition must be fully coordinated with the IDF, the attorney-general, and every other body that will have to make split-second decisions when violence erupts.

Otherwise, Katz risks creating precisely the outcome critics fear: the IDF is instructed to step back from confronting Jewish extremists, while the police are not yet equipped or positioned to step forward.

Responsibility has not been transferred; it has simply fallen into the gap between two institutions, a concern Bob’s reporting notes is already being raised by critics of Katz’s proposal.

There is also an unavoidable political dimension. Israel is heading toward an October 27 election, and the settler movement represents an important constituency on the Right. That does not by itself prove Katz’s proposal is motivated by campaigning.

However, when a minister announces a politically convenient transfer of responsibility before resolving operational and legal questions, it is reasonable to ask whether political considerations are outrunning policy.

That is ultimately the most troubling part of Katz’s approach. Settler violence is not an administrative nuisance for the Defense Ministry to pass elsewhere; it is a security and law enforcement problem that requires attention, resources, and leadership.

Katz may genuinely believe the police should carry more of the burden, but his responsibility is to make sure somebody actually carries it.

Israel does not need leaders who solve difficult problems by putting distance between themselves and the problem. It needs ministers willing to own those problems until workable solutions are in place.

Katz should focus less on who can be made responsible for settler violence and more on ensuring that Israel’s authorities stop it. That is the responsibility he cannot outsource.