Trump's energy dominance turning into hubris

WHEN Donald Trump returned to the White House last year, "energy dominance" was the bedrock of his economic and foreign policy plans.

But an unpopular war with Iran and soaring household fuel costs have now made energy policy a major liability for the United States president heading into next month's midterm elections.

In the first two years of Trump's second term, vast US oil and gas resources emboldened Washington abroad, strengthened its hand in trade disputes and underpinned a broader effort to restore US geopolitical dominance.

Yet the Iran war exposed the central weakness in that vision: dominating energy production does not mean controlling its prices.

What began as a pursuit of US energy independence evolved into a doctrine of energy dominance. That is now looking like energy hubris.

The development of cost-effective techniques to tap the country's onshore shale basins had transformed the US into the largest producer of natural gas in 2009 and petroleum in 2018.

By 2022, it was the leading exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), giving Washington unprecedented influence over energy markets.

On his first day back in office, he declared a national energy emergency and ordered the government to "unleash American energy", prioritising oil, gas, coal and nuclear power while sidelining renewables.

The administration's national security strategy, published last December, explicitly linked US influence in the Western Hemisphere to energy dominance, drawing on the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine that sought to oppose European political intervention in the region.

The high-water mark for Trump's energy doctrine arguably came early this year after Washington removed Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro in a swift military operation.

By February, the US possessed not only more energy than any rival, but also the ability to use that abundance to shape trade, diplomacy and security.

Trump's decision to go to war with Iran in late February put that doctrine to the test.

The war led to the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, triggering one of the largest energy disruptions in modern history.

Even though crude flows from the Middle East have mostly recovered, Brent is trading around US$110. Trump wanted to put his stamp on global energy markets, but this was clearly not what he had in mind.

In one respect, the 2026 energy shock has vindicated Trump's strategy. The war cemented the US position as the top supplier of crude, refined fuels and LNG, delivering enormous profits to domestic producers and exporters.

Energy independence certainly offered US consumers some protection against the energy shock, particularly compared with Asian economies.

But that protection has been far from ironclad.

The Iran war has shown that cheap and reliable energy is essential for economic growth, whether it powers heavy industry or the data centres underpinning the artificial intelligence race.

But the conflict has also changed the meaning of energy security.

For countries dependent on imports, particularly many in Asia, the shock has revealed the risks of relying heavily on distant suppliers, vulnerable shipping routes and a concentrated global refining system.

Their response is likely to be broader diversification.

The conflict has, perhaps permanently, undermined Trump's promise that energy dominance would guarantee low prices and economic security at home.