Closing NATO’s deterrence gap

Lithuanian soldiers train with a French-designed drone during the U.S. military and NATO Allied Spirit 25 exercise in Hohenfels, Germany, in March 2025. | Bloomberg

By Agnia Grigas
Project Syndicate

Oct 9, 2026

VILNIUS – On Sept. 23, just a week after NATO aircraft shot down a drone that had entered Lithuanian airspace from Belarus, a Russian military helicopter flying out of Kaliningrad briefly breached Polish airspace. Neither intrusion was an isolated episode. A growing catalogue of security incidents shows that the Kremlin’s war of aggression against Ukraine is pressing ever more ominously on NATO’s borders.

As reassuring as it was to see NATO scramble fighters to intercept and destroy the drone, the broader pattern of encroachments raises a difficult question: What will Europe and NATO do about these provocations? NATO has become increasingly capable of defending against them, but it has been much less willing to impose costs on Russia for its aggression.

This failure of deterrence goes to the heart of Europe’s security problem. On one hand, NATO’s frontline states, like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, are responding to Russian military and hybrid threats, as well as investing heavily in air and missile defense, counterdrone systems, cyber resilience, critical infrastructure and civil preparedness. NATO has reinforced its eastern flank and European governments are rebuilding military capabilities after decades of underinvestment. But, as I show in a new Atlantic Council report, there is a persistent gap: NATO members’ response remains overwhelmingly defensive and reactive.

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