The diplomatic endgame of 2026

As the year draws to a close, three major summits are to bring together world leaders in overlapping yet distinct fora: the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Manila, the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Shenzhen and the G20 Summit in Miami. Their significance lie not merely in the declarations they produce, but in which leaders attend, who stays away and what bilateral or trilateral encounters take place on their sidelines.

The summits occur amid deepening international divisions: US-China rivalry, conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, economic disruption and weakening multilateral institutions. Their challenge is to restore cooperation increasingly subordinated to great-power competition.

The East Asia Summit comes first. The Philippines concludes its ASEAN chairmanship amid sharp confrontation with China in the South China Sea. Manila has emerged as ASEAN’s most outspoken challenger of Chinese maritime assertiveness. Meanwhile, the Myanmar situation remains unresolved, exposing ASEAN’s limited capacity to manage its internal crises.

The EAS brings together ASEAN and eight dialogue partners, including the US, China, Russia and India. Its strategic importance contrasts with its limited ability to generate cohesion. ASEAN centrality remains its organizing principle, but ASEAN’s influence over major powers rarely extends beyond its convening role.

US President Donald Trump’s anticipated attendance would be significant, although his motivation might be more to support the Philippines than ASEAN. China normally participates through its premier rather than Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), while Moscow has been represented by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov. Their continued engagement nevertheless acknowledges the EAS as a useful diplomatic forum.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s participation would reaffirm India’s commitment to ASEAN centrality, particularly during the ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation.

A potentially important development is the Quad Leaders’ Summit on the EAS sidelines, bringing together Trump, Modi, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. Although all four could meet again at the G20, convening the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in the Indo-Pacific region would carry greater strategic symbolism. It could revive leadership-level momentum while reinforcing cooperation already continuing at working levels. China’s criticism of a possible Quad resurgence suggests that this could also sharpen exchanges at the EAS.

The APEC Summit in Shenzhen would shift attention toward economic competition. China would present itself as a champion of regional integration, open markets and technological cooperation, seeking to counter concerns about industrial overcapacity, economic coercion and excessive supply-chain dependence.

Hosting APEC in Shenzhen symbolizes Chinese technological and economic ambitions. Beijing would promote cooperation on artificial intelligence, digital commerce, technology standards and supply-chain resilience. Yet APEC’s consensus-based framework faces contradictions when its two largest economies increasingly weaponize trade and technology.

A possible Trump-Xi bilateral meeting could overshadow APEC’s formal proceedings. Agreements on tariffs, technology restrictions or trade imbalances would have consequences extending far beyond the summit. Renewed confrontation would deepen regional uncertainty.

Taiwan participates in APEC as “Chinese Taipei,” represented by a designated envoy rather than its president. Its economic importance, particularly in semiconductors, contrasts with its diplomatic exclusion from the EAS. Nevertheless, Taiwan would remain a shadow agenda at Manila, influencing US-China exchanges, Japanese security concerns and regional strategic calculations.

Taiwan has objected to China’s handling of its invitation to APEC at Shenzhen, making its representation a diplomatic issue in itself.

Russia’s representation remains uncertain, although the Chinese venue increases the possibility of Russian President Vladimir Putin attending. Speculation about a Trump-Xi-Putin trilateral encounter could consequently become another defining feature of Shenzhen.

The G20 Summit in Miami would bring wider participation from Europe, West Asia and other regions. Its principal challenge might be managing not merely the global economy, but the G20 itself.

The Trump administration seeks to narrow the agenda toward deregulation, energy costs, innovation and growth, moving away from the development, climate and debt priorities advanced under the Indonesian, Indian, Brazilian and South African presidencies. South Africa’s exclusion, alongside invitations to nonmembers such as Poland, raises questions about whether a rotating chair can reshape participation according to national preferences.

Xi’s attendance appears likely, while Putin’s remains uncertain. A Trump-Putin meeting could advance negotiations over Ukraine, but excluding Kyiv or European leaders from substantive discussions would raise questions of legitimacy. European governments fear that a Washington-Moscow accommodation could undermine their security interests.

For India, the EAS and G20 provide complementary opportunities, since it is not an APEC member. EAS offers a platform to reinforce Act East, maritime cooperation and the Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions vision. G20 provides an opportunity to defend development priorities, energy security and the interests of emerging economies.

Together, the summits expose a fundamental contradiction. Multilateral institutions remain indispensable as convening platforms, yet their capacity to shape outcomes is diminishing. The EAS would test ASEAN centrality, while APEC would assess China’s ability to manage economic interdependence and the G20 would probe the resilience of inclusive economic governance under US leadership.

Their collective legacy might depend less on negotiated declarations than on whether bilateral and trilateral power bargains reinforce multilateral cooperation or reduce these institutions to convenient theatres for great-power diplomacy.

Gurjit Singh is a former ambassador to ASEAN and author of The Durian Flavour.