In age of flux, India must not shy away from risks, bold reforms

At the recently concluded Kautilya Economic Conclave, external affairs minister S Jaishankar spoke about an “age of flux” but exuded confidence that the government managed to hold India in a sweet spot, which he conceded was not static but kept shifting. That said, India faces profound challenges, both internal and external, because of the geopolitical flux that is a harsh reality. Before we address India’s challenges, it would be useful to understand the main features and implications of the geopolitical flux that the world is currently witnessing.

The most important actor driving this, without a shadow of doubt, is the US, which under President Donald Trump, has embarked on a reordering of the international relations system as we know it after World War II. Three things about this are noteworthy. One, the US has concluded that the existing order strategically disadvantages it, carries an unacceptable price, and allows other major countries a free ride. Two, the changes underway in America’s foreign and security policy will likely outlast President Trump. Three, no major power can claim that it has been left untouched by US policy changes. The main strategic implication of this is that US foreign policy retrenchment has become both transactional and unpredictable.

The second feature of the geopolitical flux, unsurprisingly, is China. China presents a conundrum. On the one hand, China is unquestionably America’s peer and while it is running behind on some metrics, it is catching up fast. On the other hand, China really runs the risk of getting old before it becomes rich. In addition, President Xi Jinping confronts political headwinds at home although given the level of opacity in China, the extent of discontent is in doubt. Xi Jinping has continued for way too long as President and can justify his long reign only with something dramatic like the reunification of Taiwan or demonstrable subordination of America by China in some way. The main strategic implication of this is that Beijing may become more assertive and conflictual.

The third feature is the demise of multilateralism and other countries being left to their own devices. The dysfunctional UN Security Council, the irrelevance of the World Trade Organization and the near-total collapse of the alliance system (with NATO leading the way) has left countries, both big and small, scrambling for a response. Canada’s Mark Carney has spoken of a coalition of the “Middle Powers”, but it is becoming obvious that this is easier said than done. The main strategic implication of this is that while the old order has clearly perished, a new one is yet to take its place. This interregnum may neither be transient nor necessarily peaceful.

The fourth feature of the geopolitical flux is that conflicts and crises are rapidly becoming irresolvable, and the cascading effect of this turbulence is to impose great hardships on ordinary people everywhere. The conflict in Ukraine is more than four years old. The war in Iran is already eight months old. Neither shows any sign of abating. The main strategic implication of this is to cause enormous strain on the global order which is already straining at the leash.

The last feature of the geopolitical flux is that it is hard to think of any rules being followed by anyone, when talking of the global order at present. It has become a cliché to say that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. It is easy to say the weak states must hang together, or else they will hang separately.

Nevertheless, we should not discount the ability of the small and weak States to hedge their bets and negotiate their way out of trouble. The main strategic implication of this is that in the absence of clear rules, countries will all practice their own version of ad hoc multi-alignment with a view to advancing their national interests.

So, against the above backdrop, what can India do to navigate this geopolitical flux and safeguard its interests? One obvious answer is to double down on our foreign and security policy of multi-alignment designed to preserve India’s strategic autonomy. But it is worth bearing in mind that multi-alignment is not a static concept but a dynamic one. The scope and depth of engagement that India chooses to have with another, changes over time. These changes can be wrought either by the country practising multi-alignment, namely India or by the country which is the object of it. Similarly, the amount of policy space that India seeks through strategic autonomy is not static and can change over time. On both these things, it can be argued that India has more policy flexibility than is commonly believed. On multi-alignment, it is clear that the US is recalibrating its ties with India (as it is doing with every other country in the world), so India is probably doing the same vis-à-vis the US. This is no bad thing since this can simultaneously give India more strategic space to deal with the EU or even Russia. It has also resulted in careful reassessment of our ties with China. With strategic autonomy meant to preserve policy space, perhaps India can afford to use the policy space acquired in the past for carrying out key domestic economic reforms and for making adjustments to its foreign security and trade policy, both of which are vital to increase its comprehensive national power.

The geopolitical flux is undoubtedly challenging, but countries with an ability to take risks and carry out bold reforms can find crucial opportunities even in this scenario. India must not fight shy of doing it.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and is currently dean/professor at OP Jindal Global University. The views expressed are personal.