Neville Alexander’s legacy can’t be honoured by policing who may speak in his name
Trevor Manuel’s invitation to deliver the annual Neville Alexander Lecture raises a question that goes beyond the propriety of the choice. Can a lecture honouring a radical critic of South Africa’s post-apartheid settlement be delivered by one of the principal architects of that settlement? More importantly, should an intellectual’s legacy be honoured by policing who may speak in his name, or by contesting the ideas he spent a lifetime advancing?
Manuel and Alexander both emerged from Cape Town’s anti-apartheid politics, both called themselves non-racialists, and both shaped how South Africans think about life after 1994. Yet they drew profoundly different conclusions from the same transition. Manuel went into the state and argued that a liberation government had to win the confidence of markets before it could redistribute. Alexander remained outside it, arguing that this confidence was bought by surrendering much of the transformation the struggle had promised.
Manuel’s politics were formed in the United Democratic Front of the 1980s. He became minister of finance in 1996, holding the post until 2009. His approach was pragmatic rather than doctrinaire, favouring a small, open, indebted economy that had to win investor confidence, with redistribution following from growth and a healthy tax base.
The Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) plan, unveiled in June 1996, months after a rand crash, put that belief into practice. A small team drafted it without meaningful consultation with Cosatu or the SACP, and the ANC leadership declared it non-negotiable. It promised fiscal discipline, low inflation, looser exchange controls, lower tariffs and wage restraint, projecting 6% growth by 2000 and 400,000 new formal jobs annually. Manuel maintained that it was simply the macroeconomic means to achieve the RDP’s ends.
GEAR met its fiscal targets but missed its growth and employment ambitions. Critics blamed fiscal contraction and high interest rates, arguing that investment followed weak demand rather than creating it. Supporters point to the longer run: lower debt costs helped fund a substantial expansion of social grants, and by the mid-2000s growth exceeded 4%. Yet unemployment remained extraordinarily high, while wealth and opportunity remained deeply unequal. The distinction between managing poverty and transforming the economy was never adequately resolved.
Foundational differences
Alexander came from the Non-European Unity Movement and Trotskyism. Convicted of conspiracy to commit sabotage, he spent 1964 to 1974 on Robben Island. He later led the Workers’ Organisation for Socialist Action and directed the Project for the Study of Alternative Education in South Africa at the University of Cape Town, never joining the ANC alliance. For him, apartheid was a racial form of capitalism; ending legal racism without changing the underlying economic relationships would leave the majority largely where they were.
His 2002 book, An Ordinary Country, rejected the idea of a miracle transition. He saw 1994 as a historic compromise: political power changed hands, but economic ownership largely did not. South Africa, he argued, risked becoming a conventional bourgeois democracy, with the structures of inequality intact. In this reading, GEAR was the moment the compromise became economic policy. Manuel saw constraints to be managed; Alexander saw political choices presented as constraints.
Their different understandings of nonracialism were equally revealing. Manuel’s governments used apartheid’s racial categories to measure and redress historical disadvantage through employment equity and BEE. Alexander rejected the treatment of race as a permanent organising principle, regarding race-based redress as implemented as a mistake that perpetuated apartheid identities while enriching a small elite. He favoured redress directed at class and championed mother-tongue multilingual education as a means of empowerment from below. This was not merely a disagreement over instruments, but over the very foundations of social transformation.
Each position still has questions to answer. If fiscal discipline was the foundation for growth, why did growth fail to absorb labour? Why did redistribution arrive so substantially through grants rather than meaningful economic participation? Yet the years after Manuel’s departure brought neither socialism nor a more equitable settlement, but institutional decay, State Capture and soaring debt. Critiquing GEAR is not, in itself, an alternative economic programme; nor does it answer how a different path would have survived capital flight and the constraints of a small, open economy.
The fairest summary is that Manuel governed within the limits he believed were real; Alexander insisted those limits were themselves political, and spent his life challenging them. Manuel’s actions had practical mixed implications; Alexander’s were theoretical and untested.
Neither history nor the present has entirely vindicated either position, and requires robust debate.
If Alexander’s legacy is to mean anything, it must surely include the willingness to confront uncomfortable arguments, including those made by people with whom he profoundly disagreed. A lecture in his name should not be an exercise in hagiography. It should be an invitation to intellectual engagement. That, after all, is a more fitting tribute to a man who refused to accept that the boundaries of the possible were fixed. DM
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