Democrats’ blue wave means rough waters ahead for US-China relations

Comedian Patton Oswalt once joked about the United States electing a KKK president after the progressive years of Barack Obama. It’s worth retelling, not just because it’s funny but because it captures the swing between extremes in US politics. That’s worth keeping in mind in light of the so-called Democratic blue wave sweeping the country.

It goes: “We will have a woman president, probably sooner than later … but just keep in mind that after she serves her term, the choices will very probably be a very qualified gay guy, and then a KKK dude with the ass cut out of his jeans. And the country’s going to go: ‘Let’s see what the KKK guy’s got. I don’t know, maybe he’s got some ideas, I’d love to hear them.’”

Moderation and consistency are not features of contemporary US politics. That’s why after Obama, Americans elected Donald Trump, and after Joe Biden, an even more in-your-face Trump. Now the political pendulum is swinging from “Maga” back towards the progressives.

Democrats and some Republicans are now likely to overcorrect against Trump’s China policy by adopting more hawkish postures after the midterm elections and during the 2028 presidential race.

It is not that Trump is friendly towards Beijing. He started the trade war with China, which escalated under Biden into a full-blown economic war, especially over technology. This conflict expanded further under Trump 2.0. More recently, however, he and President Xi Jinping have taken steps to stabilise relations.

If there is one area where Trump can work with a Democrat-dominated Congress, it is getting tough on China.

In a Foreign Affairs essay last month, Ali Wyne of the International Crisis Group and Ryan Hass of the Brookings Institution argue that Trump has prioritised warm personal ties with Xi and set aside long-standing tensions. His sustained attacks on allies, they say, have pushed partners to hedge and strengthen their own ties with China.

The essay warns of a reflexive shift towards confrontation. Possible actions include penalising Chinese supply chains for pharmaceutical ingredients and rare earths, diversifying away from them and expanding protectionist measures. The authors also acknowledge ongoing competitive steps, including critical mineral stockpiling and deeper security cooperation with willing allies such as Australia, Japan and the Philippines.

Unlike the purely transactional Trump, many centrists, whether Democrat or Republican, regard China as the most serious strategic and economic threat facing the US. They favour Biden’s “managed competition” approach – which combines stronger alliances, support for Taiwan’s self-defence and high-level diplomacy – and they might even push it further. They will once again advocate a pivot to Asia, away from the political quicksand of the Middle East.

Before the 2028 presidential race, the foreign policy debate in the US is likely to be about how hard to confront China, not whether to do so. If there is one thing Democrats and Republicans can agree on, it is that the US must win the artificial intelligence (AI) race with China, however “winning” is understood. They cite Anthropic’s Mythos model as an example. Its immense power to discover and exploit software vulnerabilities is the kind of cyber-capability they believe must be held back from China and other perceived adversaries.

Even the new progressive Democrats entering Congress are likely to support tighter US export controls against China, especially in tech and AI. Progressive lawmakers such as Bernie Sanders, Ro Khanna and Elizabeth Warren already favour tougher action on what they see as unfair Chinese trade practices.

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In another Foreign Affairs essay, Thomas Wright, a senior official on the National Security Council under Biden, writes that some progressives view the “strategic competition frame as excessively hawkish and self-fulfilling”. In their view, Washington and Beijing share interests in AI safety and climate change, and detente is achievable. Some even call for deeper economic ties.

The problem is that no one in US politics earns political capital by going soft on China. The new progressives could easily join the centrists in the Democratic Party to broaden industrial policy and coordinate tariffs with Europe to counter China’s supposed excess capacity.

On paper, the new progressives could cooperate with Beijing on electric vehicles (EVs), clean technology and climate change. Once in office, though, they are likely to doubt that China can be a reliable partner and oppose Chinese EVs entering the US on national security grounds.

Wright observes that among Democrats, “centrists and progressives have considerable common ground”. The same can be said of centrist and anti-Trump Republicans when it comes to China, if little else.

As a lame-duck president, Trump will have neither the ability nor the inclination to oppose them.