Opinion: Opinion | The Global Right Had A Problem. Israel And Brazil Just Made It Bigger

Brazil's presidential runoff has delivered a consequential verdict on the country's political trajectory. Incumbent President Luiz Incio Lula da Silva of the Workers' Party secured a historic fourth, non-consecutive term, defeating far-right Senator Flavio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro. Lula won 51.79% of the vote, approximately 64.3 million ballots, against Bolsonaro's 48.21%, or around 59.8 million. With turnout at approximately 80.8%, the result underscores the depth of political mobilisation in Latin America's largest democracy.

The outcome is significant not merely because Lula has prevailed, but because he overturned the first-round verdict, in which he had trailed Bolsonaro 45.16% to 47.03%. The reversal illustrates the capacity of Brazil's electoral system to generate unexpected outcomes in a deeply polarised political environment. It also demonstrates that the recent momentum enjoyed by the political right across parts of Latin America is neither irreversible nor uniform. Yet the larger challenge for Lula will be translating an electoral mandate into effective governance. A conservative-leaning Congress is likely to constrain his legislative ambitions, forcing the president to negotiate with political forces that do not necessarily share his domestic priorities or international outlook.

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Lula's fourth term, beginning January 5, 2027, will therefore be defined by a familiar paradox: considerable symbolic authority accompanied by limited room for manoeuvre. His victory provides continuity in Brazil's independent foreign policy, its commitment to BRICS, and its advocacy of a more multipolar international order. But domestic political fragmentation could limit the resources available to sustain these ambitions.

Israel: Electoral Deadlock and the Politics of Coalition-Building

Israel's Knesset election has produced a fragmented political landscape, with neither of the principal Jewish political blocs approaching the 61 seats required for a parliamentary majority. With most regular ballots counted, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's right-wing and religious coalition was projected to secure around 53-56 seats. The principal anti-Netanyahu opposition grouping, led by former Israel Defense Forces chief Gadi Eisenkot and his Yashar movement and allies, was estimated at 47-49 seats. Arab-led parties, including the Joint List and Ra'am, registered a substantial surge, together reaching approximately 19 seats. Turnout of 77.7% was the highest in more than two decades.

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The immediate consequence is political uncertainty at a moment when Israel's domestic and external security challenges remain unusually acute. Netanyahu retains the position of caretaker prime minister while coalition negotiations await the final results, expected around November 4. President Isaac Herzog will then ask a candidate to attempt to assemble a government. The arithmetic is unforgiving. Netanyahu may retain the largest identifiable bloc, but that does not automatically translate into a viable governing majority. Equally, the anti-Netanyahu camp must reconcile ideological differences and secure additional parliamentary support. Protracted negotiations, a minority government, or another election remain plausible outcomes.

The Arab parties' gains introduce an additional complication. Their electoral performance demonstrates that Arab voters can play a consequential role in determining the composition

of the Knesset. However, the reluctance of several Jewish political parties to depend on Arab parliamentary support will complicate efforts to construct a durable coalition. The central question is not simply who commands the largest bloc, but whether Israel's political system can produce a government capable of governing amid entrenched ideological and communal divisions.

The foreign-policy implications will depend heavily on the coalition that emerges. A Netanyahu-led government, or one substantially influenced by his political camp, would likely preserve a hardline approach to security, settlements, and regional diplomacy. A government led by Eisenkot or built around a broader centrist-right alignment could alter diplomatic messaging and tactical priorities, although any fundamental shift would remain constrained by Israel's security establishment, domestic polarisation, and the consequences of the post-October 7 wars. For regional actors, the coalition negotiations will be closely watched for indications of Israeli policy towards Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, and the prospects for normalisation with Arab states.

