Summit sheds light on global south

At the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi, people will remember less what China achieved and more what the global south attained. China did not lose face: President Xi Jinping (習近平) was an honored guest in India, was endorsed as the chair of BRICS for next year, and China is to host the next summit. Yet the carefully crafted 140-paragraph New Delhi Declaration (NDD), the longest BRICS declaration so far, reveals a subtle, but important shift. BRICS is moving from a loose grouping toward a more substantive platform for the global south, giving developing countries greater voice and bargaining space in international governance. This has constrained the gradual effort to make BRICS an instrument of China’s geopolitical strategy.

The central tension is that China is a major power, while most BRICS members are developing countries whose interests do not always coincide with Beijing’s. China wants BRICS to increase the strategic weight of a multipolar order and reduce Western dominance. Much of the global south wants something different: not to replace dependence on the West with dependence on China, but to acquire greater autonomy and bargaining power with both. New Delhi brought this distinction into sharper focus.

Xi’s vision contrasted with the summit’s outcome. In his opening address, Xi spoke of BRICS as an important global platform for cooperation among emerging-market and developing countries. He sought enhanced cooperation in artificial intelligence (AI), supply chains, peace and stability, WTO-focused trade and reform of global governance, and greater representation for the global south. He also proposed cooperation with China on AI-driven new industrialization.

Many of these issues found their way into the NDD; their emphasis was placed within a broader multilateral framework acceptable to all members.

Consider the financial agenda. China and Russia have supported reducing dependence on Western financial systems, enhancing local-currency settlements and developing alternatives to the US dollar. The NDD supports cross-border payments and settlements in local currencies, but does not commit BRICS to a common currency or a formal de-dollarization agenda. Instead, the India-led approach emphasizes interoperability of payment systems, the proposed BRICS Risk Lab in GIFT City, and continuing work on investment and financial infrastructure.

The distinction is important. For China, financial alternatives can contribute to a broader alternative to Western-dominated systems. However, for developing countries, the attraction is diversification rather than replacing one dominant system with another. Many want access to Chinese finance without becoming financially dependent on China, just as they want alternatives to Western financial institutions without abandoning them.

The same tension exists in trade. The declaration opposes unilateral tariffs, non-tariff measures and protectionism, and supports WTO reform. These positions can be read as criticism of Western trade policies, but they also touch a sensitive issue within the global south itself. China is by far the largest trading power in BRICS, yet several developing countries complain of difficulties in accessing the Chinese market, trade imbalances and non-tariff barriers. They want greater market access to China as much as they want relief from Western restrictions. Thus, language against protectionism cannot automatically be interpreted as an anti-US position.

Technology presents another dimension. China has enormous strengths in AI, manufacturing and supply chains and naturally wants BRICS cooperation to reinforce these advantages. However, developing countries want access to technology, investment, skills and value chains,not simply to become markets for Chinese technology or suppliers of raw materials to Chinese industry. The global south wants technological cooperation that builds productive capacity and autonomy, not another form of dependency.

The NDD consequently moves beyond the China-versus-West narrative. The question is no longer whether the US dollar should be replaced or whether the US should be challenged at China’s behest. The objective is to give developing countries better access to finance, technology, markets and decisionmaking, without having to depend exclusively on either Washington or Beijing.

The Chinese positions had their complexities. Xi arrived in India for the first time since 2019 and met Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Peace and stability on the border, trade imbalances, supply chains, people-to-people exchanges and building trust were among the issues discussed. Modi emphasized that peace and stability on the border were critical for improving bilateral relations.

India’s position demonstrated the variation between Chinese and Indian approaches. India is simultaneously a member of BRICS and the Quad, a partner of many Western countries, and a country invited to the G7, while also having an unresolved boundary question with China. It showed that participation in BRICS does not require alignment with Beijing. India’s concept of multipolarity envisions the global south gaining greater heft without abandoning relations with the West.

India’s convening power created space for countries with differing interests to engage. The consensus around the NDD, including on west Asia, was achieved with precision.

The New Delhi Summit represents a transition. China remains BRICS’ dominant economic power and its next chair, but it has not secured a BRICS organized primarily around its geopolitical contest with the West. The tensions between China’s interests and those of other developing countries have instead encouraged a broader definition of BRICS.

The true winner of the summit is therefore the global south. China gained the chair; India helped define the narrative. China seeks to make BRICS a stronger pole in a changing world order. The global south wants BRICS to give it greater space within that order, including greater room to negotiate with China itself. If this distinction is preserved, BRICS can become less an instrument of great-power rivalry and more an instrument of global south agency.

Gurjit Singh is a former Indian ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, ASEAN, Ethiopia and the African Union.