The Indo-Pacific in uncertain seas

US foreign policy this year has been difficult to reconcile. Washington has shown a greater willingness to engage with China while taking a tougher line toward its own allies and partners. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) meeting with US President Donald Trump in Washington in September brought this into a sharper focus. Across the Indo-Pacific region, governments are trying to work out what these shifts mean for their security and for the future of US engagement in the region.

Taiwan has a particular motivation to watch these developments closely. Beijing is assessing the direction of Washington’s relationship with China and the priorities guiding its regional policy, which could lead it to test the water with Taiwan. There is no clear evidence that the US intends to abandon Taiwan, but changes in Washington’s approach could affect how Beijing and Taipei assess the longer-term security environment.

One development that has lent itself to this debate is the decision to rename US Indo-Pacific Command as US Pacific Command. The command took its Indo-Pacific name during Trump’s first term, acknowledging the growing strategic links between the Indian and Pacific oceans. The return to the old name has led some to question whether the Indo-Pacific still holds the same place in Washington’s thinking.

The name change alone tells us little about what the US would do militarily. Still, it comes as the administration reconsiders its overseas commitments and looks for a different footing with Beijing. If Washington puts greater emphasis on the Pacific, the question is whether it would continue to give the same attention to the wider region, including the partnerships it has spent years developing.

This has prompted questions about India’s place in Washington’s regional strategy. Some have interpreted the shift as a sign that India is becoming less important to the US. That might be too narrow a reading. Washington’s approach is being shaped by several factors: Trump’s transactional view of alliances, his interest in reaching an accommodation with Beijing, competing demands on US forces elsewhere and the immediate military challenges in the Western Pacific. India matters, but changes in US policy cannot be explained by its position alone.

New Delhi has its own reasons to stay involved in the Indo-Pacific. It continues to deal with Beijing despite border disputes, while building defense ties with regional partners and taking part in joint military exercises. Its pursuit of strategic autonomy can make its choices difficult to guess, but it also means that India’s regional engagement does not depend entirely on the state of its relationship with Washington.

For Taiwan, the military implications are more immediate. China’s capabilities have grown, and its pressure on the nation continues. If Washington appears more concerned with stabilizing ties with Beijing than deterring Chinese coercion, Chinese leaders might see an opportunity to step up military activity around Taiwan, intensify economic pressure or gradually alter the “status quo.”

A crisis in the Taiwan Strait would affect the rest of the region, too. Trade and shipping would be disrupted, and neighboring governments would face difficult decisions about how to respond. Japan has an obvious stake in the outcome because of its proximity to Taiwan. In May, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi announced an updated version of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision, keeping the region on Tokyo’s strategic agenda.

India and Japan cannot take the place of the US, and neither country approaches China the same way. Both have reasons to oppose coercion and to resist a regional order shaped by China’s military weight alone. Their continued engagement helps keep security cooperation moving, even when Washington’s priorities are uncertain. India’s role is especially important, because it brings a major regional power into that effort without requiring it to align fully with the US.

There are limits to what regional partners can achieve on their own. India, Japan and others can deepen defense cooperation and improve their ability to respond to a crisis, but much would still depend on how Washington responds if China moves against Taiwan. A more conciliatory approach toward Beijing might create room for diplomacy, but without clear US resolve, it could encourage China to take greater risks.

For now, India, Japan and other regional partners are helping hold the fort as Washington reassesses its priorities. They can deepen defense cooperation and help maintain regional stability, but they cannot replace the US if a crisis erupts across the Taiwan Strait. If Beijing sees Washington’s shifting approach as an opportunity to increase pressure on Taiwan or challenge the regional “status quo,” the consequences could extend across the Indo-Pacific and in fact, be detrimental to the US as well.

Sana Hashi is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. The views expressed in this article are personal.