Netanyahu’s surprise visit and a Gulf too wide

Taken together, these developments point to countries in the region increasingly carving out their own paths as the US and Iran negotiate or escalate.

3 min readOct 1, 2026 06:40 AM IST First published on: Oct 1, 2026 at 06:40 AM IST

The perceived threat from Iran and a desire for economic cooperation pushed Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to sign the Abraham Accords in September 2020, after which their relationship has been characterised by limited public engagement and discreet diplomacy. That is why Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent trip to Abu Dhabi, his second since the start of the West Asia war in late February, is significant. It comes against a backdrop of a changing regional dynamic: Iran’s weakening grip on the Strait of Hormuz and signs of a thaw between the UAE and Saudi Arabia — a relationship that had deteriorated in recent months over their economic competition and involvement in civil wars in Yemen and Sudan. The visit also comes amid a major political row in Israel ahead of the October election over reports that UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan had warned Netanyahu of an impending Hamas attack just days before October 7, 2023 — a claim the Israeli PM has denied.

Taken together, these developments point to countries in the region increasingly carving out their own paths as the US and Iran negotiate or escalate. Iran’s retaliation — pummelling Gulf countries with drones and missiles, with the UAE hit the hardest — has underscored the limits of relying solely on the American security umbrella. But the story is far from over. A sustained rise in crude exports from West Asia in September also means that Tehran could look for other ways to maintain its leverage over Washington. Indeed, Speaker of Iran’s Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said this week: “Where we do not sell oil, no one will sell oil.” For the UAE, which has acquired air-defence systems and counter-drone capabilities from Israel that its Arab allies did not provide, the lesson is that it needs partners capable of providing hard security. For Israel, a cooperative Arab partner across the Persian Gulf offers both strategic depth and diplomatic value, strengthening the broader architecture of the Abraham Accords at a time when its war on Gaza has been globally condemned.

The emerging alignment, however, carries a contradiction of its own. Israel may offer the UAE weapons, but that does not resolve the conflicts that continue to destabilise the region, many a result of Israel’s own military adventurism, as in Lebanon and Syria. Nor can the Abraham Accords indefinitely remain insulated from the Palestinian question; Israel’s war in Gaza and settlement expansionism in the West Bank continue to shape Arab public opinion. The UAE and Israel may, therefore, have strong reasons to deepen their relationship. But without a political framework that addresses regional tensions in the long run, the stability and security they seek will remain elusive.