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Monday, November 16, 2026

'A futuristic debate now very real': Why the world is struggling to regulate killer robots

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“A computer can never be held accountable,” IBM wrote in a 1979 internal training manual. “Therefore, a computer must never make a management decision.” The world has come an awful long way since.

Government envoys from 128 nations met in Geneva Monday to decide whether to start talks around setting down legally binding rules for autonomous weapon systems that can kill without human input.

The question is not an academic one. In the skies over Ukraine, Moscow and Kyiv have both unleashed lethal unmanned drones equipped with AI-powered guidance systems that allow them to identify and strike pre-programmed targets even if they lose contact with their human operator.

These advances – if the word applies – have been born of the relentless logic of escalation that drives all wars: if one side builds signal jammers to drive attack drones off course before they hit their target, the other will build drones that have no further use of a signal.  

Both Russia and Ukraine are believed to be testing out attack drones that go a step further – not just independently locking onto the targets chosen for them by human operators, but choosing the targets themselves.

New York Times reporting suggests that the first fully autonomous drone to take human life has already been launched. Ukrainian forensic investigators believe half a dozen Russian drones that killed three people when they hit a petrol station in Ukraine’s city of Zaporizhzhia in September were entirely guided by AI systems.

This week’s talks, which are taking place under the unlikely name of the Review Conference for the UN’s Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), are likely to be tense. While a majority of member states support binding regulation around autonomous weapon systems in principle, major arms-producing countries including the US and Russia have consistently opposed such a pact. Under the convention, all decisions must be reached by consensus.

FRANCE 24 spoke with Vincent Boulanin, a senior researcher and director of the Governance and Artificial Intelligence Programme at the Swedish International Peace Research Institute, to find out just what is at stake at this week’s conference.

FRANCE 24: What is it about autonomous weapon systems that you believe justifies or necessitates further regulation – or even prohibition – beyond what is already covered under international humanitarian law?

Autonomous weapons have been discussed in the context of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons for more than 10 years, and it's a topic that the states concerned have considered important for a few reasons.

The main reason relates to whether it can be used in compliance with existing international humanitarian law. The core concern is that it forces us to kind of reflect on who is making decisions around the use of force.

In the context of autonomous weapons, the key feature is that the decisions, the way targets are being identified, selected, prioritised, and engaged is basically done through the weapon itself – through an algorithmic process where the systems automatically detect the target and use an algorithm to prioritise and then attack the target.

Read more‘Not an isolated incident’: Russian drones stalk Ukraine’s civilians in ‘human safaris’

And that’s basically a core debate. States eventually agree on the fact that, ultimately, humans, or the commanders, are the ones responsible for making decisions under international law, but the question is, how do the autonomous features affect their ability to see that their usage will be lawful.

So that's why states have been discussing for 10 years now the legalistic technicalities of this in terms of to what extent they can rely on autonomous weapons, and to what extent do they need to constrain how these systems may or may not be used.

FRANCE 24: Those discussions seem to have taken on a fresh urgency following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the proliferation of partially and potentially even fully autonomous unmanned drones that are being tested and possibly even deployed in Ukraine. How have these debates been affected by what we’ve seen in Ukraine since 2022?

Depending on how you define autonomous weapons, these systems have been around for quite a long time where states have been developing autonomous weapon systems for defensive purposes for decades.

And the idea was that in some contexts where time is critical, and you don't really have enough time to react to, for instance, an incoming missile, then you rely on automated processes to identify and engage targets. And it was broadly recognised that these types of use cases were generally fine because they were constrained to very specific use cases and defensive purposes where you could know how the systems would operate and what type of target you will engage – and in most cases, that would be incoming projectiles or large military objects.

And what is unsettling in the context of the war in Ukraine is that we can see now more offensive use cases, combinations of drones and missiles where autonomy is enabling these systems to automatically identify or engage targets in areas where remote control is not technically feasible because communication is denied – “last-mile” targeting.

Firefighters work at the site of an apartment building, which was damaged following a Russian drone strike in Kyiv, Ukraine
Firefighters work at the site of an apartment building, which was damaged following a Russian drone strike in Kyiv, Ukraine, November 12, 2026. © Gleb Garanich, Reuters

Surprisingly, drones in Ukraine from both the Ukrainian side or Russian side are still to a large extent remotely piloted and controlled. But due to this communication denial, they're increasingly relying on automated targeting capabilities to finish the mission. And there have been reports that they have been used against human targets.

