Inside the Houthi advance: How Iran's allies are helping tighten Tehran's grip on the Red Sea

In recent days, the Houthis have seized control of the Greater and Lesser Hanish islands in the southern Red Sea, continuing their lightning advance that has brought the organization to effectively control the strategically important Bab el-Mandeb Strait. 

Earlier this month, their forces captured the strategic port city of Mocha, expelling forces linked to the Saudi-linked Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). They also overran Perim Island, located directly inside the strait, and the Zuqar islands further north.

The Iran-supported Shi’ite militiamen are now located at the narrowest point of the coastline, just 20 km. from the African coast. This affords them, and by extension the Iran-led regional alliance of which they are a part, effective control over maritime traffic making its way through the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea.

In statements made as they advanced, the Houthis made it clear that they intend to target Saudi shipping on the strait, rather than institute a general naval blockade. 

The Houthi advance was accompanied by an Iraqi Shi’ite militia drone attack on the Saudi East-West pipeline on September 10. The pipeline had served as a means for Riyadh to transport oil to the Red Sea, thereby avoiding the Strait of Hormuz, which is subject to Iranian attacks. It is expected to be out of service for three to five weeks. 

Iran’s allies coordinate pressure across the Red Sea corridor

The coordinated action between the Iraqi Shi’ite militias and the Houthis is clearly intended to extend the Iran-led alliance’s ability to impose rules on maritime traffic from Hormuz to the Red Sea. The focus on Saudi Arabia (which initiated the current round of fighting with its attack on Sana’a airport in July) avoids inviting US retaliation, which a more general effort to blockade Bab el-Mandeb might trigger.

The events of the last days demonstrate the Iran-led regional bloc’s continued ability to act in coordination for shared objectives. While Israel has pummeled and drastically weakened (though not destroyed) Iran’s clients in the Levant, further south in the Gulf area, Tehran and its allies remain very much in business.

Nuances and details are important here. The Houthis, like Hamas and unlike Lebanese or Iraqi Hezbollah, are not a direct franchise or proxy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Like Hamas, the Houthis are an authentic and deep-rooted local movement, with their own agenda and preferences.

It is notable, for example, that the Houthis preferred to avoid direct engagement in the current round of fighting prior to the Saudi attacks, and are now directing their efforts specifically against Riyadh. This confirms the considerable extent to which the organization is not simply a puppet of the Iranians, acting militarily in response to orders from Tehran.

At the same time, this operational independence should not be exaggerated. While the Houthis do not simply take orders from the Iranians, much of their impressive military capacity derives directly from their relationship with Tehran.

Indeed, close examination of the evidence indicates that the military activities of the Houthis are enabled by the direct presence of Iranian and other allied personnel on Yemeni soil, and the close involvement of Iranian and allied Iraqi and Lebanese personnel who are instructing and managing the Houthis. Notably, China and Russia support these efforts on the basis of their shared geopolitical interests.

Documents reveal Iranian, Iraqi and Lebanese support for Houthis

Documents recently obtained by The Jerusalem Post from Yemeni sources provide details regarding this reality. The documents list the names and identifying information of Iranian, Iraqi, and Lebanese experts in Yemen who are providing expert advice and supervision to the Houthis regarding drones, missiles, and intelligence/security operations. 

The documents name, for example, the Iranian citizen Haji Murtaza Mokhles and the Iraqi Abu Mukhtar Bari Mashour, who are giving expert advice in the field of intelligence and security operations. They are working closely with Abu Jihad Muhammad Alawi al-Tiri, a senior Houthi official from the village of Bayt Baws, located 8 km. south of Sana’a. He is described as a senior official of the “Houthi Security and Intelligence Service,” serving as “administrator of the Military Intelligence Center and supervisor of the Presidential Information Center.”

Similarly, in the field of drones, the documents reference the Iranian citizen Hasan bin Hasan Danbous, and the Iraqi Hasan Iyad al-Ameri, both senior experts in this field, as working with the senior Houthi commander Hassan Sharafi in development in this area.

Regarding missiles, the Iraqi Muhammad Sayed al-Hakim and the Iranian citizen Karar Mumammad al-Musawi are named as working with Abu Bashar Saleh al-Saree, who is named as managing the central information department of the missile forces.

These examples are part of a much longer list. Identifying details, location, and sometimes the telephone numbers of the officials are in the documents.

Iran, Russia and China links emerge in Houthi supply chains

The documents also include details regarding the smuggling methods that enable the Houthis to bring vital components and equipment into Yemen, and the roles played by Iran, Russia, and China. They name a number of businessmen residing in the Houthi-controlled part of Yemen, who are responsible for the import of spare parts for drones from China to Houthi-controlled Yemen. Among them are Safwan al-Dabai, Yasser al-Dabai, and Rami al-Hajj al-Alimi, along with several others. Yemeni, and in one case Chinese phone numbers, are included, along with the men’s names.

According to these documents, following a meeting held under Iranian auspices in Muscat, Oman, in March 2024, several Chinese shipping companies have been paying the Houthis in hard currency so their ships can pass through the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea undisturbed. The list of companies includes two major Chinese concerns: COSCO Shipping and Sea Legend Shipping.

In two further passages, the documents reference a communications system south of Saada city, and connected to centers in the mountains of Hajjah, Amran, Sana’a, and the mountains overlooking the west coast.

“This network was created by experts from Iran and uses Iranian-made encryption devices, in addition to the use of Russian communication and encryption devices, especially in the Morse messaging system…

“US airstrikes were able to destroy many communication networks and jamming devices, and the Houthi militias are currently trying to replace them with Chinese devices, even if temporarily, so that Iran can then smuggle devices to Yemen and restart the jihadi communications department with all its capacity.”

It is also noted that “most of the electrical and optical infrared sensors used by the Houthi militias are Iranian-made systems that were smuggled from the Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas and Shahbar to the port of Saleef, Hodeidah, and the coasts of Al-Mahra governorate (the process is still ongoing), where the components of the missiles, and the devices, are also smuggled in the form of parts that are reassembled when they arrive in Yemen. As for the thermal cameras – the Houthis use Chinese thermal cameras, imported through official means.”

 This evidence showcases an integrated de facto alliance in which the Houthis, in the service of shared goals but not under the direction of any other element, are provided with advanced capacities and assistance, enabling them to better pursue their aims. This structure, in addition to the undoubted religious-ideological zeal of the Shi’ite Islamist fighters, is what underlies the successes of recent days. 

Divisions weaken the anti-Houthi coalition

It is instructive to compare these arrangements with the contrasting divisions on the anti-Houthi side. There, the Saudis acted militarily against the United Arab Emirates-supported, highly capable South Yemeni element earlier this year, removing them from the field. They then concluded a pact with Turkey and Pakistan, which seems to have brought some ineffectual Turkey-supported Sunni jihadi fighters to Yemen, and little else.

The United States, meanwhile, has been looking for a way to avoid escalation, and for now seems to be staying uninvolved. Its position is based on the grounds that the Houthis are only targeting a US ally, and not the general shipping traffic that traverses the strait.

The developments witnessed this week highlight both the deep structures of cooperation and assistance from which the Houthis benefit, and the relative disarray of their opponents. Reversing these advances will mean addressing both of these elements.