Tokyo braces for fallout from the U.S. midterms

Donald Trump suffered a major political setback in the U.S. midterm elections, with the Republican party losing control of both chambers of Congress. But with two years remaining in Trump’s term, the administration appears determined to avoid becoming a lame duck, likely focusing instead on expanding its use of executive authorities and “flooding the zone” on outstanding issues.

Although the Japan-U.S. alliance remains relatively well-insulated from executive actions based on longstanding bipartisan congressional support, Tokyo will nevertheless be bracing for changes in the post-election White House decision-making. Trump might have been weakened domestically, but he maintains the ability to significantly sway global events.

Five areas of U.S. policy warrant particular attention in Tokyo.

The U.S.-Iran War

The first and most immediate concern is the U.S.-Iran War.

Trump repeatedly suggested that Tehran was factoring the outcome of the midterm elections. The question now is how the White House will adjust, particularly in its efforts for bringing the conflict to a close.

U.S. and Iranian officials have communicated through intermediaries in recent weeks about potential terms for ending the war. Tehran has maintained seven conditions for ending hostilities and fully reopening the Strait of Hormuz. These include lifting sanctions, unfreezing Iranian assets and removing the U.S. naval blockade against Iran.

Until now, the White House has maintained a hard line, but the political cost of the war could prompt Trump to reconsider.

Vice President J.D. Vance was particularly blunt in assessing the political consequences, saying: “The reason we lost is the war.” He also identified ending the conflict as a central demand among voters who had previously supported Trump in 2024.

Nevertheless, the White House has been considering the possibility of resuming major military operations to compel concessions from Tehran. A temporary escalation could therefore remain an option.

Japan has already had to contend with the stop-start nature of U.S. decision-making over the Iran war, particularly its effects on global energy markets and the flow of Japan-bound goods through Middle Eastern waters.

Attendees cheer during an election night event with Troy Jackson, Democratic U.S. Senate candidate for Maine, not pictured, in Portland, Maine, early on Wednesday. | BLOOMBERG

Tokyo will once again need to assess how Washington’s next moves could affect both the Japanese economy and its broader security planning, including relief measures if there is a reescalation of the conflict and potential deployment of Self Defense Force units to support the post-conflict stabilization operations that Trump has previously requested of allies and partners.

U.S. engagement with China

The APEC summit scheduled for Nov. 18-19 in Shenzhen, will deliver another opportunity for Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping to talk. The two leaders have already met in Washington in September, but their relationship remains an uneasy balance between efforts to stabilize economic ties and unresolved strategic differences.

It is unlikely that Trump will make a major policy move on Taiwan during that engagement, but potential deliverables on trade and other economic matters could have indirect effects for Japan.

For Tokyo, the central question is whether Trump will prioritize near-term economic agreements with Beijing at the expense of broader U.S. strategic objectives in the region. Washington and Beijing have been seeking new arrangements on market access, while disagreements over advanced technology including semiconductors and artificial intelligence, as well as critical minerals remain sources of friction.

The White House may seek to sidestep those issues that can produce near-term economic relief for the United States. This could also benefit Japanese companies operating in both markets, but that will depend on the scope of any agreements and how they relate to broader trade relationships.

The Russia-Ukraine War

U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff announced earlier this week that Washington will soon engage in working-level trilateral discussions with Russian and Ukrainian counterparts in Abu Dhabi. Trump has repeatedly pledged to end the war quickly.

With the midterms out of the way, the question is how the Trump administration will adjust its mediation efforts. Will Washington pursue a more cooperative approach toward Ukraine – which has been Tokyo’s preference – or will it continue its current trajectory of applying greater pressure on Kyiv while offering incentives to Moscow?

The answer will matter to Japan, which has invested considerably in supporting Ukraine and maintaining alignment with its G7 partners on the conflict.

White House decisions on sanctions towards Russia influences Japan’s own relations with Russia. It has been Tokyo’s policy since the outset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to maintain diplomatic and economic pressure on Moscow. There are some politicians and businesses, however, who see opportunities to revitalize shelved energy projects and trade amid ongoing turmoil in the Middle East.

There is also the issue of Japan’s prospective role within the “Coalition of the Willing” — the multinational group that has pledged commitment to support Ukraine’s postwar security. How Trump handles Russia-Ukraine ceasefire negotiations will not only influence the policies related to ceasefire monitoring and security guarantees, but their potential timetables for implementation.

Pursuit of engagement with North Korea

Ahead of the APEC summit, the White House is reportedly seeking another summit between Kim Jong Un and Trump. Washington has extended various signals and overtures towards Pyongyang, although North Korea has rebuffed these efforts, most notably through two statements this week attributed to Kim Jong Un’s high-ranking sister, Kim Yo Jong.

In both statements, Pyongyang denounced U.S. policy toward North Korea. The second statement went further, arguing that dialogue with Washington was not currently considered to be in North Korea’s national interests, particularly as the United States fails to meet the Kim regime’s conditions for talks. Chief among those conditions is for Washington to drop denuclearization as a policy objective.

Nevertheless, a Trump administration seeking diplomatic victories may be tempted to make a dramatic shift in its approach to North Korea. One possibility would be an acknowledgment of North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state, potentially signaling a retreat from the longstanding U.S. objective of denuclearization and a further hollowing-out of the global Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Such a move would weaken the diplomatic framework underpinning Tokyo’s longstanding North Korea policies. It may also undermine trilateral cooperation with South Korea, as the regional partners adjust to U.S. policy changes in Northeast Asia.

Realignment of U.S. forces in Europe

Finally, there is the question of U.S. military presence in Europe as part of the administration’s proposed vision of a “NATO 3.0.”

Although Congress retains considerable influence through its control of defense appropriations, the White House may seek to restructure the U.S. military presence in Europe by relocating units and capabilities to other theaters.

This matters to Japan for two reasons.

First, some U.S. units currently stationed in Europe could potentially be reassigned to the Indo-Pacific. U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson advocated last month for the relocation of a multi-domain task force from Germany to the Korean Peninsula, and other regional commanders may be making similar proposals. This could involve potential basing arrangements in Japan that Washington has not yet publicly advertised.

Second, a retrenchment from Europe could affect the longer-term prospects for practical security cooperation between Japan and its European partners. Japan has sought deeper defense ties with NATO members, including its unsuccessful bid to establish a NATO liaison office in Tokyo.

If Washington continues pressing European allies to assume greater responsibility for their own security, those countries may devote more of their resources to their immediate neighborhood. This could reduce opportunities for cooperation with Japan in the Indo-Pacific, forcing Tokyo to reconsider whether to deepen its own security engagement in Europe.

The precise direction of White House policy remains unclear. Although a Democratic-controlled Congress will have greater oversight and could constrain parts of Trump’s domestic agenda, the president will retain considerable latitude in foreign policy, particularly in his role as commander-in-chief.

The transition period before the new Congress takes office could prove consequential. Rather than entering a period of political paralysis, Trump may seek to accelerate his agenda, pursuing diplomatic and military initiatives while it still enjoys greater freedom of action.

For Tokyo, the challenge will be anticipating the potential policy shifts and preparing Japan’s responses. The midterms might have weakened Trump domestically, but they have not diminished his capacity to reshape the international environment in which Japan must operate.