So that’s the novel element – where suddenly something that for a long time would be seen as futuristic is increasingly taking place today, where we see increasing use cases where the weapon is being used in autonomous mode to finish an attack.

What has changed is that what used to be considered a futuristic debate is now something that is very tangible and real.

FRANCE 24: What precedents do you see for ways in which states have submitted themselves to binding regulations that have pulled them back from this logic of mutual escalation that we’re seeing in Ukraine?

There's been a few cases where states eventually agreed that the weapon that they had deployed was considered problematic from a legal or ethical standpoint.

One famous case that was meant to be the blueprint when the conversation on autonomous weapon systems started was the protocol on blinding lasers [Editor's note: The 1995 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons prohibits the use in war of laser-based weapons that could permanently damage people's vision – a kind of weapon that had not, and still hasn't, been used on the battlefield]. That was one of the first times that states agreed to ban a technology that had not yet been properly deployed, and they could eventually agree on the fact that it would be problematic to use blinding lasers that have a permanent effect.

That was considered to be a success, and the NGOs that were at the origin of the debate on autonomous weapons and were pushing for a ban from the beginning were hoping to replicate the model.

Unfortunately that did not happen, in large part because the case of autonomous weapons and AI is much less specific in terms of use case, and that makes the debate look more complicated.

We're not just talking about a very specific use case with a very specific set of effects, like you might have in the case of anti-personnel landmines.

Servicemen of the National Police Special Purpose Battalion Zaporizhzhia region prepare a Gara reconnaissance and strike drone for a flight while they work at a position near a front line
Servicemen of the National Police Special Purpose Battalion Zaporizhzhia region prepare a Gara reconnaissance and strike drone for a flight while they work at a position near a front line in Donetsk region, Ukraine, October 16, 2026 © Reuters

Autonomous weapons can take so many shapes and forms and be used in so many different types of conflict scenarios – asymmetric warfare, where you’re chasing terrorist groups in tunnels versus high-intensity conflicts involving the US and China fighting at sea, and so on.

But to go back to your question, I think the case of landmines is a useful example, because we all know they have been used, and eventually states agreed that these were weapons that were leading to unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury and at least some of them agreed that it would make sense to ban those.

So it's possible, but at the end of the day I think it depends on a number of factors. Historically, major progress was linked to actual evidence of humanitarian harm, where there are actually documented cases that technology is leading to unnecessary harm to civilians.

But more importantly, I think it's also the equation of the political context and the appetite of states to work towards a consensus. And the challenge that I see today is that the political conditions are very difficult for states to agree on a new regulation. At least a legally binding regulation.

FRANCE 24: Going into this week’s discussions in Geneva, it does seem like there is resistance from major weapons-manufacturing states such as the US, Russia and Israel. How do you account for this resistance?

First of all, I think it's important to underline that Russia, the US and to some extent Israel have been opposed to the idea of a legally binding treaty or a legally binding prohibition of autonomous weapons since the very beginning, since the convention started.

What was different is that at the time when the convention started, the US at least was still willing and proactive in having discussions on the substance and was open to possibly agreeing on an outcome document that could provide new guidance as to, for instance, how the use of autonomous weapons can be used in compliance with international law, and could add further details as to what would be responsible behaviour when it comes to the development and use of such capabilities.

But that shifted with the Trump administration. Now, the US has a much harder line and is now in a way opposing any substantial progress that would go beyond existing international law.

And part of that opposition is also linked to the prominence of the idea that the US is engaged in a high-stakes competition with China, and they need to plan for the possibility that there could be a major conflict between the US and China in the future, and therefore, they should not be limiting their ability to fight.

That's the strategic rationale for opposing the regulations. That’s not something that they articulate in a very open and explicit way, but I think that's often the bottom line of why they are resistant to the idea of any regulation – because they don't trust their potential adversaries to abide by this new regulation, and they want to keep as much room to manoeuvre as possible as to how they may be leveraging new technologies in warfighting.

And I think that's the same rationale for Israel – they want to keep the ability to leverage that technology in their war against Hamas, and they are not willing to see restrictions on their offensive capabilities.

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