A Setback for Trump-Aligned Politics

Lula's victory constitutes a setback for the right-wing political currents that have gained ground across parts of Latin America and often found ideological affinity with US President Donald Trump. The Brazilian result complicates any assumption that the hemisphere is moving uniformly towards conservative nationalism or closer alignment with Washington. Brazil's importance extends beyond its electoral politics. As the region's largest economy and a prominent BRICS member, it remains central to debates about strategic autonomy, development finance, global governance, and the distribution of international power. Lula's return reinforces the likelihood that Brasilia will continue to resist a narrowly US-centric conception of the Western Hemisphere and seek a greater role for emerging powers in shaping international institutions.

This does not necessarily imply a decisive rupture with Washington. Economic interdependence, trade, investment, and shared regional concerns will continue to impose limits on bilateral confrontation. Nevertheless, ideological differences between Lula and Trump are likely to sustain friction over multilateralism, climate policy, trade, and the geopolitical orientation of Latin America.

Financial markets' negative short-term reaction to Lula's victory also highlights the tension between electoral legitimacy and investor expectations. The durability of market concerns will depend less on the symbolism of Lula's return than on fiscal credibility, economic management, and the government's ability to navigate a difficult Congress.

The Middle East

Israel's electoral deadlock highlights the difficulty of converting intense political mobilisation into a stable governing arrangement. The election has not resolved the fundamental divisions over Netanyahu's leadership, national security, religion and state, and the future direction of Israeli politics.

A continuation of Netanyahu's influence would suggest substantial policy continuity, particularly on security and settlements. It would also leave Washington facing the familiar challenge of balancing support for Israel with disagreements over regional escalation and the

diplomatic endgame in Gaza. An alternative government could create room for adjustments in diplomatic signalling, but expectations of a dramatic strategic transformation would be premature.

The strong Arab electoral showing presents a parallel dilemma. Greater parliamentary representation could create opportunities for political bargaining and a more consequential Arab role in domestic decision-making. Yet the exclusion of Arab parties from governing arrangements would reinforce the gap between electoral participation and political influence. The eventual coalition will therefore have implications not only for government formation but also for Israel's internal cohesion.

Regional powers will interpret the outcome through their own strategic calculations. Gulf governments will assess whether Israel can offer a sufficiently predictable partner for normalisation and regional cooperation. Iran will watch for signs of continuity or change in Israel's security posture. Palestinians will look for indications of whether a new Israeli government is prepared to alter its approach to Gaza and the wider conflict. In each case, coalition composition will matter, but structural security concerns are likely to remain decisive.

BRICS, Multipolarity, and the Limits of Ideological Momentum

For BRICS and the wider Global South, Lula's re-election reinforces Brazil's role as an advocate of multipolarity and reduces the prospect of a sharp foreign-policy discontinuity that a Bolsonaro victory might have introduced. For the United States, the Brazilian result is a reminder that ideological affinity with conservative political movements does not guarantee electoral success across the hemisphere. Washington will have to contend with a Brazil that is likely to preserve its strategic autonomy rather than automatically align with US preferences.

Israel's outcome, meanwhile, will shape the immediate context for US engagement with the Middle East. Whether Netanyahu remains at the centre of government or an alternative coalition emerges, Washington will continue to confront difficult questions involving Iran, Gaza, regional deterrence, and normalisation. The election may change the political interlocutors, but it will not remove the underlying strategic dilemmas.

The broader lesson is that the global political landscape cannot be reduced to a single ideological trajectory. Right-wing forces remain influential, but their momentum is uneven. Left-wing electoral victories do not automatically produce effective governance, just as high turnout does not guarantee political stability. In both Brazil and Israel, polarisation has mobilised voters while complicating the formation of durable governing coalitions.

The significance of these elections lies not simply in who won or lost, but in what they reveal about the relationship between electoral legitimacy, institutional constraints, and strategic ambition. In both democracies, the decisive test will be whether political leaders can convert the authority conferred by voters into stable governance at a time of deep domestic divisions and mounting geopolitical uncertainty.

(Harsh V Pant is Vice President for Studies at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.)