Lessons from the Mataian disaster

On Sept. 23 last year, an overflow from a Mataian River (馬太鞍溪) barrier lake devastated Hualien County’s Guangfu Township (光復).

In the aftermath, tens of thousands of people boarded trains with their shovels, rain boots and tools to travel to the disaster site and help clear away the mud. The so-called “shovel heroes” quickly became one of the most celebrated and moving images of Taiwanese civil society. One year on, what the occasion calls for is not simply another celebration of that generosity, but an examination of how much has actually changed since the disaster.

The government has been reviewing its disaster preparedness and prevention systems based on lessons learned from the flood, rapidly expanding training programs for disaster relief volunteers, and making amendments to the Disaster Prevention and Protection Act (災害防救法) regarding responsibility management, local coordination and barrier lake risks.

However, the most pressing question still remains: When the next disaster arrives even faster and harder than the last, would we still be waiting on an organization of volunteers to rush to the scene, or have we found a way to harness civic power, such as those shown by the shovel heroes, into a mobilizable force of national resilience?

Guangfu showed us that Taiwan has the people. The next step is to prove whether it has the systems.

Extreme weather events this year have only heightened the issue’s urgency. Bouts of short, but intense rainfall have repeatedly broken records, while the limits of river dredgers, drainage systems, box culverts, water pumping stations and flood detention facilities are beginning to be tested.

The water management system’s measures for success can no longer just be about how much silt has been cleared and how many flood retention ponds have been built; we must start seriously stress testing for extreme climate conditions. When rainfall over 24 hours exceeds flood control standards, the government should be clear on which communities might experience flooding, which bridges might break, which power stations and cell towers might fail, and which hospital and care facilities need protection.

How we think about disasters must change: We need system-level thinking about drainage, water storage, flood detention and diversion and pre-emptive evacuations. True social resilience does not mean that cities would never flood; it means that when the limits of defenses are breached, the government knows where people should evacuate, supplies should be sent and equipment should be deployed, while ensuring essential services continue to operate.

Even more important to consider is the institutionalization of professional engineering capacity. In 2018, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) converted the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force Hydropower Corps into China Anneng Construction Group, a centrally owned engineering and emergency-rescue enterprise. Taiwan does not need to replicate that system, but it could learn from some of its strengths and establish a national engineering emergency response system compatible with a democratic system.

We already have a legal framework for requisitioning professionals, private vehicles and engineering equipment; the armed forces and reserve system also offer an institutional basis for supporting disaster prevention and response. What truly needs to be strengthened is the ability to use those resources when disaster strikes.

The central and local governments should establish a national engineering disaster response resource database, recording the locations and mobilization times of excavators, bulldozers, cranes, low-bed trailers, dump trucks, water pumps, generators and their operators. Personnel that specialize in engineering, communications, medical care, transportation, water, electricity, civil engineering and drones should also be incorporated into a reserve and civil coordination units.

Disaster response preparations should follow the logic of military operations: During normal times, resources are organized, drills are conducted, equipment are readied and chains of command are established, so that resources could be mobilized properly when a disaster strikes, instead of scrambling for personnel and equipment during the emergency.

The most precious lesson the Mataian disaster gave Taiwan is that the nation has a powerful societal capacity for spontaneous mutual aid. However, the state cannot treat people’s goodwill as a disaster response plan, nor could it expect another group of shovel heroes to swoop in each time a major disaster strikes.

On their first anniversary, we should turn the civic miracle of the shovel heroes into the starting point for reform. Taiwan should reassess capacity during extreme rainfall, establish specialized disaster response units, create a disaster mobilization database for civilian equipment, and connect volunteers, businesses, local governments, the armed forces and the central government’s disaster response system.

In the face of disasters, Taiwan last year saw that Taiwanese were willing to step in. Now, the state must demonstrate that before torrential rain falls, roads are cut off or infrastructure is damaged, it already knows what to do next. That is the true meaning of treating disaster response like combat, and what shovel heroes have left for Taiwan to fulfill.